Information Technologies
and the
Information Professions
and the
Information Professions
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Information Technologies
and the Information Professions |
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STUDY GUIDE, HOBART & SCHIFFMAN,
Part 3
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| • | Chapter 7: “Analysis Uprooted” |
| pp. 175f | Note the connection made between Charles Babbage’s analytical
engines and Jacquard’s looms for operating the engine |
| 176 | Hobart & Schiffman (H & S) explicitly emphasize
the two functions of analysis that arose with modern symbolic mathematics:
(1) the “storage” [recall the reified metaphor here] of information
in abstracted symbols and (2) the algorithmic operations for manipulating
those symbols |
| 177 | they use the term “haptic” (related to or relying on
touch) to describe the connection that physics kept with our “phenomenal”
world in contrast with the increasingly abstract nature of mathematics
exemplified by the development of non-Euclidean geometries – think
a bit about what the term “phenomenal” means here and whether or not
you agree with their implication |
| 178ff | in the context of information retrieval (IR), our field
uses some of the work of logician George Boole – H & S also rely
on the work of another, Augustus De Morgan; the work of both is explored
in a bit of depth on pp. 187ff |
| here lies the heart of their discussion of how analysis
became “pure technique,” as the foundations of grounded knowledge
in the Enlightenment/modernist tradition were undermined by mathematical,
logical, and linguistic/philosophical analysis |
|
| but please note that the concept of “analysis” itself
was not overthrown |
|
| 184 | the ability of symbols to indicate procedures or processes
not just things, as noted in Part II of the book, was the key to many
of the intellectual changes wrought in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries |
| 186 | their use of the phrase “vast galaxies of information”
is more than a bit much, in my estimation, for a number of reasons
– what is your reaction? |
| 187f | the 19th century saw two ways in which mathematics
and logic were intertwined: (1) the formalization of mathematics,
using a “more rigorously defined, logical and symbolic form” as mathematics
became more of a “postulational-deductive science” and (2) greater
flexibility in the use of abstract symbols |
| 189 | note De Morgan and “arbitrary” assignment of symbols
and their meaning to relations |
| 190 | here, as with their denigration of the Romans as supposedly
“simple peasant” people, they patronize Boole by referring to his
upbringing and their surprise at his accomplishment |
| H & S return to a theme they emphasized in Part
II, Boole’s conviction that he was discovering and outlining “’certain
general principles founded in the very nature of language, by which
the use of symbols, which are but the elements of scientific language,
is determined.’” What do you think of this grand, ground-all-knowledge
claim? What are its strengths and weaknesses? |
|
| 191 | the key to the power of Boole’s technique is two-fold:
(1) the use of “single, arbitrary” letters to represent (2) the abstract
classes with which nouns and adjectives are identified |
| 192 | here H & S discuss Boole’s rules for aggregating
the classes in three ways: union (logical addition), intersection
(logical multiplication), and negation (logical complementation);
review the material about Boolean algebra in the class notes about
information retrieval |
| their use of the locution “manipulating abstract classes
and the information they contained” is problematic for a number of
reasons – what do you think? |
|
| 193 | Boole’s logical operations and their expansion into
Boolean algebra led to what they call “the propositional or sentential
calculus of logic”; this logic is an essential component of computing
as developed by von Neumann |
| 194ff | they describe how Boole’s logical algebra, already seen
as the means for transforming the syntax of natural language into
a “flexible, rule-governed instrument for describing the world with
precision,” was further expanded into the understanding that logical
algebra can be used for 1 and 0, “which correspond respectively to
the universal and null sets” |
| thus, 0 and 1 became logical operators |
|
| this section is essential to understanding the remarkable
depth and breadth of Boole’s work and the far-reaching and fundamental
effects it has had on computation and other disciplines |
|
| 195 | Gottlob Frege’s term “truth-value” |
| unfortunately, here and elsewhere (p. 199 “flakey”)
they fall into the trap of failed diction using such colloquial and
distracting terms as “mellow dog” – GAK! |
|
| 197 | H & S explore the meaning of the ability to classify
using “arbitrarily” agreed upon conventions – the reasons I put quotation
marks around “arbitrarily” is that more critical and constructivist
approaches to culture and communication maintain that the apparently
arbitrary use of symbols is, in fact, much more predictable, situated,
and consistent than might appear at first glance. H & S make
this point clear on p. 201. |
| 198 | their discussion of the computer as the means for knowledge
discovery as well as organization is more than a bit mushy and ill-conceived
(see the remarks on the successive chapters below). What is most
bothersome is that the status of computing as a knowledge “tool” is
worth much more serious exploration and explanation, and many researchers
and practitioners in our field have done such work |
| the deterministic scientific abstractions that characterized
modernist, Enlightenment-based thinking were further eroded by the
“discovery” [recall the controversy about whether we “discover” or
“develop/invent” such things] of quantum physics and its determination
of “empirical limits” of such deterministic abstractions |
|
| 199 | Kurt Gödel is important in this regard, especially his
Incompleteness Theorem, a concept essential to research of all kinds |
| H & S link this concept with Bertrand Russell’s
class paradox (see p. 179) |
|
| After having described “the erosion of global, foundational
claims” in some detail, H & S are certain to distance themselves
from what they see as the excesses of postmodernist and similar modes
of thought – I find their use of terms such as “a cauldron of postmodernist
perspectives and enthusiasms” a bit too dismissive, but, obviously,
they don’t. |
|
| 200 | their final thought at the end of this chapter is that
we have lost any pretense of global certainty, but we do not despair
[let them speak for themselves <grin>] because of the ability
of computing to keep the flood of information at bay – this concept
is key to this part of their argument. What do you think of its grand
claims? I am, if you haven’t already guessed, more than a bit skeptical. |
| BE (pp. 288-290) | |
| 288-289 | it is worth your time, when you have some, to follow the development of Babbage’s work |
| 289 | as H & S note, Henri Poincaré’s work is paradigmatic
for 19th century determinism |
| as is statistics, especially the development of what
we now know as inferential techniques |
|
| 290 | of course, Hofstader’s Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal
Golden Braid (1980) is still considered a defining work of the
late 20th century – it may be of special interest to those
of you with any training in music and the mathematics of shape, including
topology |
| • | Chapter 8: “The Realm of Pure Technique” |
| 201 | “Symbols stand in bizarre conjunction – at once determinate
and utterly capricious.” – this statement is among the most thought-provoking
of the book |
| here and elsewhere, but especially in this chapter,
H & S beat the drum that information is just symbols, while knowledge
“means something” – as noted in many other places, I find that distinction
defensible but unconvincing |
|
| 202 | this theme sets up their conclusion that “the computer
has elicited the information potential of purely abstract symbol,
fabricating a pure technique apart from any foundation in knowledge”
– again, this statement would elicit wide-spread disagreement as well
as support in LIS and other fields |
| this chapter is full of the “content/container” metaphor |
|
| 203 | recall their somewhat idiosyncratic definition of information:
the encoded “content or ‘stuff’ of our exchanges with the world” –
again, a defensible but hardly compelling or adequate definition in
my estimation |
| 207 | a useful reminder that most analogue computing machines
remain only calculators |
| 208 | among the reasons that digital machines overcome being
simple calculators is their ability of keeping “information in available
memory” |
| other advantages of digital computers over their analogue
counterparts are an ability to adapt to different tasks (what H &
S call generality) and accuracy |
|
| 209 | the development of electronic components allowed digital
machines to compute quickly enough to make the benefits of their advantages
sufficient to supplant analogue machines |
| note ENIAC – Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer
– the first electronic computer. It was developed at the University
of Pennsylvania in the first half of the 1940’s by J. Presper Eckert
and John Mauchly and used vacuum tubes which moved only electrons
not physical components of the machine |
|
| 210ff | the vital link between Boole and electronic circuits
deserves close reading and re-reading, as well as referral back to
the material about Claude Shannon and information theory |
| 212 | the isomorphism between the propositional calculus
of Boole and the logical gates informed by Shannon’s work, combined
with the speed of electronic calculation, makes digital computers
able to become “all-purpose” machines |
| 212ff | closely read the material on Alan Türing, especially
about the conjunction of numbers and operations upon them |
| 215 | here 0 and 1 serve three purposes: to indicate the
values of numbers in the binary system, to symbolize truth values,
and to indicate sequences of instructions for electronic computers |
| 218 | be sure to review the explanation of the ways that
encoding binary numbers and instructions for manipulating them lead
to the means for encoding letters, words, and sentences |
| beware the cognitivist bias of the book as a whole –
it is a bias that our culture and our field avidly display and one
that the information professions need to be especially aware of |
|
| 219 | the hagiographic approach to John von Neumann is even
more unsettling than the rest of the hero worship/”great man”/Whiggish
history that sometimes plagues the book |
| it is absolutely essential to recall and understand
the origins of the computer in war, in defense, and in ballistics
and cryptography [and the Internet is not that much different] |
|
| von Neumann is often given credit for identifying (analytically
and nominatively) the component parts of the computer and for the
development of stored instructions, i.e., software, that did not require
the physical manipulation of the components |
|
| 220 | the effects of the flow diagram, adapted from General
Systems Theory, cannot be overestimated, not only in the science of
computing but in modern organizations and the technocratic mindset
generally |
| 221 | “if-then” statements are at the heart of von Neumann’s
computer design |
| 223 | especially as components of sequential design and execution |
| 224 | H & S refer their reader to Plate 22, showing RAM
– they ask there (p. 233) “[w]here is the information?” How would
you reply? |
| again they call data “empty containers” if they do not
have information “in” them. Does this statement make sense to you?
Why or why not? |
|
| BE (pp. 290-292) |
|
| 290 | their reference to Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens
is important – if you have the interest, look at the book |
| over the course of this part of the Bibliographic Essay,
they refer to many histories of computing; whether now or sometime
during your program here at GSLIS, look at at least two or three such
histories |
|
| • | Chapter 9: “Information Play” |
| 236ff | while I am a strong proponent of the (serious) play
element in culture, I find Hobart & Schiffman’s use of the concept
in this chapter quite unsatisfying and more than a little forced,
even anti-climactic |
| 236f | they cite three characteristics of information today
– “unprecedented profusion,” complexity, and emergence – the point
about profusion is, in fact, quite contestable, although their general
argument here is worth close attention |
| 238 | the property of emergence is important to understanding
social phenomena of all kinds |
| their mention of the “arrow of time” and, later, what
we usually term the Second Law of Thermodynamics is also quite contentious
partially because of autopoetic systems, despite their interpretation
implied on pp. 250ff, |
|
| 239 | note their brief discussion of assembly, machine, and
compiler computer languages, as well as of FORTRAN and COBOL; if these
terms are unfamiliar to you, doing some research about them would
be time well-spent |
| 240 | their point about the “liberation of programming languages
from their early machine dependence” is quite important and is a major
theme of the development of contemporary computing |
| the phrase “our experience becomes digitally encoded”
bears very close scrutiny |
|
| 241 | their technophoria is especially rampant here |
| the idea of information is a very important concept
– if you are interested, as noted in the Study Guide to the first
part of the book, you might enjoy Mark Posters’ Mode of Information
(1990), Rob Kling et al.’s “Information Entrepreneurialism” (1994)
in his Computerization and Controversy, and the early chapters
in Jorge Schement and Terry Curtis’ Tendencies
and Tensions of the Information Age: The Production And Distribution
of Information in the United States (1997) |
|
| 242 | in a similar vein, H & S are absolutely right about
“the elevation of ‘information’ from a descriptive term into a dominant,
explanatory metaphor” |
| if you know little about the sciences of complexity,
their discussion in this chapter is as good an introduction as any |
|
| 247 | throughout the chapter, I am reminded of the foundational
work done in the last few decades by IBM’s Benoit Mandlebrot on fractals |
| 248 | be very careful about the anthropomorphizing, teleological,
and agency-assigning nature of their description here of natural phenomena |
| also be wary with their tendency to reify metaphors
a bit too quickly and easily in their breathless descriptions |
|
| and keep your antennae up for a quick curve or two about
AI (artificial intelligence, especially of the strong kind) |
|
| 249 | one of their best uses of complexity concepts is their
reminder of dynamic systems’ “extreme sensitivity to initial conditions”
– this idea is powerful, and one that animates much of social and
anthropological research into communities of practice and information
technologies; one need not accept its connection to the analysis of
dynamic systems to use the concept fruitfully, as Nardi & O’Day
demonstrate |
| 255 | a useful reminder about their “plausible scientific
speculation” |
| 257 | their warning about linguistic looseness and their stretching
of metaphors such as complexity, information, and learning is well-founded
and to their credit |
| 258 | they make an evocative point that “In the strictest
and most rigorous sense . . ., with complexity not only is information
undefined, it is undefinable, indeterminate.” What do you think? |
| BE (pp. 292-293) |
|
| 292 | Negroponte’s being digital, despite its glaring
weaknesses, is well worth a read, if for nothing else than its status
as a type |
| Tom Forester’s The Information Technology Revolution
is also a valuable source |
|
| 293 | their mention of Ilya Prigogine & Isabelle Stengers’
Order Out of Chaos is a very interesting book and serves as
a reminder that Nobelist Prigogine is here at UT-Austin |
| • | Conclusion: “The Two Cultures and the Arrow of Time”
|
| 261 | their attack on persons they refer to distastefully
as “’critical theorists’” (along with the dismissive quotation marks)
leaves me shaking my head ;~), as does their scolding tone, evocation
of common sense, and knee-jerk use of the term “relativizing science.”
Those of you with an interest in the Science Wars (perhaps alluded
to in some of the Science and Technology material you have read or
consulted) should let me know – there are lots of sources to share
and viewpoints to explore |
| 263 | they give us a useful warning about the dangers of
historicism – and this warning reminds me of how useful as well as
frustrating it is to have two historians write this kind of intellectual
history |
| 264 | a good go at summing up their book in the phrase “the
historicity of information” – beside the informative discussions of
historical trends, events, and persons of import, it is the historicity
of information that makes this book of value and why we have it serve
as a text for the course |
| be a bit wary, however, of their implicit belief in
the Archimedean Point of historiography and recall the same term from
the Study Guide to Part II of their book (p. 107 of the text) |
|
| a strong reminder of the continuing coexistence in current
times of their three historical “ages” of information – the classical
(literacy and classification), the modern (analysis and determination
of how things work), and the contemporary (computing and exploring
how things “come about” [p. 265]) |
|
| 267 | their use of the term “technique” throughout the book
brings to mind the French la technique which has a much broader
meaning; see the work of one of the great technology pessimists Jacques
Ellul, especially his La technique translated in 1964 as The
Technological Society. Nardi & O’Day, our other text, discuss
him and other grand utopian and dystopian theorists of technology. |
| their use of the phrase “life’s inevitable march forward”
is a bit much stylistically and, more importantly, betrays an unintended
sense of teleology |
|
| 268 | their final warning is a good one and recall’s Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorem – even if a final “theory of everything” à
la Steven Weinberg (see below) were possible, much would remain outside
it |
| BE (pp. 294) |
|
| 294 | they note Richard Kearney’s useful 1986 intro to critical
theory Modern Movements in European Philosophy |
| H & S refer to Steven Weinberg, a Nobel Prize-winning
physicist and UT-Austin faculty member, and his amusing piece on the
Science Wars. Weinberg is widely known, as you may already be aware,
as a popularizer of science and a firm proponent of what we might
call the “hard science” view of knowledge. His work is terrific,
even though I cannot agree with many of his epistemological assumptions. |
|
| a telling error in using lower case “i” in spelling
“Internet”; plainly they should have used the upper case “I” – more
on this point later in the semester |
Some final words
I wanted to conclude these three Study Guides with the reiteration of my admiration for the many fine parts of Hobart & Schiffman’s book. If I thought otherwise, Ron and I would not have it as one of the texts for the course. While it may appear that the many critiques offered in the guides betray a dismissal of H & S’s work, that impression would be misleading. As should be plain to any close reader of the book and of the Study Guides, Information Ages is a very good book, deserving active readership and worth returning to again and again. I hope you have read it in that spirit.
As you have noticed, I have deliberately kept the tone in the Study Guides conversational and informal. The goal of such usage is to help imitate the kinds of exchanges and remarks we would make in the traditional face-to-face setting of the classroom. Please feel free to react to these interpretations, interpolations, and assertions as you see fit. I’d be happy to talk to any of you about them all.
| Course emailbox: l38613dw@gslis.utexas.edu GSLIS Website: www.gslis.utexas.edu Last updated 2001 Aug 21 by R. E. Wyllys |