<chronology>

<when><text>1978</text><date>19780000 </date></when>
<text>

On January 27, Premier Price rejected a proposed compromise with Guatemala whereby Belize would cede 300 square miles of mainland and 600 square miles of seabed in the south of Belize in return for Guatemala's recognition of Belize's Independence. A similar proposal by Britain for Belize to cede between 1000 an 2000 square miles of land and adjacent seabed was earlier rejected.
 
 

Mr. Price announced on March 10 at a conference that Barbados, Guyana an Jamaica had agreed to take part in multilateral security arrangements that would defend the territorial integrity of an independent Belize. This agreement did not come into force since at the time Belize's Independence date could not be agreed upon.
 
 

On May 18, the Gutemalan foreign minister, Señor Adolfo Molina Orantes said in a press interview that his government maintained its demand for a cession of territory by Belize. He insisted that the two governments set up a join military staff, consultations on Belize's external relations and economic integration into the Central American system.
 
 

The British Permanent Representative at the U.N. announced on November 28 that a four-point proposal had been put to Guatemala to resolve the conflict with Belize. Development aid including help with construction of roads to facilitate Guatemala's access to the coast, free port in the Port of Belize and a revision of the seaward boundaries of the two countries to guarantee permanent access for Guatemala to the open sea.
 
 

On December 7 the Guatemalan foreign minister, Señor Castillo Valdez announced that the British plan for the settlement of the dispute with Belize was unacceptable and that he would now deal directly with Belize. Belize rejected any bilateral negotiations with Guatemala (1).

 </text>
<date>

19790000 </date>
<text>  In November the People's United Party was reelected to office winning thirteen of the eighteen in the House of Representatives. The opposition party--UDP--won the remaining five seats. This election victory was seen as a mandate for the government to proceed with the finalization of the independence status since the People's United Party ran on a platform of moving towards independence. The opposition party, UDP, ran on a platform against independence in the immediate future until the Guatemalan dispute was settled (2).

 </text>
<date>

19800000 </date>
<text>

By November, international support for Belize was virtually unanimous. A.U.N. resolution (A/35/596) called for independence for Belize without conditions, and security, by the end of 1981. This time the United States of America, which had previously abstained on all the Belize resolutions since 1975, voted in favour, and no country voted against.
 
 

The Organization of American States, which had traditionally taken Guatemala's side in the controversy, endorsed by an overwhelming majority the U.N. resolution calling for an independent Belize secure and without conditions before the end of 1981. (3)

 </text>
<date>

19810000 </date>
<text>

On January 31 the Belize government issued its White Paper on the Proposed Terms for the Independence Constitution of Belize. The National Assembly of Belize had earlier appointed a bi-partisan Joint Select Committee comprising of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate to consider the Proposals in the White Paper and to report thereon. The Committee was instructed to canvass the opinion of the country before making this report.
 
 

Special invitations were sent out to all organizations throughout the country inviting ideas both written and oral. The committee found a general and overriding acceptance of the monarchical form of government based on the westminister parliamentary pattern. Although the opposition party refused to serve on the Joint Select Committee, it took steps to appear before the Committee by a senior official of their political party in each district of the country and made a written presentation in Belize City. (4)
 
 

In March Britain and Guatemala signed the Heads of Agreements providing the basis for a fully negotiated settlement and a termination of Guatemala's claim to Belize. Basically, these agreements provided for Guatemala's recognition of Belize's Independence and territorial integrity, economic cooperation and Guatemala's access to the Caribbean Sea from the south of Belize. Subsequent negotiations ended without a formal treaty-both parties were unable to agree on the conditions of the use of two cayes and the sea corridor to south for Guatemala's access to the Caribbean. (5)
 
 

Between April 6-14, the Belize Constitutional Conference was held at Marlborough House, London. The basic conference document was the White Paper on Proposed Terms of the Independence Constitution prepared by the Belize government. Also considered was Belize's membership in international institutions an Belize's succession to obligations and responsibilities which the U.K. had hitherto exercised. (6)
 
 

On July 28 the Belize Independence Act received the Royal Assent. This Act provides for: the fully responsible status of Belize, the power to make a new constitution for Belize, the operation of existing laws, modification of the British Nationality Act and the retention of citizenship of the U.K. and colonies in certain cases.
 
 

The Belize Independence Order was made on July 31. this Independence Constitution Order includes, to a large extent, the institutions and procedures with which Belizeans have been familiar for the past eighteen years of self government under the constitution of 1963. The Belize Advisory Council was created under the Independence Constitution with the functions in relation to the security of tenure of individuals occupying judicial and public offices and provides for appeals against any act of the Public Services Commission. This Council will also advise the Governor General on the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. There is a section on human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which draws on the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and similar to the equivalent section of other Commonwealth constitution. (7)
 
 

The Belize Independence Order was laid before Parliament on August 10.
 
 

On September 21 Belize became independent as provided for in the Belize Independence Order. Britain, however, has agreed to provide for the defense and security of Belize for an "appropriate" period of time.
 
 

On September 25 Belize was admitted to the UN, becoming the 156th member, by a vote of one- hundred-and-forty-four with Guatemala voting against.

 </text>
<title>

2. The Road To Independence, September, 1981.
 
 

3. The Road To Independence, September, 1981.
 
 

4. Command Paper 8245, "Report of the Belize Constitutional Conference, "London, April, 1981, p.24.
 
 

5. Brukdown the Magazine of Belize , Special Souvenir Issue # 3 & 4, 1981, p. 16-18.
 
 

6. Report of the Belize Constitutional Conference, p. 22.
 
 

7. Statutory Instruments 1981 No. 1107, "The Belize Independence Order 1981.

 </text> </chronology>

<analysis>
<title>

The Constitution of the State of Belize is a well drafted document which follows the general pattern of other newly independent states od the West Indies. It appears that the drafters of the Constitution used the British Honduras Constitution Ordinance of 1963 as the basis for Chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX in the new Constitution. The new features of the 1981 Constitution can be found in Chapters I, II, III, IV and V.
 
 

Chapter I states that "Belize shall be a sovereign democratic State of Central America in the Caribbean region. "The frontiers of Belize shall be comprised of those land and sea areas which immediately previous to Belize's Independence constituted the colony of Belize.
 
 

Chapter I, Section 2 contains the supremacy clause of the new Constitution. "This Constitution is the supreme law of Belize and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void."
 
 

Chapter II deals with the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the peoples of Belize. As stated in Section 3 of Chapter II, every person in Belize is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms, regardless of "his race, place of origin, political opinions, color, creed, or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others for the public interest, to each and all of the following, namely - a) life, liberty, security of the person, and the protection of the law; b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association ; c) protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and recognition of his human dignity ; and d) protection from arbitrary deprivation of property. "These provisions are only limited if said rights prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.
 
 

Chapter III sets forth the citizenship requirements of Belize.
 
 

Chapter IV establishes the Governor-General's office, powers, and duties. In section 31 provision is made for Acting Governor-General; the power to appoint a Deputy to perform his or her functions during a period of absence of a short duration; is specified in Section 33.
 
 

As stated in Section 35, the Prime Minister shall keep the Governor General informed concerning the general conduct of the government of Belize.

 Chapter V of the Constitution defines organization and the powers of the executive branch of the government. As stated in Section 36, the executive authority may be exercised on her behalf by the Governor-General or the Governor-General's subordinate officers.
 
 

Section 37 provides that there shall be a Prime Minister of Belize who shall be appointed by the Governor-General. Provision is also made for the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister (Section 38). The following section concerns the performance of functions of the office of Prime Minister during his absence or illness. The appointment of Minister of Government by the Governor-General, with the advice of the Prime Minister, is regulated in Section 40. It is the function of the Governor-General to assign any Minister the responsibility for any business of the Government, including the administration of any department of government (Section 41).
 
 

The principal legal officer is to be the Attorney-General (Section 42). Provisions for the performance of functions of Ministers during absence or illness are made in Section 43.
 
 

The Governor-General may, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, "constitute offices for Belize, make and terminate appointments to any such office." (Sec. 51).
 
 

The Governor-General may pardon, grant a respite, or lessen punishment to any person convicted of any offence, with the advice of the Belize Advisory Council (Sec. 52).
 
 

Provision is made for the establishment of the Belize Advisory Council "which shall consist of not less than six members of which two shall be appointed by the Governor-General, on the advice of the Prime Minister. The others are to be appointed by the Governor -General after consulting the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition (Sec. 54).
 
 

Chapter VI entitled "The Legislature" contains several new sections. According to Section 69, the National Assembly may alter any provisions of the Constitution. Section 88 provides for the establishment of an Elections and Boundaries Commission; Belize is to consist of eighteen electoral divisions (Art. 89), but the Election and Boundaries Commission may increase the number of electoral divisions (Sec. 90). The Election and Boundaries Commission may also redivide the electoral divisions (Sec. 91). The requirements for the right to vote (age, one vote, and secret ballot) are stated in Section 92. The conduct of elections is regulated in Section 93.
 
 

Chapter VII, entitled "The Judiciary," provides for the establishment of a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeals. Appeals to Her Majesty in Council are provided for in Section 104.
 
 

Chapter VIII which corresponds to Part IV of the 1963 Constitution, concerns the public service. Among the new features are the following: Appointment of a Director of Prosecutions by the Governor General (Sec. 108); and the appointment of the Auditor-General by the Governor-General (Sec.109).
 
 

Chapter X, entitled "Miscellaneous" refers to a variety of matters such as a Code of Conduct for persons to whom this section applies, which include the Governor-General, members of the National Assembly, the Belize Advisory Council and public officers (Sec.121); powers of appointment and acting appointments (Sec. 123); removal of public officers from office (Sec. 125); and resignations (Sec. 126). Section 131 gives interpretation and definition of certain terms in this document.

 </text>
</analysis>
<note>

<title>

COEDITOR'S NOTE: </title>
<text>

It should be noted that the printed text of the Belize Independence Order 1981 (1981 No. 1107), which was printed in London, contained only 10 Chapters and 131 sections. The Constitution which was subsequently published in Belize contains 12 Chapters and 142 sections. Chapter XI contains important transitional provisions. Unfortunately one page (74) was left blank and we were unable to obtain a corrected copy as this publication goes to press. We hope to obtain the missing page for insertion at a later time.
 
 

Chapter XII, consisting of two articles, concerns the date of commencement of this Constitution (September 21,1981).

</text>
<author><initials> G.H.F. </initials> </author>
</note>
<constitution>
<title>

1. The Conference met at Marlborough House and held 18 Plenary Sessions between 6 and 14 April. A list of delegates, officials and advisers who took part in the Conference is at Annex A. An invitation to attend the Conference was extended to the Leader of the Belizean Opposition and representatives of the United Democratic Party but this was declined. The Minister of State, Mr. Nicholas Ridley, presided at the opening session and some of the Plenary Sessions. At the other Plenary Sessions the Chair was taken by the Alternate Chairman, Mr. John Hickman.
 
 

2. At the opening session speeches were made by Mr. Ridley and by Mr. Rogers, the Deputy Premier of Belize, The text of these speeches is at Annex B.
 

3. The Conference had before it a White Paper issued by the Government of Belize containing "Proposed Terms of a Constitution for the Independent Belize" and the Report of a Joint Select Committee set up by both Houses of the Belize Legislature to which the White Paper had been referred and which had been directed to canvass the opinions of the Belizean people. The Committee met and received oral and written evidence in all district towns of Belize. The Report, which recommended a number of amendments to the proposals in the With Paper, was adopted by the House of Representatives on 27 March. Evidence submitted to the Committee was made available to the Conference.
 
 

4. Arising from the convening of the Constitutional Conference, a number of Belizean organizations and individuals addressed submissions to Her Majesty's Government. These were also formally tabled and, to the extent that they were relevant to the formulation of an Independence Constitution, were taken into consideration by the Conference. A list of these submissions is given at Annex C.
 
 

5. The conclusions of the Conference were as follows.
 

6. The Constitution shall set out, in a Preamble, principles which are desirable national goals and which may be referred to for purposes of interpretation. The proposed Preamble is at Annex D.
 

7. On independence Belize shall become a sovereign democratic State of Central America in the Caribbean Region. It shall comprise the territories which have hitherto constituted the Colony of Belize, including all Cays and other islands, and waters, forming part of the Colony. These territories shall be more precisely described in the Constitution.
 
 

8. Belize shall become a constitutional monarchy with The Queen as Head of State. The Queen shall be represented in Belize by a Governor-General, who shall be a citizen of Belize appointed by The Queen after consultation with the Prime Minister of Belize.
 
 

9. The Constitution shall be the supreme law of Belize. Any law inconsistent therewith shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency.
 

10. The Constitution shall include a comprehensive section on human rights and freedoms, elaborating the general principles set out in the White Paper and drawing as appropriate on the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and on other Commonwealth Constitutions (particularly those of Caribbean countries).
 
 

11. The human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the Constitution will be:
 
 

a. Protection of the Right to Life;
 
 

b. Protection of the Right to Personal Liberty;
 
 

c. Protection of the Law;

 d. Protection from Inhuman Treatment;
 
 

e. Protection from Forced Labour;
 
 

f. Protection against Arbitrary Search or Entry;
 
 

g. Protection of Freedom of Movement;
 
 

h. Protection of Freedom of Conscience;
 
 

i. Protection of Freedom of Expression;
 
 

j. Protection of Freedom of Assembly and Association;
 
 

k. Protection of Right to Privacy;
 
 

l. Protection of Freedom to pursue Profession or Occupation;
 
 

m. Protection from Discrimination;
 
 

n. Protection from Deprivation of Property.
 
 

These rights and freedoms shall be defined and qualified in such a way as to ensure that the enjoyment of them by one individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of another nor damage the public interest.
 
 

12. For the removal of doubt, every citizen shall have access to the Supreme Court of Judicature, and that Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and make such order as is appropriate to grant redress when a person alleges that one of his human rights or fundamentals freedoms is violated or is about to be violated. From the Supreme Court, a right of appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal and thence to the Privy Council.
 

13. The provisions protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms shall be especially entrenched. However, laws passed during a period of public emergency may, if reasonably justified for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during the period, derogate from those provisions, other than paragraphs 11 a), d) and h).
 
 

14. A period of public emergency shall exist when:

 a. Belize is engaged in any war;
 
 

b. there is in force a Proclamation by the Governor-General declaring that a state of public emergency exists;
 
 

c. there is in force a resolution of both Houses of the Legislature, in the House of Representatives passed by a majory of two-thirds of members present and voting, declaring that democratic institutions in Belize are threatened by subversion.
 
 

15. Proclamations of a state of emergency by the Governor-General may be made if he is satisfied a) of the imminence of a state of war or that an emergency exists as a result of a hurricane, flood, earthquake, fire, outbreak of pestilence or infectious disease, or other calamity; b) that action or the threat of action by any person is of such a nature or on so extensive a scale as to endanger the public safety or deprives the community, or a substantial portion thereof, of supplies or services essential to life, Such a proclamation shall remain in force for a period not exceeding one month unless previously revoked or extended by the legislature.
 
 

16. A resolution by the legislature under paragraph 14 c) shall not last longer than two months in the first instance, and may be extended for successive periods of two months.
 

17. The laws existing and in force in Belize at the commencement of the Constitution shall, for a period of five years, not be open to challenge on grounds of inconsistency with the provisions protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
 

18. The following categories of person, being citizens of the United Kingdom an Colonies immediately before the day of independence, shall automatically become citizens of Belize on the day of independence:
 
 

i. citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies born in Belize;
 
 

ii. citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies born outside Belize, one of whose parents was born in Belize;
 
 

iii. citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies born outside Belize, one of whose grandparents was born in Belize, provided they have no other citizenship;
 
 

iv. citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies registered or naturalized as such in Belize;
 
 

v. citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, one of whose parents was registered or naturalized as such in Belize;
 
 

vi. citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, one of Whose grandparents was registered or naturalized as such in Belize, provided they have no other citizenship;
 
 

vii. women who became citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of marriage to any person falling within any of categories i), vi) above.
 
 

19. With effect from the day of independence, the following persons may upon application be registered as a citizen of Belize:
 
 

a. the spouse of a Belizean citizen;
 
 

b. any other person who has been resident continuously in Belize for a period of five years (whether before or after independence) immediately prior to the day of making application.
 
 

20. On and after the day of independence every person born in Belize shall become a Belizean citizen at the date of his birth save for children of person with diplomatic immunity or of enemy aliens during a period of hostile occupation. Moreover, a person born of a citizen of Belize, who acquired that citizenship otherwise than by descent, shall become a Belizean citizen on the date of his birth.
 
 

21. Any person who is a Belizean citizen shall forfeit such citizenship by any voluntary act (other than marriage) by which he acquires a citizenship other than Belizean.
 
 

22. The Constitution will contain a provision enabling the National Assembly to provide by law for such matters as the acquisition of citizenship by persons who are not eligible to become citizens under the Constitution, the deprivation of citizenship, and the renunciation of citizenship.
 

23. It was agreed that in general and except when indicated otherwise Belize should retain the institutions and procedures of the existing democratic system to which Belizeans are accustomed and which has served Belize well. Therefore, in elaborating the revelant sections of the Constitution the language of the present Constitution will in general be followed. In certain respects it was agreed that procedural provisions found in the Constitutions of many independent Commonwealth countries, especially those in the Caribbean, could be adapted for Belize.
 

24. The Governor-General shall be The Queen's representative in Belize.
 

25. In the exercise of his functions, the Governor-General shall act in accordance with the advice of Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of Cabinet except in cases where the Constitution or any law requires him to act on the advice of any other person or authority,
 
 

26. He shall act in his own deliberate judgment in the appointments of Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition and the revocation of such appointments and in any other cases as the Constitution or any other law provides.
 
 

27. The Cabinet shall be the principal instrument of policy with general direction and control of the Government of Belize and shall be collectively responsible to the National Assembly for all things done by or under the authority of any Minister in the execution of his office. It shall consist of the Prime Minister and such number of Ministers as may be appointed by the Governor-General.
 

28. The Governor-General shall appoint as Prime Minister the member of the House of Representatives who is the leader of the Party that commands the support of the majority of the members of that House. In the event that no party has an undisputed majority, he shall appoint the member who is most likely to command the support of the majority of members of the House.
 
 

29. The Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister shall appoint Ministers responsible for any business of Government including responsibility for any department of Government from among members of the House of Representatives or the Senate, except the persons holding the office of Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate. Where a Minister has ben charged with responsibility for departments or subjects of Government the Minister shall exercise general direction and control over the departments or institutions relating to the subjects in his portfolio. A Minister may also be designated Deputy Prime Minister to whom the functions of the Prime Minister may be deputed from time to time by the Prime Minister. The Minister of Finance shall be a member of the House of Representatives.
 
 

30. The Attorney- General, who must have been qualified for at least five years to practice as an advocate, shall be the principal legal adviser to the Government of Belize and shall also be responsible for the administration of legal affairs in the country. Legal proceedings for or against the State shall be taken, in the case of civil proceedings, in the name of the Attorney-General and, in the case of criminal proceedings, in the name of the Crown.
 

31. If the House of Representatives passes a motion declaring that it has no confidence in the Prime Minister, the Governor-General shall remove the Prime Minister from office if the Prime Minister does not within seven days either resign or advise the Governor - General to dissolve the National Assembly.
 
 

32. The Prime Minister shall also vacate his office if he is informed by the Governor-General that he is about to re-appoint him as Prime Minister or to appoint another person as Prime Minister or if for any reason other than a dissolution the Prime Minister ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives.
 
 

33. The office of every Minister shall become vacant upon the appointment or re-appointment of any person to the office of Prime Minister; if the Prime Minister resigns or is removed under paragraph 31; if his appointment is revoked by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister; if for any reason other than a dissolution of the National Assembly he ceases to be a member of the House of which he was a member when he was appointed Minister; if after a general election he is not a member of the House; or if for any other reason he is required to cease to exercise any of his functions as a member of either House.
 
 

34. Whenever the Prime Minister in unable to perform his functions by reason of illness or absence from Belize, the Governor-General may authorize any other Minister to perform the functions of the Prime Minister. This power shall be exercised by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister, but in the event that it is impracticable to obtain such advice owing to the Prime Minister's illness or absence, the Governor-General shall act in his own deliberate judgment.
 
 

35. There shall be provision for the appointment of Deputy Ministers and temporary Minister.
 
 

36. The Prime Minister shall so far as is practicable attend an preside at all Cabinet meetings, and in his absence any other Minister that he appoints shall preside.
 

37. Except at times when there are no members of the House of Representatives who do not support the Government, there shall be a Leader of the Opposition who shall be appointed by the Governor-General. He shall be the member of the House of Representatives who, in the deliberate judgment of the Governor-General, in best able to command support of a majority of those members who do not support the Government, or if there is no such person, the member who commands the support of the largest single group of members opposed to the Government.
 
 

38. The Leader of the Opposition shall vacate his office if for any reason, other than a dissolution of the National Assembly, he ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives; if he is required to cease to perform his functions as a member of the House; or if his appointment is revoked by the Governor-General because he is no longer able to command the support required for his appointment.
 

39. The office of Permanent Secretary shall be a public office. He shall be responsible for the supervision of any department or institution of Government assigned to him. Two or more Government departments or institutions may be placed under the supervision of one Permanent Secretary.
 

40. There shall be a Belize Advisory Council which shall consist of a minimum of six members appointed by the Governor-General, four or more on the advice of the Prime Minister after consulting the Leader of the Opposition, and two on the advice of the Prime Minister with the concurrence of the Leader of the Opposition. All the members of the Advisory Council must be citizens of Belize (except as may be necessary in respect of serving or retired Judges) and must be persons of integrity and high national standing. The membership of the Advisory Council shall include at least two members who hold or have held public office of high standing; one serving or retired

 Judge of a Superior Court of Record; and one person who is an eminent member of a recognized profession in Belize.
 
 

41. The office of a member shall become vacant at the expiration of 10 years or such earlier period as may be specified in the instrument of his appointment; when he attains the age of 75 years; if he resigns; or if by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives he is declared unable to perform his functions as a member of the Council by reason of his absence or infirmity of body or mind or by reason of a breach of paragraph 106.
 
 

42. One of the Council's functions shall be to advise the Governor-General on the exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy. Other functions and duties of the Council shall be those conferred or imposed upon or under the Constitution or any other law. In the exercise of its functions the Council shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.
 
 

43. The Council shall be summoned by the Governor-General in the circumstances envisaged in the Constitution and otherwise by the Governor-General acting in his own deliberate judgment. He shall, so far as is practicable, attend and preside at all meetings of the Council.
 
 

44. On the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, the Governor-General shall appoint one of the members of the Council to be the Senior Member who shall preside over any meeting of the Council at which the Governor-General is absent. If at any meeting of the Council the Senior Member is absent, the members present shall elect one of their number to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Senior Member at that meeting. In the event that the Governor-General, shall have a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote.
 
 

45. In any case where the Council is summoned to discharge its duties under paragraph 82 and 85 it shall be presided over by a member who holds or has held judicial office deputed by the Governor-General acting in his own deliberate judgment. A quorum of the Council shall not be less than five members. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Council may regulate its own procedure. The question whether the Council has validly performed any function vested in it by the Constitution or by any other law shall not be questioned in any court.
 
 

46. There shall be a National Assembly, comprising a House of Representatives and a Senate.
 

47. The House of Representatives shall consist of members elected in the manner prescribed by the Representation of the People Ordinance. The basic principles regarding the right to vote and the Elections and Boundaries Commission will be included in the Constitution. If the person elected as Speaker is not a member of the House, then by virtue of holding the office of Speaker, he shall be a member of the House.
 
 

48. The National Assembly of Belize constituted on the day prior to the day of the independence of Belize shall continue and remain the National Assembly for the remainder of the term of office for which it was elected and shall enjoy all the powers and perform all the duties in this Constitution granted and imposed upon the National Assembly of Belize as if it had been elected hereunder.
 
 

49. After independence the Elections an Boundaries Commission shall, after considering the position in the whole of Belize, make proposals from time to time for dividing the country into constituencies in a manner which will ensure that each elected member represents a constituency comprising no less than 2,000 registered voters and no more than 3,000 until the number of constituencies reaches twenty-nine. These proposals shall not become effective until approved by a law adopted by the National Assembly.
 
 

50. Upon the elected membership of the House of Representatives reaching twenty-nine members, the National Assembly shall determine the formula to be followed by the Elections and Boundaries Commission thereafter for proposing to The National Assembly the number and size of constituencies.
 

51. A person shall be qualified to be elected a member of the House of Representatives or to be appointed to the Senate if he is a Belizean citizen, eighteen years old or older and has lived in Belize for at least one year immediately before the date of his nomination for election.
 
 

52. A person shall be disqualified from election as a member of the House of Representatives or appointment to the Senate if he owes allegiance to a foreign power or state, is an undischarged bankrupt, is certified insane, is under a sentence of death, or is serving a sentence of imprisonment exceeding twelve months. He is also disqualified from membership of The National Assembly if he is holding or acting in a public office, has been convicted of any offence relating to elections, or belongs to any contract with the Government of Belize and has not declared his interest publicly within one month before the date of election in the case of the House of Representatives or within one month of his appointment in the case of the Senate.
 
 

53. Every member of the National Assembly shall vacate his seat on the dissolution of the Legislature after the expiration of a period of five years from his election or appointment, or a dissolution brought about in any other manner.
 
 

54. A member of the National Assembly shall also vacate his seat if he is absent from the sittings of the House or Senate for such periods and in such circumstances as may be prescribed by the Standing Orders; if he ceases to be a citizen of Belize; or if any circumstances arise that were he not a member he would be disqualified for election or appointment to the National Assembly.
 
 

55. There shall be provision for a Speaker an Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives.
 

56. There shall be eight members of the Senate appointed by the Governor-General. The age qualification will be 18. If any person who is not a Senator is elected to be President of the Senate, he shall become a Senator.
 
 

57. Of the eight Senators five shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister, two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, and one in his own deliberate judgment after consultation with the Belize Advisory Council.
 
 

58. If there is no opposition party represented in the House of Representatives, or if two or more opposition parties are equally represented, the two Senators may be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice in each case of a person selected by him, in his own deliberate judgment, for the purpose of tendering such advice.
 
 

59. The Governor-General may also, on advice or acting in his own deliberate judgment as the case may be, declare the seat of a Senator vacant. The Governor-General may declare a Senator to be temporarily incapable of performing his functions by reason of illness, in which case such Senator shall not perform his functions until he is declared by the Governor-General capable of performing them.
 
 

60. There shall be provision for a President and a Vice-President of the Senate.
 

61. There shall be a Clerk and Deputy Clerk to the National Assembly who shall perform their functions at the direction of the presiding officers of the Assembly.
 
 

POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PRIVILEGES
 
 

62. The National Assembly may make laws for the peace, order and good government of Belize.
 
 

63. The National Assembly shall not have the power to amend the Constitution until after the first general election following independence (save for minor amendments on which there is unanimous agreement in the National Assembly).
 
 

64. Thereafter the powers of the National Assembly to amend the Constitution shall be as follows:
 
 

a. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution except by a Bill approved by a final vote in the House of Representatives of no less than two-thirds of the membership; and
 
 

b. in regard to the provisions relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the House of Representatives, the Judiciary, the Belize Advisory Council, the Public Services Commission, and the provisions concerning amendment of the Constitution, no amendment shall be made unless ninety days have elapsed between the presentation of a Bill and its second reading in the House of Representatives and the Bill is approved in the House of Representatives by a final vote of no less than three-quarters of the membership.
 
 

65. A Minister shall be permitted to address the House of which he is not a member, but shall not have a vote in that House.
 
 

66. No civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against any member of either House for words spoken before, or written in a report to, either House or a committee of both Houses, or for any matter brought by him in the form of a petition, bill, resolution, motion or otherwise.
 
 

67. Except as otherwise provide in the Constitution, all questions proposed for decision in either House shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting.
 
 

68. A Speaker elected from among members of the House of Representatives (or in the case of the Senate, the President) shall have an original vote, but not a casting vote. A Speaker elected from outside the House of Representatives (or in the case of the Senate, the President) shall have no vote.
 

69. A Bill, other than a money Bill, may be introduced in either House. A money Bill shall not be introduced in the Senate.
 
 

70. Except on the recommendation or with the consent of the Cabinet signified by a Minister, neither House shall proceed with not amend any Bill which provides for taxation, imposing or altering any charge on the country's revenues or funds, or compound or remit any debt due to Belize.
 
 

71. If a money Bill passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate is not passed by the Senate without amendment within one month after it is sent to that House, the Bill shall be present to the Governor-General for assent, not withstanding that the Senate has not consented. The Speaker shall endorse with his certificate every money Bill when it is passed by the National Assembly.
 
 

72. A Bill passed by the House of Representatives for two successive sessions, and having been sent to the Senate on two successive occasions, shall, on its rejection the second time by the Senate, be presented to the Governor-General for assent, notwithstanding that the Senate has not consented to the Bill. Six months must elapse between the time the Bill is first passed by the House of Representatives in the first session and the time it is passed in the second session.
 
 

73. When a Bill is presented to the Governor-General for assent, he shall signify his assent or that he withholds assent. A Bill shall not become law inless it has been duly passed and assented to in accordance with the Constitution.
 

74. Each session of the National Assembly shall be held at such place within Belize and shall commence at such time as the Governor-General shall by Proclamation appoint. There shall be a session of each House at least once in every year so that a period of six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of the National Assembly in one session and the first sitting in the next session.
 
 

75. The Governor General, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister may at any time prorogue or dissolve the National Assembly shall continue for five years from the date of the first sitting of both House after any dissolution and shall then stand dissolved. If at any time Belize is at war, the National Assembly may by legislation extend the period of five years for not more than twelve months at a time, provide that the life of the National Assembly shall not be extended for more than two years.
 
 

76. If between the dissolution of the National Assembly and the next ensuing general election, an emergency arises that in the opinion of the Prime Minister makes it necessary to convene the National Assembly before the general election can be held, the Governor-General, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, may summon the two Houses of the preceding National Assembly and that National Assembly shall be deemed not to have been dissolved until the date on which the next general election is held.
 
 

77. A general election shall be held at such time within three months of every dissolution of the National Assembly as the Governor-General, on the advice of the Prime Minister, shall appoint. As soon as is practicable after any general election, The Governor-General shall proceed to the appointment of Senators.
 
 

78. During the period between a dissolution of the National Assembly and the first meeting thereof after any general election, the Government of Belize shall continue to be administered by the Prime Minister and the other Ministers and Deputy Ministers of Government.
 
 

80. The Judges of the Supreme Court shall be the Chief Justice and such number of Judges of that Court as the National Assembly may determine. The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister after consulting the Leader of the Opposition. The other Judges shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Judicial and Legal Services section of the Public Services Commission and with the concurrence of the Prime Minister after consulting the Leader of the Opposition. The Governor-General may also appoint temporary Supreme Court Judges in the event that the office of a Supreme Court Judge is vacant or any Supreme Court Judge is unable to perform his functions.
 
 

81. A Judge of the Supreme Court shall vacate his office on raching the age of 62 years, unless otherwise authorized by the Governor-General. No office of Judge of the Supreme Court shall be abolished while there is a substantive holder of such office.
 
 

82. A Judge of the Supreme Court may be removed from office only for inability to perform his functions or for misbehavior, and the question of his removal has been referred by Her Majesty The Queen to the Belize Advisory Council and the Council has advised Her Majesty accordingly. When considering the removal of a Judge, the Belize Advisory Council shall sit as a tribunal with a Judge or retired Judge of a Superior Court of Record as Chairman.
 

83. The Judges of the Court of Appeal shall be the President, who shall preside, and such number of Justices of Appeal as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. No office of Judge of the Court of Appeal shall be abolished while there is a substantive holder of such office.
 
 

84. The Court of Appeal shall be a superior court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court. All Judges of the Court of Appeal shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister after consulting the Leader of the Opposition.
 
 

85. A Judge of the Court of Appeal may be removed from office only for inability to perform his functions or for misbehavior, after the question of his removal has been referred by Her Majesty The Queen to the Belize Advisory Council (acting as provided in paragraph 82) and Her Majesty has been advised accordingly.
 

86. An appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal to Her Majesty in Council shall lie as of right in the case of a final decision in any civil, criminal or other proceedings which involves a question of interpretation of the Constitution, and in any other case prescribed by law.
 
 

87. The Court of Appeal may give leave for an appeal to Her Majesty in Council from decisions in any civil case which in the Court's opinion has general or public importance or otherwise, or in any other cases prescribed by law. Her Majesty may grant special leave to appeal from decisions of the Court of Appeal in any civil, criminal or other matter.
 

88. There shall be a Director of Public prosecutions for Belize whose office shall be a public office. He shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Public Service Commission with the concurrence of the Prime Minister after consulting the Leader of the Opposition.
 
 

He shall have power to institute, control, take over and discontinue all criminal prosecutions. His functions shall be exercised by him in person or through any person acting under and in accordance with his general or special instructions.
 
 

89. The Director of Public Prosecutions shall be removed from office only for inability to perform his functions or for misbehavior by the Governor-General acting on the advice of the Belize Advisory Council.
 
 

90. There shall be a Public Services Commission comprising a Chairman and twelve members, four of whom shall be authorized to deal with matters relating to the Civil Service, two authorized to deal with matters relating to the Judicial and Legal Services, four authorized to deal with matters relating to the Military Service and two authorized to deal with matters in the Police Service. The Permanent Secretary Establishment shall be the secretary to the Public Services Commission.
 
 

91. Except for ex-officio members, the Chairman and the members of the Public Services Commission shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the advise of the Prime Minister. Before tendering his advice the Prime Minister shall consult the Leader of the Opposition. Members of the Commission shall hold office for such period as their appointment designates and in no case for more than three years. Removal from office shall be made by the Governor-General only for inability to perform his functions or for misbehavior after the matter or removal has been referred to and recommended by the Belize Advisory Council. Members of the National Assembly shall not be eligible for membership of the Commission.
 
 

92. The Chief Justice and a Supreme Court Judge designate by the Chief Justice shall be ex-officio members of the Public Services Commission authorized to deal with matters relating to the Judicial and Legal Services. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and the Commandant, Belize Defence Force, shall be ex-officio members of the Public Services Commission authorized to deal with matters relating to the Military Service. The Commissioner or Police shall be ex-officio a member of the Public Services Commission authorized to deal with matters relating to the Police Service.
 
 

93. The effect of the foregoing will be to continue existing arrangements but in a more economical and streamlined way. As at present certain office holders will be debarred from membership of the Commission. It was agreed that the Belize Government shall continue the present convention of consulting the Public Services Union about appointments to the Commission.
 

94. Power to appoint persons to hold office in the Public Services, to exercise disciplinary control over persons in the Services, and to remove such persons from office, shall vest in the Public Services Commission. The following offices shall be excluded from the authority of the Public Services Commission: Secretary of the Cabinet, Permanent Secretaries, the heads of Departments of Government, the chief professional advisors to Departments of Government, the Auditor-General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commandant of the Belize Defence Force, the Commissioner of Police, Ambassadors, High Commissioner or other principal representatives of Belize accredited to any international organization and any other office designate by the Commission.
 
 

95. Except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, the appointment to, discipline of, and removal from the offices listed above shall vest in the Governor-General acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.
 

96. The provisions of Sections 53 and 54 of the present Constitution and the law relating to pensions for members of the Public Services and teachers shall remain in force and apply to persons in the Public Services and in relation to those already enjoying a pension, shall remain unaltered. All pensions and rights thereto stand charged on the consolidate Revenue Fund of Belize. The discretion relating to pensions formerly vested in the Governor shall vest in the Governor-General acting on the advice of the Public Services Commission.
 

97. Appeals against any act of the Public Services Commission or the Governor-General in relation to the Public Services shall lie to the Belize Advisory Council.
 

98. Cabinet shall provide for and determine all matters relating to employment in the Public Services including the formulation of schemes or recruitment; determining a code of conduct; fixing salaries and privileges, terms of employment, and the principles to be follower in making promotion and transfers; measures to endure discipline, to govern dismissals and retirement; procedures for the delegation of authority, and generally for the good management and control of the Public Services. All such decisions and directives issued by Cabinet shall be laid on the table of both Houses of the National Assembly.
 
 

99. All revenues or other moneys raised or received by Belize (not being revenues or other moneys payable under any law into some other public fund established for a specific purpose) shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund except to meet expenditure charge upon the Fund by the Constitution or by an Act of the National Assembly, or where the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an appropriate law.
 
 

100. The Minister responsible for Finance shall lay before the House of Representatives in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Belize for the next financial year. If in any financial year the amount appropriated for any purpose is insufficient, or a need arises for expenditure for a purpose for which no amount of money was appropriated, or moneys have been spent in excess of that appropriated, a supplementary estimate showing the sums required or spent shall be laid before the House of Representatives.
 
 

101. The National Assembly may make provision to allow the Minister responsible for Finance to authorize expenditure necessary to carry on the services of Government for a specified period. The National Assembly may also provide for the establishment of a Contingencies Fund and authorize the Minister responsible for Finance to make advances from this Fund to meet any urgent and unforeseen need for expenditure for which no other provision exists.
 
 

102. The salaries and allowances of the Governor-General and certain other officers, including the Chief Justice, Justices of Appeal, Supreme Court Judges, members of the Belize Advisory Council and the Public Services Commission, members of the Elections and Boundaries Commission, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Auditor-General, shall be a charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
 

103. There shall be an Auditor-General for Belize, whose office shall be a public, office. He shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Public Services Commission with the concurrence of the Prime Minister after consulting the Leader of the Opposition. He shall audit and report annually on the public accounts of Belize, and of all officers, courts and authorities of Belize. The Auditor-General shall submit his reports annually to the Minister responsible for Finance to be laid before the House of Representatives. If the Minister responsible for Finance fails to lay any such reports before the House of Representatives within the prescribed time, the Auditor-General shall transmit copies of the reports to the Speaker of the House of Representatives for presentation to the House. In the exercise of his functions, the Auditor-General shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.
 
 

104. The Auditor-General shall be removed from office only for inability to perform his functions or for misbehavior by the Governor-General acting on the advice of the Belize Advisory Council.
 

105. The public debt of Belize shall be a charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
 

106. The Governor-General, members of the National Assembly, the Belize Advisory Council, the Public Services Commission, and the Elections and Boundaries Commission, public officers, officers of statutory corporations and government agencies and such other officers as the National Assembly may prescribe, have a duty to conduct themselves in such a way as not:
 
 

a. to place themselves in positions in which they have or could have a conflict of interest;
 
 

b. to compromise the fair exercise of their public or official functions and duties;
 
 

c. to use their office for private gain;
 
 

d. to demean their office or position;
 
 

e. to allow their integrity to be called into question; or,
 
 

f. to endanger or diminish respect for, or confidence in, the integrity of the Government of Belize.
 

107. The Government of Belize will establish a representative committee which will, as a matter of priority, consider and make proposals on national symbols for Belize. These proposals will be put before the House of Representatives. The Constitution will provide for the proposals adopted by the House of Representatives to be part of the Constitution.
 
 

NICHOLAS RIDLEY C.L.B. ROGERS
 
 

THE CONSTITUTION OF BELIZE shall commence with a preamble which shall state that the people of Belize:
 
 

a. affirm that the Nation of Belize shall be founded upon principles which acknowledge the supremacy of God, faith in human rights and fundamental freedoms, the position of the family in a society of free men and free institutions, the dignity of the human person and the equal and inalienable rights with which all members of the human family are endowed by their Creator;
 
 

b. respect the principles of social justice and therefore believe that the operation of the economic system must result in the material resources of the community being so distributed as to subserve the common good, that there should be adequate means of livelihood for all, that labour should not be exploted or forced by economic necessity to operate in inhumane conditions but that there should be opportunity for advancement on the basis of recognition of merit ability and integrity, that equal protection should be given to children regardless of their social status, and that a just system should be ensured to provide for education an health on the basis of equality;
 
 

c. believe that the will of the people shall form the basis of government in a democratic society in which the government is freely elected by universal adult suffrage and in which all persons may, to the extent of their capacity, play some part in the institutions of national life and this develop and maintain due respect for lawfully constituted authority;
 
 

d. recognize that men and institutions remain free only when freedom in founded upon respect for moral and spiritual values and upon the rule of law;
 
 

e. require policies of state which protect an safeguard the unity, freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belize; which eliminate economic and social privilege and disparity among the citizens of Belize whether by race, color, creed or sex; which protect the rights of the individual to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; which preserve the right of the individual to the ownership of private property and the right to operate private businesses; which prohibit the exploitation of man by man or by the state; which ensure a just system of social security and welfare; which protect the environment; which promote international peace, security and co-operation among nations, the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order in the world with respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings among nations;

 f. desire that their society shall reflect and enjoy the above mentioned principles, belief and needs and that their Constitution should therefore enshrine and make provisions for ensuring the achievement of the same in Belize.
 
 

1. Fully responsible status of Belize.
 
 

2. Power to provide new constitution for Belize.
 
 

3. Operation of existing law.
 
 

4. Consequential modifications of the British Nationality Acts.
 
 

5. Retention of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies in certain cases.
 
 

6. Interpretation.
 
 

7. Short title.
 

Schedule 1 - Legislative power of Belize.
 
 

Schedule 2 - Consequential amendments not affecting the law of Belize.
 

An Act to make provision for, and in connection with, the attainment by Belize of independence within the Commonwealth. [28th July 1981]
 
 

BE IT ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-
 
 

1. 1) On and after Independence Day Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall have no responsibility for the government of Belize. (Fully responsible status of Belize.)
 
 

2) No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after Independence Day shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to Belize as part of its law; and on and after that day the provisions of Schedule 1 to this Act shall have effect with respect to the legislative powers of Belize.
 
 

2. 1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council made before Independence Day provide a constitution for Belize to come into effect on that day.
 
 

2) An Order in Council under this section (in this section referred to as a "Constitution Order") may include provision as to the manner in which the legislature of Belize may alter any provisions of that Order, or may alter any law which alters any of those provisions; and a constitution provide by a Constitution Order may include provisions as to the manner in which the legislature of Belize may alter any law which alters that constitution or any provisions thereof.
 
 

3) In this section references to altering a constitution or to altering any provision or law include references-
 
 

a. to revoking it, with or without re-enactment thereof or the making of different provision in lieu thereof;
 
 

b. to modifying it, whether by omitting or amending any of its provisions or inserting additional provisions in it or otherwise; and
 
 

c. to suspending its operation for any period, or terminating any such suspension.
 
 

4) A Constitution Order may contain dutch transitional or other incidental or supplementary provisions as appear to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient.
 
 

5) Any Constitution Order shall be laid before Parliament after being made.
 
 

3. 1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, all lae to each this section applies, whether being a rule of law or a provision of an Act of Parliament or of any other enactment or instrument whatsoever, which is in force on Independence Day, or, having been passed or made before that day, comes into force thereafter, shall, unless and until provision to the contrary is made by Parliament or some other authority having power in that behalf, have the same operation in relation to Belize and persons and things belonging to or connected with Belize as it would have had apart from this subsection if there had been no change in the status of Belize.
 
 

2) This section applies to the law of, or of any part of, the United Kingdom, the Channel Island and the Isle of Man and, in relation only to any enactment of the Parliament of the United Kingdom or any Order in Council made by virtue of any such enactment whereby any such enactment applies in relation to Belize, to law of any other country or territory to which that enactment or Order extends.
 
 

3) Subsection 1) above shall not apply in relation to the British Nationality Act 1981.
 
 

4) On an after Independence Day the enactments specified in Schedule 2 to this Act shall have effect subject to the amendments there specified.
 
 

5) Subsection 4) above and that Schedule shall not extend to Belize as part of its law.
 
 

4. 1) On and after Independence Day the British Nationality Act 1984 shall have effect as if in section 1 3) (Commonwealth countries having separate citizenship) there were added at the end the words "and Belize". (Consequential modifications of the British Nationally Acts. 1948 c.56.)
 
 

2) Except as provided by section 5 below, any person who immediately before Independence Day citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies shall on that day cease to be such a citizen if he becomes on that day a citizen of Belize.
 
 

3) Except as provide by section 5 below, a person in relation to whom the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say-
 
 

a. immediately before Independence Day, he is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies; and
 
 

b. one of his grandparents-
 
 

i. was born in Belize, or
 
 

ii. was naturalized in the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of a certificate of naturalization granted in Belize, or
 
 

iii. was registered in Belize as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies; and
 
 

c. on Independence Day cease to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies if he then a citizen of some other country.
 
 

4) Section 6 (2) of the 1948 Act (registration as citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies of women who have been married to such citizen) shall not apply to a woman by virtue of her marriage to a person who on Independence Day ceases to be such a citizen under subsection 2) or 3) above or who would have done so if living on that day.
 
 

5) In accordance with section 3 (3) of the West Indies Act 1967 it is hereby declared that this section and section 5 below extend to all associated states.
 
 

5. 1) A person shall not cease to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies under section 4 (2) or 3) above if he, his father or his father's father- ( Retention of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies in certain cases.)
 
 

a. was born in the United Kingdom or a relevant territory; or
 
 

b. is or was a person naturalized in the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of a certificate of naturalization granted in the United Kingdom or a relevant territory; or

 c. was, in the United Kingdom or a relevant territory, registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, or was so registered by a High Commissioner exercising functions under section 8 (2) or 12 (7) of the 1948 Act; or
 
 

d. became a British subject by reason of the annexation of any territory included in a relevant territory, or if his father or his father's father would, if living immediately before the commencement of the 1948 Act, have become a person naturalized in the United Kingdom and Colonies under section 32 (6) of that Act (previous local naturalization in a colony or protectorate) by virtue of having enjoyed the privileges of naturalization in a relevant territory.
 
 

2) In subsection 1) above "relevant territory" means any territory which on Independence Day is a colony or an associated state other than a territory which on that day is not a colony for the purposes of the 1948. Act as then in force (and accordingly does not include Belize).
 
 

3) Subsection 1) above does not apply to a woman by virtue of her registration as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies if that registration was effected under section 6 (2) of the 1948 Act (registration as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies of women who have been married to such citizens).
 
 

4) A person shall not cease to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies under section 4 (2) or 3) above if, immediately before Independence Day, he has the right of above in the United Kingdom under the Immigration Act 1971.
 
 

5) A woman who is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies and is the wife of such a citizen shall not herself cease to be such a citizen under section 4 (2) or 3) above unless her husband does so.
 
 

6) Part III of the 1948 Act (supplementary provisions) as in force from time to time, except section 23 (legitimated children), shall have effect for the purposes of this section as if this section were included in that Act.
 
 

7) A person born out of wedlock and legitimated (within the meaning of section 23 (2) of the 1948 Act) by the subsequent marriage of his parents shall be treated, for the purpose of determining whether he has by virtue of this Act ceased to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, as if he had been born legitimate.
 
 

6. 1) In this Act, and in any amendment made by this Act in any other enactment, "Belize" means the territories which immediately before Independence Day constitute the colony of Belize (formerly Known as British Honduras).

2) In this Act "Independence Day" means such day as Her Majesty may by Order in Council appoint; and any Order in Council under this subsection shall be laid before Parliament after being made.
 
 

3) In this Act " the 1948 Act" means the British Nationality Act 1948.
 
 

7. This Act may be cited as the Belize Act 1981.

1. The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 shall not apply to any law made on or after Independence Day by the legislature of Belize.
 
 

2. No law and no provision of any law made on or after Independence Day by that legislature shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, including this Act, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and accordingly the powers of that legislature shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as it is part of the law of Belize.
 
 

3. The legislature of Belize shall have full power to make laws having extra-territorial operation.
 
 

4. Without prejudice to the generality of the preceding provisions of this Schedule-
 
 

a) section 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 shall be construed as if references therein to the legislature of a British possession did not include references to the legislature of Belize;
 
 

b) section 4 of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 (which requires certain laws to be reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure or to contain a suspending clause), and so much of section 7 of that Act as requires the approval of Her Majesty in Council to any rules of court for regulating the practice and procedure of a Colonial Court of Admiralty, shall cease to have effect in Belize.
 

Armed Forces
 
 

1. The expression "colony" in the Army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 and the Naval Discipline Act 1957 shall not include Belize; and in the definitions of "Commonwealth force" in section 225(1) and 223(1) respectively of those Acts of 1955, and in the definition of "Commonwealth country" in section 135(1) of that Act of 1957, at the end there shall be added the words "or Belize".
 
 

2. In the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act 1933. section 4 (attachment and mutual powers of command) shall apply in relation to forces raised in Belize as it applies to forces raised in Dominions within the meaning of the Statute of Westminster 1931.
 
 

3. In the Visiting Forces Act 1952-
 
 

a) in section 1 (1) a) (countries to which the Act applies) at the end there shall be added the words "Belize.or";
 
 

b) in section 10(1) a), the expression "colony" shall not include Belize;
 
 

and, until express provision with respect to Belize is made by Order in Council under section 8 of that Act (application to visiting forces of law relating to home forces), any such Order for the time being in force shall be deemed to apply to visiting forces of Belize.
 
 

Ships and Aircraft
 
 

4. In section 427 (2) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, as set out in section 2 of the Merchant Shipping (Safety Convention) Act 1949, before the words"or in any" there shall be inserted the words "or Belize".
 
 

5. In the Whaling Industry (Regulation) Act 1934, the expression "British ship to which this Act applies " shall not include a British ship registered in Belize.
 
 

6. Belize shall not be a relevant overseas territory for the purposes of section 21(2) and 22(3) of the Civil Aviation Act 1971.
 
 

Colonial Stock
 
 

7. Section 20 of the Colonial Stock Act 1877 (which relates to the jurisdiction of courts of the United Kingdom as to colonial stock) shall, in its application to stock of Belize, have effect as if for the second paragraph there were substituted-
 
 

"(2) Any person claiming to be interested in colonial stock to which this Act applies, or in any dividend thereon, may institute civil proceedings in the United Kingdom against the registerer in relation to that stock or dividend.
 
 

(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this section, the registerer shall not by virtue of an order made by any court in the United Kingdom in any such proceedings as are referred to in this section be liable to make any payment otherwise than out of moneys in his possession in the United kingdom as registerer.".
 
 

Commonwealth Institute
 
 

8. In section 8 (2) of the Imperial Institute Act 1925, as amended by the Commonwealth Institute Act 1958 (power to vary the provisions of the said Act of 1925 if an agreement for the purpose is made with the focernments of certain territories which for the time being are contributing towards the expenses of the Commonwealth Institute) at the end there shall be added the words "and Belize".
 
 

I assent,
 
 

J. P. I. HENNESSY

  Governor
 
 

20th September, 1981.
 
 

BE IT ENACTED by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the House of Representatives and the Senate of Belize, and by the authority of the same as follows:-
 
 

This Law may be cited as the Short Title.
 
 

WHEREAS THE PEOPLE OF BELIZE
 
 

a. affirm that the Nation of Belize shall be founded upon principles which acknowledge the supremacy of God, faith in human rights and fundamental freedoms, the position of the family in a society of free men and free institutions, the dignity of the human person and the equal and inalienable rights with which all members of the human family are endowed by their Creator;
 
 

b. respect the principles of social justice and therefore believe that the operation of the economic system must result in the material resources of the community being so distributed as to subserve the common good, that there should be adequate means of livelihood for all, that labour should not be exploited or forced by economic necessity to operate in inhuman conditions but that there should be opportunity for advancement on the basis of recognition of merit, ability and integrity, that social status, and that a just system should be ensured to provide for education and health on the basis of equality;
 
 

c. believe that the will of the people shall form the basis of government in a democratic society in which the government is freely elected by universal adult suffrage and in which all persons may, to the extent of their capacity, play some part in the institutions of national life and this develop and maintain due respect for lawfully constituted authority;
 
 

d. recognize that men and institutions remain free only when freedom is founded upon respect for moral and spiritual values and upon the rule of law;
 
 

e. require policies of state which protect and safeguard the unity, freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belize; which eliminate economic and social privilege and disparity among the citizens of Belize whether by race, color, creed or sex; which protect the rights of the individual to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; which preserve the right of the individual to the ownership of private property and the right to operate private businesses; which prohibit the explotation of man by man or by the state; which ensure a just system of social security and welfare; which protect the environment; which promote international peace, security and co-operation among nations, the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order in the world with respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings among nations;
 
 

f. desire that their society shall reflect and enjoy the above mentioned principles, belief and needs and that their Constitution should therefore enshrine and make provisions for ensuring the achievement of the same in Belize;
 
 

NOW, THEREFORE. the following provisions shall have effect as the Constitution of Belize:
 
 

1. (1) Belize shall be a sovereign democratic State of Central America in the Caribbean region.
 
 

(2) Belize comprises the land and sea areas defined in Schedule 1 to this Constitution, which immediately before Independence Day constituted the colony of Belize.
 

2. This Constitution is the supreme law of Belize and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.
 
 

3. Whereas every person in Belize is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, color, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each and all of the following, namely-
 
 

a. life, liberty, security of the person, and the protection of the law;
 
 

b. freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association;
 
 

c. protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and recognition of his human dignity; and
 
 

d. protection from arbitrary deprivation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any person does nor prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.
 

4. (1) A person shall not be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence under any law of which he has been convicted.
 
 

(2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his lief in contravention of this section if he dies as the result of the use, to such extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably justifiable-
 
 

a. for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property;
 
 

b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
 
 

c. for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny; or
 
 

d. in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence.
 
 

or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war.
 

5. (1) A person shall not be deprived of his personal liberty save a may be authorized by law in any of the following cases, that is to say:-
 
 

a. in consequence of his unfitness to plead to a criminal charge or in execution of the sentence or order of a court, whether establisher for Belize or some other country in respect of a criminal offence on which he has been convicted;
 
 

b. in execution of the order of the Supreme Court of the Court o Appeal punishing him for contempt of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal or of another court or tribunal;
 
 

c. in execution of the order of a court made to secure the fulfilmen of any obligation imposed on him by law;
 
 

d. for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court;
 
 

e. upon a reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence under any law;
 
 

f. under the order of a court or with the consent of his parent or guardian, for his education or welfare during any period ending not later than the date when he attain the age of eighteen years;
 
 

g. for the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious of contagious disease;
 
 

h. in the case of a person who is, or is reasonably suspected to be, of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or a vagrant, for the purpose of his care or treatment or the protection or the community;
 
 

i. for the purpose of preventing his unlawful entry into Belize, or for the purpose of effecting his expulsion, extradition or other lawful removal from Belize or for the purpose of restraining him while he is being conveyed through Belize in the course of his extradition or removal as a convicted prisoner from one country to another; or
 
 

j. to such extent as may be necessary in the execution of a lawful order requiring him to remain within a specified area within Belize, or prohibiting him from being within such an area, or to such extent as may be reasonably justifiable for the taking of proceedings against him with a view to the making of any such order or relating to such an order after it has been made, or to such extent as may be reasonably justifiable for restraining hum during any visit that he is permitted to make to any part of Belize in which, in consequence of any such order, his presence would otherwise be unlawful.
 
 

(2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be entitled-
 
 

a. to be informed promptly, and in any case no later than forty-eight hours after such arrest or detention, in a language he understands, of the reasons for his arrest or detention:
 
 

b. to communicate without delay and in private with a legal practitioner of his choice and, in the case of a minor, with his parents or guardian, and to have adequate opportunity to give instructions to a legal practioner of his choice:
 
 

c. to be informed immediately upon his arrest of his rights under paragraph (b.) of his subsection: and
 
 

d. to the remedy by way of habeas corpus for determining the vality of his detention.
 
 

(3) Any person who is arrested or detained-
 
 

a. for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court; or
 
 

b. upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence under any law.
 
 

and who is not released, shall be brought before a court without undue delay and in any case not later than seventy-two hours after such arrest or detention.
 
 

(4) Where any person is brought before a court in execution of the order or a court in any proceedings or upon suspicion of his having committed or being about to commit an offence, he shall not be thereafter further held in custody in connection with those proceeding or that offence save upon the order of a court.
 
 

(5) If any person arrested or detained as mentioned in subsection (3)b. of this section is not tried within a reasonable time, then without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought against him, he shall, unless he is released, be entitled to bail on reasonable conditions.
 
 

(6) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained by any other person shall be entitled to compensation therefor from that other person or from any other person or authority on whose behalf that other person was acting:
 
 

Provided that no person shall be liable for any act done in the performance of a judicial function for which he would not be liable apart from this subsection.
 
 

(7) For the purposes of subsection (1)a. of this section a person charged before a court with a criminal offence in respect of whom a special veredict has been returned that he was guilty of the act or omission charged but was insane when he did the act or made the omission shall be regarded as person who has been convicted of a criminal offence and the detention in execution of the order of a court.
 

6. (1) All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.
 
 

(2) If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.
 
 

(3) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence-
 
 

a. shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty;
 
 

b. shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable in a language that the understands, of the nature and particulars of the offence charged;
 
 

c. shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence:
 
 

d. shall be permitted to defend himself before the court in person or at his own expense, by a legal practitioner of his own choice:
 
 

e. shall be afforded facilities to examine in person or by his legal representative the witnesses called by the prosecution before the court, and to obtain the attendance and carry out the examination of witnesses to testify on his behalf before the court on the same conditions as those applying to witnesses called by the prosecution; and
 
 

f. shall be permitted to have without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial.
 
 

and except with his own consent the trial shall not take place in his and except with his own consent the trial shall not take place in his absence unless he so conducts himself as to render the continuance of the proceedings in his presence impracticable and the court has ordered him to be removed and the trial to proceed in his absence:
 
 

Provided that the trial may take place in his absence in any case in which it is so provide by a law under which he is entitled to adequate notice of the charge and the date, time and place of the trial and to a reasonable opportunity or appearing before the court.
 
 

(4) A person shall not be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute sich an offence, and not penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence that is severer in degree or description than the maximum penalty that might have been imposed for that offence at the time when it was committed.
 
 

(5) A person who shows that he has been tried by a competent court for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall not again be tried for that offence or for any other criminal offence if which he could have been convicted at the trial for that offence, save upon the order of a superior court in the course of appeal or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal.
 
 

(6) A person who is tried for a criminal offence shall not be compelled to give evidence at the trial.
 
 

(7) Any court or other authority prescribed by law for the determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation shall be established by law and shall be independent and impartial; and where proceedings for such a determination are instituted by any person before such a court or other authority, the case shall be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time.
 
 

(8) Except with the agreement of all the parties thereto, all proceedings of every court and proceedings for the determination of the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation before any other authority, including the announcement of the decision of the court or other authority, shall be held in public.
 
 

(9) Nothing in subsection (8) of this section shall prevent the court or other adjudicating authority from excluding from the proceedings persons other than the parties thereto and the legal practitioners representing them to such extent as the court or other authority-
 
 

a. may by law be empowered to do and may consider necessary or expedient in circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice or in interlocutory proceedings or in the interest of public morality, the welfare of persons under the age of eighteen years or the protection of the private lives of persons concerned in the proceedings; or
 
 

b. may by law be empowered or required to do in the interests of defence, public safety or public order.
 
 

(10) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of-
 
 

a. subsection (3)a. of this section to the extent that the law in question imposes upon any person charged with a criminal offence the burden of proving particular facts;
 
 

b. subsection (3)e. of this section to the extent that the law in question imposes reasonable conditions that must be satisfied if witnesses called to testify on behalf of an accused person are to be paid their expenses out of public funds; or
 
 

c. subsection(5) of this section to the extent that the law in question authorizes a court to try a member of a disciplined force for a criminal offence notwithstanding any trial and conviction or acquittal of that member under the disciplinary law of that force, so however, that any court so trying such a member and convicting him shall in sentencing him to any punishment take into account any punishment awarded him under that disciplinary law.
 
 

(11) In the case of any person who is held in lawful detention the provisions of subsection (2) and paragraphs (d.) and (e.) of subsection (3) of this section shall not apply in relation to his trial for a criminal offence under the law regulating the discipline of persons held in such detention.
 
 

(12) In this section"criminal offence" means a criminal offence under a law.
 

7. No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.
 

8. (1) No person shall be held in slavery or servitude.
 
 

(2) No person shall be required to perform forced labor.
 
 

(3) For the purposes of this section, the expression "Forced labor" does not include-
 
 

a. any labor required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court;
 
 

b. labor required of any person while he is lawfully detained that, though not required in consequence of the sentence or order of a court, is reasonably necessary in the interests of hygiene or for the maintenance of the place at which he is detained;
 
 

c. any labor required of a member of a disciplined force in pursuance of his duties as such or, in the case of a person who has conscientious objections to service as a member of a naval, military or air force, any labor that that person is required by law to perform in place of such service; or
 
 

d. any labor required during any period of public emergency or in the event of any accident or natural calamity that threatens the life and well-being of the community, to the extent that the requiring of such labor is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing during that period or as a result of that accident or natural calamity for the purpose of dealing with that situation.
 

9. (1) Except whit his own consent, a person shall not be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.
 
 

(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes reasonable provision-
 
 

a. that is required in the interests of the defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning the development and utilization of mineral resources or the development or utilization of any property for a purpose beneficial to the community;
 
 

b. that is required for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of other persons;
 
 

c. that authorizes an officer or agent of the Government, a local government authority or a body corporate established by law for public purposes to enter on the premises or any person in order to inspect those premises or anything thereon for the purpose of any tax, rate or due or in order to carry out work connected with any property that is lawfully on those premises and that belongs to the Government or to that authority or body corporate, as the case may be; or
 
 

d. that authorizes, for the purpose of enforcing the judgment or order of the court in any civil proceedings, the search of any person or property by order of a court or entry upon any premises by such order.
 

10. (1) A person shall not be deprived of his freedom of movement, that is to say, the right to move freely throughout Belize, the right to reside in any part of Belize, the right to enter Belize, the right to leave Belize and immunity from expulsion from Belize.
 
 

(2) Any restriction on a person's freedom of movement that is involved in his lawful detention shall not be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section.
 
 

(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes reasonable provision-
 
 

a. for the imposition of restrictions on the movement or residence within Belize of any person or on any person's rights to leave Belize that are required in the interests of defence, public safety or public order;
 
 

b. for the imposition or restrictions on the movement or residence within Belize or on the right to leave Belize or persons generally or any class of persons in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health or, in respect of the right to leave Belize, of securing compliance with any international obligation of the Government;
 
 

c. for the imposition or restrictions, by order of a court, on the movement or residence within Belize or any person or on any person's right to leave Belize either in consequence of his having been found guilty of a criminal offence under a law or for the purpose of ensuring that he appears before a court at a later date for trial of such a criminal offence or for proceedings preliminary to trial or for proceedings relating to his extradition or lawful removal from Belize;
 
 

d. for the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement of any person who is not a citizen of Belize;
 
 

e. for the imposition of restrictions on the acquisition or use by any person of land or other property in Belize;
 
 

f. for the imposition of restriction on the movement or residence within Belize or on the right to leave Belize of any officer in the public service that are required for the proper performance of his functions;
 
 

g. for the removal of a person from Belize to be tried or punished in some other country for a criminal offence under the law of that other country or to undergo imprisonment in some other country in execution of the sentence or a court in respect or a criminal offence under a law of which he has been convicted; or
 
 

h. for the imposition or restrictions on the right or any person to leave Belize that are required in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation imposed on that person by law.
 
 

(4) If any person whose freedom of movement has been restricted by virtue of such a provision as is referred to in subsection (3)a. of this section so requests at any time during the period of that restriction not earlier than twenty-one days after the order was made or three months after he last made such a request, as the case may be, his case shall be reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal presided over by a person appointed by the Chief Justice from among persons who are legal practitioners.
 
 

(5) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of subsection (4) of this section of the case of any person whose freedom of movement has been restricted, the tribunal may make recommendations concerning the necessity or expediency of the continuation of that restriction to the authority by whom it was ordered and, unless is otherwise provided by law, that authority shall be obliged to act in accordance with any such recommendations.
 

11. (1) Except with his own consent, a person shall not be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, including freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others, and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship teaching, practice and observance.
 
 

(2) Except with his own consent (or, if he is a person under the age of eighteen years, the consent of his parent or guardian) a person attending any place of education, detained in any prison or corrective institution or serving in a naval, military or air force shall not be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if that instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion which is not his own.
 
 

(3) Every recognized religious community shall be entitled, at its own expense to establish and maintain places of education and to manage any place of education which or maintains; and no such community shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for persons of that community in the course of any education provided by that community whether or not it is in receipt of a government subsidy or other form financial assistance designed to meet in whole or in part the cost of such course of education.
 
 

(4) A person shall not be compelled to take any oath which is contrary to his religion or belief or to take any oath in a manner which is contrary his religion or belief.
 
 

(5) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention or this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably required-
 
 

a. in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health;
 
 

b. for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons, including the right to observe and practice any religion without the unsolicited intervention of members of any other religion; or
 
 

c. for the purpose or regulating educational institutions in the interest of the persons who receive or may receive instruction in them.
 
 

(6) References in this section to a religion shall be construed as including references to a religious denomination, and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.
 

12. (1) Except with his own consent, a person shall not be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information without interference (whether the communication be to the public generally or to any person or class of persons) and freedom from interference with his correspondence.
 
 

(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes reasonable provision-
 
 

a. that is required in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health;
 
 

b. that is required for the purpose of protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons concerned in legal proceedings, preventing the disclosure or information received in confidence, maintaining the administration or the technical operation of telephony, telegraphy posts, wireless broadcasting, television or other means of communication, public exhibitions or public entertainments; or
 
 

c. that imposes restrictions on officers in the public service that are required for the proper performance of their functions.
 

13. (1) Except with his own consent, a person shall not be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form or beling to trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests or to form or belong to political parties or other political associations.
 
 

(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes reasonable provision-
 
 

a. that is required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health;
 
 

b. that is required for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of other persons;
 
 

c. that imposes restrictions on officers in the public service that are required for the proper performance of their functions; or
 
 

d. that is required to prohibit any association the membership or which is restricted on grounds of race or color.
 

14. (1) A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. The private and family life, the home and the personal correspondence of every person shall be respected.
 
 

(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention or this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision of the kind specified in subsection (2) of section 9 of this Constitution.
 

15. (1) No person shall be denied the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, whether by pursuing a profession or occupation or by engaging in a trade or business, or otherwise.
 
 

(2) It shall not be inconsistent with subsection (1) of this section to require, as a condition for embarking upon or continuing work, the payment of professional fees, trade or business license fees, or similar charges, or the possession or appropriate licenses or qualifications.
 
 

(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes reasonable provision-
 
 

a. that is required in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health;
 
 

b. that is required for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of other persons; or
 
 

c. for the imposition of restrictions on the right to work of any person who is not a citizen of Belize.
 

16. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (4) (5) and (7) of this section, no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.
 
 

(2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (6) (7) and (8) of this section, no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person or authority.
 
 

(3) In this section, the expression "discriminatory" means affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective description by sex, race, place or origin, political opinions, color or creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description.
 
 

(4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes provision-
 
 

a. for the appropriation or public revenues or other public funds;
 
 

b. with respect to persons who are not citizen of Belize;
 
 

c. for the application, in the case of any such description as is mentioned in subsection (3) of this section (or of persons connected with such persons), of the law with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other like matters which is the personal law of persons of that description; or
 
 

d. whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in subsection (3) of this section may be subjected to any disability or restriction or may be accorded any privilege or advantage that, having regard to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining to those persons or to persons of any other such description, is reasonably justifiable.
 
 

(5) Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of subsection (1) of this section to the extent that it makes provision with respect to standards or qualifications (not being standards or qualifications specifically relating to sex, race, place of origin, political opinions, color or creed) to be required or any person who is appointed to or to act in any office or employment.
 
 

(6) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to anything which is expressly or by necessary implication authorized to be done by any such provision of law as is referred to in subsection (4) or subsection (5) of this section.
 
 

(7) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention or this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in subsection (3) of this section may be subjected to any restriction on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by sections 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of this Constitution, being such a restriction as is authorized by section 9(2), paragraph a., b. or h. of section 10 (3), section 11(5), section 12(2) or section 13(2), as the case may be.
 
 

(8) Nothing contained in subsection (2) of this section shall affect any discretion relating to the institution, conductor or discontinuance of civil or criminal proceedings in any court that is vested in any person by or under this Constitution or any other law.
 

17. (1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired except by or under a law that-
 
 

a. prescribes the principles on which and the manner in which reasonable compensation therefor is to be determined and given within a reasonable time; and
 
 

b. secures to any person claiming an interest in or right over the property a right or access to the courts for the purpose of-
 
 

i) establishing his interest or right (if any)
 
 

ii) determining whether that taking of possession or acquisition was duly carried out for a public purpose in accordance whit the law authorizing the taking of possession or acquisition;
 
 

iii) determining the amount of the compensation to which he may be entitled; and
 
 

iv) enforcing his right to any such compensation.
 
 

(2) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any by reason only that it provides for the taking possession of any property or the acquisition of any interest in or right over property-
 
 

a. in satisfaction of any tax, rate or due;
 
 

b. by way of penalty for breach of the law or forfeiture in consequence of a breach of the law;
 
 

c. by way of taking a sample for the purposes of any law;
 
 

d. as an incident of any deposit required to be made with the Government of a reasonable number of copies of every book, magazine, newspaper or other printed work published in Belize;
 
 

e. where the property consist of an animal, upon its being found trespassing or straying;

 f. as an incident of a lease, tenency, mortgage, bill of sale or any other right or obligation arising under a contract;
 
 

g. by way of requiring persons carrying on business in Belize to deposit money with the Government or an agency or the Government for the purpose of controlling credit or investment in Belize;
 
 

h. by way of the vesting and administration of trust property, enemy property, the property of deceased persons, persons of unsound mind or persons adjudged or otherwise declared bankrupt or the property of companies or other societies (whether incorporated or not) in the course of being wound up;
 
 

i) in the execution of judgments or orders of courts;
 
 

j) in consequence of any law with respect to the limitation of actions;
 
 

k) by reason of its being in a dangerous state or injurious to the health of human beings, animals or plants;
 
 

l) for the purpose of marketing property of that description in the common interests of the various persons otherwise entitled to dispose of that property; or
 
 

m) for so long only as may be necessary for the purpose of an examination, investigation, trial or enquiry or, in the case of land, the carrying out on the land-
 
 

i) of work of soil conservation or the conservation for other natural resources; or
 
 

ii) of agricultural development or improvement which the owner or occupier of the land has been required and has without reasonable and lawful excuse refused or failed to carry out.
 

18.- (1) In this Chapter "period of public emergency" means any period during which-
 
 

a. Belize is engaged in any war; or
 
 

b. There is in force a resolution of the National Assembly declaring that democratic institutions in Belize are threatened by subversion.
 
 

(2) The Governor-General may by proclamation which shall be published in the Gazette, declare that a state of public emergency exists for the purposes of this Chapter.
 
 

(3) A proclamation made by the Governor-General under subsection (2) of this section shall not be effective unless it contains a declaration that the Governor-General is satisfied-
 
 

a. that state of war between Belize and another State is imminent or that a public emergency has arisen as a result of the occurrence of any earthquake, hurricane, flood, fire, outbreak of pestilence, outbreak of infectious disease, or other similar calamity; or
 
 

b. that action has been taken or is immediately threatened by any person or body of persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be likely to endanger the public safety or to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of supplies or services essential to life.
 
 

(4) A proclamation made under subsection (2) of this section may be made so as to apply only to such part of Belize as may be specified in the proclamation (in this subsection called "the emergency area"), in which case regulations made under subsection (9) of this section shall except as otherwise expressly provided in such regulations have effect only in the emergency area.
 
 

(5) A proclamation made by the Governor-General for the purposes of and in accordance with this section-
 
 

a. shall, unless previously revoked, remain in force for a period not exceeding one month;
 
 

b. may be extended from time to time by a resolution passed by the National Assembly for further periods, not exceeding in respect of each such extension a period of twelve months; and
 
 

c. may be revoked at any time by a resolution of the National Assembly.
 
 

(6) A resolution of the National Assembly passed for the purposes of subsection (1) (c) of this section shall remain in force for two months or such shorter period as may be specified therein:
 
 

Provided that amy such resolution may be extended from time to time by a further such resolution, each extension not exceeding two months from the date of the resolution effecting the extension; and any such resolution may be revoked at any time by a further resolution.
 
 

(7) A resolution of the National Assembly for the purposes of subsection (1) (c) of this section, and a resolution of the National Assembly extending or revoking any such resolution, shall not be passed unless it is supported by the votes of two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives present and voting.
 
 

(8) Any provision of this section that a proclamation or resolution shall lapse or cease to be in force at any particular time is without prejudice to the making of a further such proclamation or resolution whether before or after that time.
 
 

(9) During any period of public emergency, the following provisions shall have effect-
 
 

a. the Governor-General may make such regulations as are necessary or expedient for securing public safety, the defence of Belize, the maintenance of public order and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community;
 
 

b. any such a regulations may empower such authorities or persons as may be specified in the regulations to make orders and tales for any of the purposes for which such regulations are authorized by this subsection to be made and may contain such incidental and supplementary provisions as are necessary or expedient for the purposes of the regulations;
 
 

c. any such regulations or any order or rule made in pursuance of such regulations may amend or suspend the operation of any law and shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any law;
 
 

d. in this subsection, "law" does nor include this Constitution or ant provision thereof or any law that alters this Constitution or any provision thereof.
 
 

(10) Nothing contained in or don under the authority of any law (including any regulations made under subsection (9) of this section) shall be help to be inconsistent with or in contravention of sections 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 or 17 of this Constitution to the extent that the law in question makes in relation to any period of public emergency provision, or authorizes the doing during any such period of any thing, that is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of any situation arising or existing during the period for the purpose of dealing with that situation.
 

19. (1) When a person is detained by virtue of a law that authorizes the taking during a period of public emergency of measures that are reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists in Belize during that period, the following provisions shall apply, that is to say:-
 
 

a. he shall, with reasonable promptitude and in any case not more than seven days after the commencement of his detention, be informed in a language that he understands of the grounds upon which he is detained and furnished with a written statement in English specifying the particulars of those grounds;
 
 

b. not more than fourteen days after the commencement of his detention, a notification shall be published in the Gazette stating that he has been detained and giving particulars of the provision of law under which his detention is authorized;
 
 

c. not more than one month after the commencement of his detention and thereafter during his detention at intervals of not more than three months, his case shall be reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law and presided over by a person appointed by the Chief Justice from among persons who are legal practitioners;
 
 

d. he shall be afforded reasonable facilities for private communication and consultation with a legal practitioner of his own choice who shall be permitted to make representations to the tribunal appointed for the review of the case of the detained person; and
 
 

e. at the hearing of his case by the tribunal appointed for the review of his case he shall be permitted to appear in person or to be represented by a legal practitioner of his own choice.
 
 

(2) On any review by a tribunal in pursuance of this section of the case of a detained person, the tribunal may make recommendations concerning the necessity or expediency of continuing his detention to the authority by which it was ordered but, unless it is otherwise provided by law, that authority shall not be obliged to act in accordance with any such recommendations.
 
 

(3) Nothing contained in subsection (1) (d) or subsection (1) (e) of this section shall be construed as entitling a person to legal representation at public expense.
 

20.- (1) If any person alleges that any of the provisions of sections 3 to 19 inclusive of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him (or, in the case of a person who is detained, if any other person alleges such a contravention in relation to the detained person), then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person (or that other person) may apply to the Supreme Court for redress.
 
 

(2) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction-
 
 

a. to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of subsection (1) of this section; and
 
 

b. to determine any question arising in the case of any person which is referred to it in pursuance of subsection (3) of this section, and may make such declarations and orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions of sections 3 to 10 inclusive of this Constitution:
 
 

Provided that the Supreme Court may decline to exercise its powers under this subsection if it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are or have been available to the person concerned under any other law.
 
 

(3) If in any proceedings in any court (other than the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court or a court-martial) any question arises as to the contravention of any of the provisions of sections 3 to 19 inclusive of this Constitution, the person presiding in that court may, and shall if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the Supreme Court unless, in his opinion, the raising of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious.
 
 

(4) Any person aggrieved by any determination of the Supreme Court under this section may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeal:
 
 

Provided that no appeal shall lie from a determination for the Supreme Court under this section dismissing an application on the grounds that it is frivolous or vexatious.
 
 

(5) Where any question is referred to the Supreme Court in pursuance of subsection (3) of this section, the Supreme Court shall give its decision upon the question and the court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with that decision or, if that decision is the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal or to Her Majesty in Council, in accordance with the decision to the Court of Appeal or, as the case may be, of Her Majesty in Council.
 
 

(6) Notwithstanding the validity of any law under section 9(2), 10(3), 11(5), 12(2), 13(2) or 16(4)(d) of this Constitution, any act or thing done under the authority of such law shall be unlawful if such act or thing is shown not to be reasonably required in the actual circumstances in which it is done.
 
 

(7) The Supreme Court shall have such powers in addition to those conferred by this section as may be conferred on it by the National Assembly for the purpose of enabling it more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by this section.
 
 

(8) The Chief Justice may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of the Supreme Court in relation to the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it by or under this section (including rules with respect to the time within which applications may be brought and references shall be made to the Supreme Court).
 

21.- Nothing contained in any law in force immediately before Independence Day nor anything done under the authority of any such law shall, for a period of five years after Independence Day, be held to be inconsistent with or done in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter.
 

22.- (1) In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
 
 

"contravention", in relation to any requirement, includes a failure to comply with that requirement, and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly;
 
 

"court" means any court of law having jurisdiction in Belize other than a court established by a disciplinary law, and includes Her Majesty in Council and in sections 4 and 8 of this Constitution a court established by a disciplinary law;
 
 

"disciplinary law" means a law regulating the discipline of any disciplined force;
 
 

"disciplined force" means-
 
 

a. a naval, military or air force;
 
 

b. the Police force;
 
 

c. a prison service; or
 
 

d. any such other force or service as may be prescribed by the National Assembly;
 
 

"legal practitioner" means a person admitted and enrolled as an attorney-at-law under the laws of Belize;
 
 

"member", in relation to a disciplined force, includes any person who, under the law regulating the discipline of that force, is subject to that discipline.
 
 

(2) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force of Belize, nothing contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter other than sections 4, 7 and 8 of this Constitution.
 
 

(3) In relation to any person who is a member of a disciplined force of a country other than Belize that is lawfully present in Belize, nothing contained in or done under the authority of the disciplinary law of that force shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter.
 
 

23. (1) Every person who, having been born in Belize, is immediately before Independence Day a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies shall become a citizen of Belize on Independence Day.
 
 

(2) Every person who, immediately before Independence Day is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies-
 
 

a. having become such a citizen under the British Nationality Act 1948 a. by virtue of his having been naturalized in Belize as a British subject before that Act came into force; or
 
 

b. having while resident in Belize become such a citizen by virtue of his having been naturalized or registered under that Act,
 
 

shall become a citizen of Belize on Independence Day.
 
 

(3) Every person who, having been born outside Belize, is immediately before Independence Day a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies shall, if his father or mother becomes, or would but for his death or the renunciation of his citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies have become a citizen of Belize by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, become a citizen of Belize on Independence Day.
 
 

(4) Every person who having been born outside Belize, is immediately before Independence Day a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies shall, if one of his grandparents becomes, or would but for his death or the renunciation of his citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies have become, a citizen of Belize by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, become a citizen of Belize on Independence Day:
 
 

Provided that a person shall not become a citizen of Belize by virtue of this subsection if immediately before Independence Day he possesses the citizenship of any country other than the United Kingdom.
 
 

(5) Every woman who, having been married to a person who becomes, or but for his death or the renunciation of his citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies would have become, a citizen of Belize by virtue of subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this section, is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies immediately before Independence Day shall become a citizen of Belize on Independence Day.
 
 

(6) In this section"the British Nationality Act 1948" includes any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom amending that Act.
 

24. Every person born in Belize on or after Independence Day shall become a citizen or Belize at the date of his birth:
 
 

Provided that a person shall not become a citizen of Belize by virtue of this section if at the time of his birth-
 
 

a. neither of his parents is a citizen of Belize and his father or mother possesses such immunity from suit and legal process as is accorded to the envoy of a foreign sovereign power accredited to Belize; or
 
 

b. his father or mother is a citizen of a country with which Belize is at war and the birth occurs in a place then under occupation by that country.
 

25. A person born outside Belize on or after Independence Day shall become a citizen of Belize at the date of his birth if, at that date, his father or mother is a citizen of Belize otherwise than by virtue of this section or subsection (3) or (4) of section 23 of this Constitution.
 

26. (1) the following persons may, upon making application at any time after Independence Day, be registered as citizens of Belize-
 
 

a. any person who is married to a citizen of Belize;
 
 

b. any person who has been resident continuously in Belize for a period of five years immediately before the date of his application.
 
 

(2) The National Assembly shall prescribe by law the procedure for making and determining applications, and the conditions to be fulfilled by persons making applications, for registration under this section.
 
 

(3) A person registered as a citizen of Belize under this section shall become a citizen of Belize on the date on which he is so registered.
 

27. Any citizen of Belize who, by virtue of any voluntary act of his (other than marriage), acquires the citizenship of any other country shall, with effect from the date of such acquisition, cease to be a citizen of Belize.
 

28. The National Assembly may make provision, not inconsistent with this Chapter, in respect of citizenship, including provision for-
 
 

a. the acquisition of citizenship of Belize by person who are not eligible or who are no longer eligible to become citizens of Belize under this Chapter;
 
 

b. depriving any person of his citizenship of Belize;
 
 

c. the renunciation by any person of his citizenship of Belize.
 

29. (1) For the purposes of this Chapter, a person born aboard a registered ship or aircraft, or aboard an unregistered ship or aircraft of the government of any country, shall be deemed to have been born in the place in which the ship or aircraft was registered or, as the case may be, in that country.
 
 

(2) Any reference in this Chapter to the national status of the father of a person at the time of that person's birth shall, in relation to a person born after the death of his father, be construed as a reference to the national status of the father at the time of the father's death; and where that death occurred before Independence Day and the birth occurred on or after Independence Day the national status that the father would have had if he had died on Independence Day shall be deemed to be his national status at the time of his death.
 
 

30. There shall be a Governor-General of Belize who shall be a citizen of Belize appointed by Her Majesty and shall hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure and who shall be Her Majesty's representative in Belize.
 

31. (1) During any period when the office of Governor-General is vacant or the holder of the office of Governor-General is absent from Belize or is for any other reason unable to perform the functions of his office those functions shall be performed by such person as Her Majesty may appoint.
 
 

(2) Any such person as aforesaid shall nor continue to perform the functions of the office of Governor-General or some other person having a prior right to perform the functions of that office has notified him that he is about to assume or resume those functions.
 
 

(3) The holder of the office of Governor-General shall not, for the purposes of this section, be regarded as absent from Belize or as unable to perform the functions of his office-
 
 

a. by reason that he is in passage from one part of Belize to another; or
 
 

b. at any time when there is a subsisting appointment of a deputy under section 33 of this Constitution.
 

32. A person appointed to hold the office of Governor-general shall before entering upon the duties of that office, take and subscribe the oath of allegiance and office.
 

33. (1) Whenever the Governor-General
 
 

a. has occasion to be absent from the seat of government but not from Belize;
 
 

b. has occasion to be absent from Belize for a period which he considers, acting in his own deliberate judgment, will be of short duration; or
 
 

c. is suffering from an illness which he considers, acting in his own deliberate judgment, will be of short duration.
 
 

he may, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, appoint, any person in Belize to be his deputy during such absence or illness and in that capacity to perform on his behalf such of the functions of the office of Governor-General as may be specified in the instrument by which he is appointed.
 
 

(2) The power and authority of the Governor-General shall not be abridged, altered or in any way affected by the appointment of a deputy under this section, and subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a deputy shall conform to and observe all instructions that the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, may from time to time address to him:
 
 

Provided that the question whether or not a deputy has conformed to and observed any such instructions shall not be enquired into by any court of law.
 
 

(3) A person appointed as deputy under this section shall hold that appointment for such period as may be specified in the instrument by which he is appointed, and his appointment may be revoked at any time by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
 

34. (1) In the exercise of his functions the Governor-General shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet except in cases where he is required by this Constitution or any other law to act in accordance with the advice of, or after consultation with, any person or authority other than the Cabinet or in his own deliberate judgment.
 
 

(2) Any reference in this Constitution to the functions of the Governor-General shall be construed as a reference to his powers and duties in the exercise of the executive authority of Belize and to any other powers and duties conferred or imposed on him as Governor-General by or under this Constitution or any other law.
 
 

(3) Where by this Constitution the Governor-General is required to perform any function after consultation with any person or authority he shall not be obliged to exercise that function in accordance with the advice of that person or authority.
 
 

(4) Where by this Constitution the Governor-General is required to perform any function in accordance with the advice of, or after consultation with, any person or authority, the question whether the Governor General has so exercised that function shall not be enquired into by any court of law.
 

35. The Prime Minister shall keep the Governor-General fully informed concerning the general conduct of the government of Belize and shall furnish the Governor-General with such information as he may request with respect to any particular matter relating to the government of Belize.
 
 

36. (1) The executive authority of Belize is vested in Her Majesty,
 
 

(2) Subject to the provision of this Constitution, the executive authority of Belize may be exercised on behalf of Her Majesty by the Governor-General either directly or through officers subordinate to him .
 
 

(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent the National Assembly from conferring functions on persons or authorities other than the Governor-General.
 

37. (1) There shall be a Prime Minister of Belize who shall be appointed by the Governor-General.
 
 

(2) Whenever the Governor-General has occasion to appoint a Prime Minister he shall appoint a member of the House of Representatives who is the leader of the political party which commands the support of the majority of the members of that House; and if no political party has an overall majority, he shall appoint a member of that House who appears to him likely to command the support of the majority of the members of that House.
 
 

(3) If occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of Prime Minister while the National Assembly is dissolved, then not withstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, a person who was a member of the House of Representatives and the Prime Minister does not within seven days either resign from his office or advise the Governor-General to dissolve the National Assembly.
 
 

(5) The office of Prime Minister shall also become vacant-
 
 

a. if the holder of the office ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives otherwise than by reason of the dissolution of the National Assembly;
 
 

b. if, by virtue of section 59(3) of this Constitution, he is required to cease to perform his function as a member of the House; or
 
 

c. if he is informed by the Governor-General that the Governor-General is in accordance with subsection (2) or (3) of this section about to reappoint him as Prime Minister or to appoint another person as Prime Minister.
 
 

(6) In exercise of the powers conferred on him by this section the Governor-General shall act in his own deliberate judgment.
 

38. The Governor-General shall, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, designate a Minister as Deputy Prime Minister to whom the Prime Minister may from time to time depute such of his functions as he may specify.
 

39. (1) Whenever the Prime Minister is absent from Belize or is by reason of illness unable to perform the functions conferred on him in accordance with this Constitution, those functions (other than the functions conferred by this section) shall be performed-
 
 

a. by the Deputy Prime Minister; or
 
 

b. in the absence of the Deputy Prime Minister or if he too is likewise unable to perform those functions, by such other Minister as the Governor-General may authorize for that purpose.
 
 

(2) The Deputy Prime Minister shall cease to perform the functions of the Prime Minister when he is informed by the Governor-General that the Deputy Prime Minister is about to assume, or that the Prime Minister is about to resume, those functions.
 
 

(4) The powers of the Governor-General under this section shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister:
 
 

Provided that if the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, considers that it is impracticable to obtain the advice of the Prime Minister owing to the absence or illness of the Prime Minister he may exercise those powers-
 
 

a. in accordance with the advice of the Deputy Prime Minister, or
 
 

b. if he likewise considers it impracticable to obtain the advice of the Deputy Prime Minister, in his own deliberate judgment.
 

40. (1) There shall be, in addition to the office of Prime Minister, such other offices of Minister of the Government as may be established by the National Assembly or, subject to the provision of any law enacted by the National Assembly, by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
 
 

(2) Appointment to the office of Minister shall be made by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, from among members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate:
 
 

Provided that person holding the office of Speaker of the House of Representatives of President of the Senate may not be appointed to the office of Minister.
 
 

(3) If occasion arises for making an appointment to the office of Minister while the National Assembly is dissolved, then notwithstanding the provisions of subsection(2) of this section, a person who was a member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate immediately before the dissolution may be appointed as Minister.
 
 

(4) The office of any Minister shall become vacant-
 
 

a. if the holder of the office ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate otherwise than by reason of the dissolution of the National Assembly;
 
 

b. if, by virtue of section 59(3) or 64(3) of this Constitution, he is required to cease to perform his functions as a member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate;
 
 

c. if the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, so directs;
 
 

d. if the Prime Minister resigns from office within seven days after a resolution of no confidence in the Government has been passed by the House of Representatives or is removed from office under section 37(4) of this Constitution; or
 
 

e. on the appointment of any person to the office of Prime Minister.
 
 

(5) In this section, "Minister" means a Minister of the Government other than the Prime Minister.
 

41. (1) The Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may, by directions in writing, assign to the Prime Minister or any other Minister responsibility for any business of the Government, including the administration of any department of government:
 
 

Provided that responsibility for finance shall be assigned to a Minister who is a member of the House of Representatives.
 
 

(2) Where a Minister has been charged with responsibility for any department of government, he shall exercise general direction and control over that department of government.
 

42. (1) The Attorney-General shall be the principal legal adviser to the Government.
 
 

(2) The office of Attorney-General shall be the office of a Minister, with responsibility for the administration of legal affairs in Belize.
 
 

(3) No person shall be qualified to hold the office of Attorney-General unless he is a person who has for at least five years been entitled to practice as an advocate in a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or in the Republic of Ireland or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from any such court.
 
 

(4) If a person holding the office of Attorney-General is for any reason unable to perform the functions conferred on him by or under any law, those functions may be performed by such other person, being a person qualified as aforesaid (whether or not that person is a member of either House of the National Assembly), as the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may direct.

 (5) Legal proceedings for or against the State shall be taken, in the case of civil proceedings, in the name of the Attorney-General and, in the case of criminal proceedings, in the name of the Crown.
 

43. (1) Whenever a Minister other than the Prime Minister is absent from Belize or is within Belize but by leave of the Governor-General is not performing the functions of his office or by reason of illness is unable to perform those functions, the Governor-General may authorize some other Minister to perform those functions or may appoint a member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate to be a temporary Minister a order to perform those functions; and that Minister may perform those functions until his authority or, as the case may be, his appointment is revoked by the Governor-General or he vacates office as a Minister under section 40(4) of this Constitution.
 
 

(2) The powers of the Governor-General under this section shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister:
 
 

Provided that if the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, considers that it is impracticable to obtain the advice of the Prime Minister owing to his absence of illness he may exercise those powers in accordance with the advice of the Deputy Prime Minister.
 

44. (1) There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers for Belize which shall consist of the Prime Minister and the other Minister.
 
 

(2) The Cabinet shall be the principal executive instrument of policy with general direction and control of the Government and shall be collectively responsible to the National Assembly for any advice given to the Governor-General by or under the general authority of the Cabinet and for all things done by or under the authority of any Minister in the execution of his office.
 
 

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall not apply in relation to-
 
 

a. the appointment and removal from office of Minister and Deputy Minister, the assignment of responsibility to any Minister under section 41 of this Constitution, or the authorization of another Minister to perform the functions of the Prime Minister during absence or illness; or
 
 

b. the dissolution of the National Assembly.
 
 

(4) Whenever practicable the Prime Minister shall attend and preside at all Cabinet meetings; at a meeting of the Cabinet from which the Prime Minister is absent, any other Minister appointed by him for the purpose shall preside.
 

45. (1) The Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may appoint Deputy Ministers from among the members of the House of Representatives or of the Senate to assist Minister in the performance of their duties.
 
 

(2) The office of a Deputy Minister shall become vacant-
 
 

a. if the holder of the office ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate otherwise than by reason of the dissolution of the National Assembly;
 
 

b. if, by virtue of section 59(3) or 64(3) of this Constitution, he is required to cease to perform his functions as a member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate;
 
 

c. if the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. so directs;
 
 

d. if the Prime Minister resigns from office within seven days after a resolution of no confidence in the Government has been passed by the House of Representatives or is removed from office under section 37(4) of this Constitution; or
 
 

e. on the appointment of any person to the office of Prime Minister.
 

46. A Minister or a Deputy Minister shall not enter upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and office.
 

47. (1) There shall (except at times when there are no members of the House of Representatives who do not support the Government) be a Leader of the Opposition who shall be appointed by the Governor-General.
 
 

(2) Whenever there is occasion for the appointment of a Leader of the Opposition the Governor-General shall appoint the member of the House of Representatives who appears to him most likely to command the support of a majority of the members of the House who do not support the Government: or, of no member or the House who appears to him to command such support, the member of the House who appears to him to command the support of the largest single group of members of the House who do not support the Government.
 
 

(3) If occasion arises to appoint a Leader of the Opposition during the period between a dissolution of the National Assembly and the day on which the ensuing election of members of the House of Representatives is held, an appointment may be made as if the National Assembly had not been dissolved.
 
 

(4) The office of Leader of the Opposition shall become vacant-
 
 

a. if the holder of the office ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of the National Assembly;
 
 

b. by virtue of section 59(3) of this Constitution, he is required to cease to perform his functions as a member of the House; or
 
 

c. if he is removed from office by the Governor-General under the provisions of subsection (5) of this section.

 (5) If it appears to the Governor-General that the Leader of the Opposition is no longer able to command the support of a majority of the members of the House of Representatives who do not support the Government or (if no member of the House appears to him to be able to command such support) the support of the largest single group of the House who do not support the Government, he shall remove the Leader of the Opposition from office.
 
 

(6) Subject to the provisions of section 61(3)b. of this Constitution during any period in which there is vacancy in the office of Leader of the Opposition, the provisions of this Constitution containing the requirement that action shall be taken in accordance with the advice of or after consultation with, or with the concurrence of, the Leader of Opposition shall have effect as if there were no such requirement.
 
 

(7) The powers of the Governor-General under this section shall be exercised by him in his own deliberate judgment.
 

48. Subject to the direction and control of the Minister pursuant to section 41(2) of this Constitution, every department of government shall be under the supervision of a public officer whose office is referred to in this Constitution as the office of a permanent secretary:
 
 

Provided that two or more government departments may be placed under the supervision of one permanent secretary.
 

49. (1) There shall be a Secretary to the Cabinet whose office shall be a public office.
 
 

(2) The Secretary to the Cabinet, who shall have charge of the Cabinet Office, shall be responsible, in accordance with such instructions as may be given to him by the Prime Minster, for arranging the business for, and keeping the minutes of, the Cabinet and for conveying the decisions of the Cabinet to the appropriate person or authority and shall have such other functions as the Prime Minister may direct.
 

50. (1) There shall be a Director of Public Prosecutions whose office shall be a public office.
 
 

(2) The Director of Public Prosecutions shall have power in any case in which he considers it desirable so to do-
 
 

a. to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court of law (other than a court-martial) in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed by that person;
 
 

b. to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that have been instituted or undertaken by any other person or authority; and
 
 

c. to discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or any other person or authority.
 
 

(3) The powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions under subsection (2) of this section may be exercise by him in person or through other persons acting under and in accordance with his general or special instructions.
 
 

(4) The powers conferred on the Director of Public Prosecutions by paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (2) of this section shall be vested in him to the exclusion of any other person or authority:
 
 

Provided that where any other person or authority has instituted criminal proceedings, nothing in this subsection shall prevent the withdrawal of those proceedings by or at the instance of that person or authority and with the leave of the court.
 
 

(5) For the purposes of this section, any appeal from a judgment in criminal proceedings before any court, or any case stated or question of law reserved for the purpose of any such proceedings, to any other court (including Her Majesty in Council) shall be deemed to be part of those proceedings:
 
 

Provided that the power conferred on the Director of Public Prosecutions by subsection (2)c. of this section shall not be exercised in relation to any appeal by a person convicted in any criminal proceedings or to any case stated or question of law reserved at the instance of such a person.

 (6) Subject to powers of the Attorney-General under section 42(2) of this Constitution, in the exercise of the powers vested in him by subsection (2) of this section the Director of Public Prosecutions shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.
 

51. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any other law, the Governor-General may constitute offices for Belize, make appointments to any such office and terminate any such appointment.
 

52. (1) The Governor-General may-
 
 

a. grant a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions, to any person convicted of any offence;
 
 

b. grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of any punishment imposed on that person for any offence;
 
 

c. substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on any person for any offence; or
 
 

d. remit the whole or any part of any punishment imposed on any person for any offence or of any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to the Crown on account of any offence.
 
 

(2) The powers of the Governor-General under subsection (1) of this section shall be exercise by him in accordance with the advice of the Belize Advisory Council.
 

53. Where any person has been sentence to death (otherwise than by a court-martial) for an offence, the Attorney-General shall cause a written report of the case from the trial judge (or the chief justice, if a report from the trial judge cannot be obtained),together with such other information derived from the record of the case or elsewhere as he may require, to be taken into consideration at a meeting of the Belize Advisory Council, so that the Council may advise the Governor-General whether to exercise any of his powers under section 52(1) of this Constitution.
 

54. (1) There shall be a Belize Advisory Council which shall consist of not less than six members who shall be persons of integrity and high national standing, of whom at leas two shall be persons who hold or have held any office referred to in section 107 of this Constitution, at least one shall be a person who holds or has held office as adjudge of a superior court of record and at least one shall be a member of a recognized profession in Belize.
 
 

(2) Two members of the Belize Advisory Council shall be appointed by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given with the concurrence of the Leader of the Opposition, and the other members of the Belize Advisory Council shall be appointed by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
 
 

(3) No person shall be appointed as a member of the Belize Advisory Council unless he is a citizen of Belize, except that a member of the Council who holds or has held office as a judge of a superior court of record need not be a citizen of Belize provided that he is a Commonwealth citizen.
 
 

(4) Members of the Belize Advisory Council shall be appointed for a period of then years or such shorter period as may be specified in their respective instruments of appointment.
 
 

(5) A member of the Belize Advisory Council shall not enter upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and office.
 
 

(6) The office of a member of the Belize Advisory Council shall become vacant-
 
 

a. at the expiration of ten years from the date of his appointment or at the expiration of the period specified in the instrument by which he was appointed, whichever is the soon;
 
 

b. when he appliance the age of seventy-five years;
 
 

c. if he resigns such office by writing under his own hand addressed to the Governor-General; or
 
 

d. if by a resolution of the House of Representatives supported by two-thirds of the members of that House he is declared unable to discharge the functions of his office by reason of persistent absence or infirmity or body or mind, or to be in breach of the provisions of section 121 of this Constitution.
 
 

(7) The functions of the Belize Advisory Council shall be-
 
 

a. to advise the Governor-General in the exercise of his powers under section 52 of this Constitution;
 
 

b. to perform such other tasks and duties as are conferred or imposed on it by this Constitution or any other law.
 
 

(8) In the exercise of its functions the Belize Advisory Council shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.
 
 

(9) The Governor-General shall convene meetings of the Belize Advisory Council as appropriate for consideration of matters which in accordance with this Constitution or any other law the Council in called upon to consider, and otherwise when the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, so decides.
 
 

(10) The Governor-General shall, whenever practicable, attend meetings of the Belize advisory Council.
 
 

(11) The Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, shall appoint one of the members of the Belize Advisory Council to be the Senior Member.
 
 

(12) At the meeting of the Belize Advisory Council the Chairman shall be-
 
 

a. the Governor-General; or
 
 

b. in the absence of the Governor-general, the Senior Member; or
 
 

c. in the absence of the Governor-General, the Senior Member, the member of the Council elected by a majory of the members attending the meeting to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Senior Member at that meeting:
 
 

Provided that in any case where the Council is convened to discharge its duties under section 98, 102,105,108 or 109 of this Constitution the Chairman shall be a member of the Council who holds or has held office as a judge of a superior court of record and who has been deputed to act in that capacity by the Governor-General acting in his own deliberate judgment.
 
 

(13) At meetings of the Belize Advisory Council-
 
 

a. the quorum shall be five members;
 
 

b. decisions shall be taken by a majority of the votes of those members of the Council present and voting, and
 
 

c. in the event that votes are equally divided on any matter, the Chairman, except when he is the Governor-General,shall have a casting vote in addition to his original vote.
 
 

(14) The Belize Advisory Council shall regulate its own procedure.
 
 

(15) The Belize Advisory Council may, subject to the provisions of this section and to its rules of procedure,act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership or the absence of any member.
 
 

(16) The question whether or not the Belize Advisory Council has validly performed any functions entrusted to it by this Constitution or any other law shall not be enquired into by any court of law.
 
 

55. There shall be in and for Belize a Legislature which shall consist of a National Assembly comprising two Houses, that is to say, a House of Representatives and a Senate.
 

56. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the House of Representatives shall consist of eighteen members who shall be elected in the manner provided by law.
 
 

(2) If any person who is not a member of the House of Representatives is elected to be Speaker of the House he shall, by virtue of holding the office of Speaker, be a member of the House in addition to the eighteen members aforesaid.
 
 

(3) The National Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of section 90 of this Constitution, may by law increase the number of members of the House of Representatives.
 

57. Subject to the provisions of section 58 of this Constitution, a person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of the House of Representatives if, and shall not be qualified to be so elected unless, he-
 
 

a. is a citizen of Belize of the age of eighteen years or upwards; and
 
 

b. has resided in Belize for a period of at least one year immediately before the date of his nomination for election.
 

58. (1) No person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of the House of Representatives who_
 
 

a. is, by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or State;
 
 

b. is an undischarged bankrupt, having been adjudged or otherwise declared bankrupt under any law in force in any part of the Commonwealth;
 
 

c. is a person certified to be insane or otherwise adjudged to be of unsound mind under any law;
 
 

d. is under sentence of death imposed on him by a court in any part of the Commonwealth or is serving a sentence of imprisonment (by whatever name called) exceeding twelve months imposed on him by such a court or substituted by competent authority for some other sentence imposed on him by such a court, or is under such a sentence of imprisonment the execution of which has been suspended;
 
 

e. is disqualified for membership of the House of Representatives by any law by reason of his holding, or acting in, any office the functions of which involve-
 
 

(i) any responsibility for, or in connection with the conduct for any election, or
 
 

(ii) any responsibility for the compilation or revision of any electoral register;
 
 

f. is disqualified for membership of the House of Representatives by virtue of any law by reason of his having been convicted of any offence relating to elections;

 g. is disqualified for membership of the House of Representatives under any law by virtue of-
 
 

(i) his holding or acting in any office or appointment specified (either individually or by reference to a class of office or appointment) by such law;
 
 

(ii) his belonging to any of the armed forces of Belize or to any class of person that is comprised in any such force; or
 
 

(iii) his belonging to any police force or to any class of person that is comprised in any such force or.
 
 

h. is a party to, or a partner in a firm or a director or a manager of a company which is a party to, any contract with the Government for or on account of the public service and has not, within one month before the day of election, declared publicity and in a newspaper circulating in the electoral division for which he is a candidate a notice setting out the nature of the contract and his interest, or the interest of any such firm or company, therein:
 
 

Provided that if it appears to the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, that is proper so to do, he may by order direct that any such disqualifications shall be disregarded for the purposes of this section, but no such order shall be made if proceedings have been commenced calling in question the right of that member to be a member of the House of Representatives on the ground that he is disqualified under this paragraph.
 
 

(2) For the purposes of paragraph b. of subsection (1) of this section-
 
 

a. two or more sentences of imprisonment that are required to be served consecutively shall be regarded as separate sentences if none of those sentences exceeds that term they shall be regarded as one sentence; and
 
 

b. no account shall be taken of a sentence of imprisonment imposed as an alternative to or in default of the payment of a fine.
 

59. (1) Every member of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in the House at the next dissolution of the National Assembly after his election.
 
 

(2) A member of the House of Representatives shall also vacant his seat in the House-
 
 

a. if he is absent from the sittings of the House for such period and in such circumstances as may be prescribed in the Standing Orders of the House;
 
 

b. if he ceases to be a citizen of Belize;
 
 

c. subject to the provisions of subsections (3) of this section, if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the House of Representatives, would cause him to be disqualified for election thereto by virtue of section 58(1) of this Constitution; or
 
 

d. if he shall become a party to any contract with the Government for or on account of the public service, or if any firm in which he is a partner or any company of which he is a director or manager shall become a party to any such contract, or if he shall become a partner in a firm or a director or manager of a company which is a party to any such contract:
 
 

Provided that if in the circumstances it shall appear to them just so to do, the House of Representatives by resolution may exempt any member there of from vacating his seat under the provisions of this paragraph if such member shall, before becoming a party to such contract as aforesaid or before or as soon as practicable after becoming otherwise interested in such contract (whether as partner in a firm or director or manager of a company), disclose to the House the nature of such contract and his interest or the interest of any such firm or company therein.
 
 

(3) a. If circumstances such as are referred to in paragraph c. of subsection (2) of this section arise because any member of the House of Representatives is under sentence of death or imprisonment, or adjudged to be insane or otherwise of unsound mind, or declared bankrupt and undischarged, or convicted of an offence relating to elections, and or it is open to the member to appeal against the decision (either with the leave or a court or other authority or without such leave), he shall forthwith case to perform his functions as a member of the House but, subject to the provisions of this subsection, he shall not vacate his seat until the expiration of a period of thirty days thereafter:
 
 

Provided that the Speaker may from time to time extend that period for further periods of thirty days to enable the members to pursue an appeal against the decision, so , however, that extensions of time exceeding in the aggregate one hundred and fifty days shall not be given without the approval, signified by resolution, of the House.
 
 

b. If on the determination of any appeal, such circumstances continue to exist and no further appeal is open to the member, or if, by reason of the expiration of any period for entering an appeal or notice thereof or the refusal of leave to appeal or for any other reason, it ceases to be open to the member to appeal, he shall forthwith vacate his seat.
 
 

c. If at any time before the member of the House vacates his seat such circumstances as aforesaid cases to exist, his seat shall not become vacant on the expiration of the period referred to in paragraph a. of this subsection and he may resume the performance of his functions as a member of the House.
 

60. (1) When the House of Representatives first meets after any general election and before it proceeds to the despatch of any other business it shall elect a person to be Speaker of the House; and, if the office of Speaker falls vacant at any time before the next dissolution of the National Assembly, the House shall, as soon as practicable, elect another person to that office.
 
 

(2) The Speaker shall be above the age of thirty years and may be elected either from among the members of the House of Representatives who are not Minister or from among persons who are not members of either House:
 
 

Provided that a person who is not a member of either House shall not be elected as Speaker if-
 
 

a. he is not a citizen of Belize; or
 
 

b. he is a person disqualified for election as a member of the House of Representatives by virtue of section 58 (1) of this Constitution.
 
 

(3) When the House of Representatives first meets after any general election and before it proceeds to the despatch of any other business except the election of the Speaker, the House shall elect a member of the House, who is not a Minister, to be Deputy Speaker of the House; and if the office of Deputy Speaker falls vacant at any time before the next dissolution of the National Assembly, the House shall, as soon as practicable, elect another such member to that office.
 
 

(4) A person shall vacate the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker-
 
 

a. in the case of a Speaker elected from among members of the House of Representatives or in the case of the Deputy Speaker-
 
 

(i) if he ceases to be a member of the House; or
 
 

(ii) if he is appointed to be a Minister;
 
 

b. in the case of a Speaker elected from among persons who are not members of either House-
 
 

(i) upon any dissolution of the National Assembly;
 
 

(ii) if he ceases to be a citizen of Belize; or
 
 

(iii) if any circumstances arise which would cause him to be disqualified for election as a member of the House by virtue of section 58(1) of this Constitution;
 
 

c. in the case of the Deputy Speaker, if he id elected to be Speaker.
 
 

(5) a. If, by virtue of section 59(3) of this Constitution, the Speaker or Deputy Speaker is required to cease to perform his functions as a member of the House of Representatives he shall also cease to perform his functions as Speaker or Deputy Speaker, as the case may be, and those functions shall, until he vacates his seat in the House or resumes the performance of the functions of his office, be performed-
 
 

(i) in the case of the Speaker, by the Deputy Speaker or, if the office of Deputy Speaker is vacant, by such member of the House not being a Minister) as the House may elect for the purpose;
 
 

(ii) in the case of the deputy Speaker, by such member of the House (not being a Minister) as the House may elect for the purpose.
 
 

b. If the Speaker or Deputy Speaker resumes the performance of his functions as a member of the House, in accordance with the provisions of section 59(3) of this Constitution, he shall also resume the performance of his functions as Speaker or Deputy, as the case may be.
 

61. (1) The Senate shall consist of eight members (in this Constitution referred to as "Senators") who shall be appointed by the Governor-General in accordance with the provisions of this section:
 
 

Provided that if any person who is not a Senator is elected to be President of the Senate he shall, by virtue of holding the office of President, be a Senator in addition to the eight members aforesaid.
 
 

(2) of the eight Senators-
 
 

a. five shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister;
 
 

b. two shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of this section;
 
 

c. one shall be appointed by the Governor-General acting after consultation with the Belize Advisory Council.
 
 

(3) The two Senators referred to in subsection (2)b. of this section shall be appointed-
 
 

a. by the Governor-general acting in accordance with the advice of the Leader of the Opposition; or
 
 

b. if the office of Leader of the Opposition is vacant, then-
 
 

(i) by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of a person selected by him, in his own deliberate judgment, for the purpose of tendering such advice; or
 
 

(ii) if the Governor-General, in his own deliberate judgment, decides to select two such persons, by the Governor-General acting in accordance with the advice of such persons, each of whom shall advice him on the appointment of one Senator.
 

62. Subject to the provisions of section 63 of this Constitution, a person shall be qualified to be appointed as a Senator if, and shall not be qualified to be so appointed unless, he-
 
 

a. is a citizen of Belize of the age of eighteen years or upwards, and
 
 

b. has resided in Belize for a period of at least one year immediately before the date of his appointment.
 

63. (1) No person shall be qualified to be appointed as a Senator who-
 
 

a. is, by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or State,
 
 

b. is a member of the House of Representatives;
 
 

c. is an undischarged bankrupt, having been adjudged or otherwise declared bankrupt under any law in force in any part or the Commonwealth;
 
 

d. is a person certified to be insane or otherwise to be of unsound mind under any law;
 
 

e. is under sentence of death imposed upon him by a court in any part of the vCommonwealth or is serving a sentence of imprisonment (by whatever name called) exceeding twelve months imposed on him by such a court or substituted by competent authority for some other sentence imposed on him by such a court, or is under such a sentence of imprisonment the execution of which has been suspended:
 
 

f. is disqualified for membership of the House of Representatives by any law by reason of his holding, or acting in any office the functions of which involve-
 
 

(i) any responsibility for or in connection with the conduct of any election, or
 
 

(ii) any responsibility for the compilation or revision of any electoral register;
 
 

g. is disqualified for membership of the House of Representatives by virtue of any law by reason of his having been convicted of any offence relating to elections;
 
 

h. is disqualified for membership of the Senate under any law by virtue of-
 
 

(i) his holding or acting in any office or appointment specified (eighter individually or by reference to a class of office or appointment) by such law;
 
 

(ii) his belonging to any of the armed forces of Belize or to any class of person that is comprised in any such force; or
 
 

(iii) his belonging to any police force or to any class of person that is comprised in any such force; or
 
 

i. is a party to, or a partner in a firm or a director or manager of a company which is a party to, any contract with the Government for or on account of the public service, and has not disclosed to the Governor-General the nature of such contract and his interest, or the interest of any such firm or company, therein:
 
 

Provide that if it appears to the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, that it is proper so to do, he may by order direct that any such disqualification shall be disregarded for the purposes of this section.
 
 

(2) For the purposes of paragraph e. of subsection (1) of this section-
 
 

a. two or more sentences of imprisonment that are required to be served consecutively shall be regarded as separate sentences if none of those sentences exceeds twelve months, but if any one of such sentences exceeds that term they shall be regarded as one sentence; and
 
 

b. no account shall be taken of a sentence of imprisonment imposed as an alternative to or in default of the payment of a fine.
 

64. (1) Every Senator shall vacate his seat in the Senate at the next dissolution of the National Assembly after his appointment.
 
 

(2) A Senator shall also vacate his seat in the Senate-
 
 

a. if he is absent from the sitting of the Senate for such period and in such circumstances as may be prescribed in the Standing Orders of the Senate;
 
 

b. if, with his consent, he is nominated as a candidate for election to the House of Representatives;
 
 

c. if he ceases to be a citizen of Belize;
 
 

d. subject to the provisions of subsections (3) of this section, if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a Senator, would cause him to be disqualified for appointment as such by virtue of section 63(1) of this Constitution;
 
 

e. if the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister in the case of a Senator appointed in accordance with that advice, or acting in accordance with the advice of the Leader of the Opposition in the case of a Senator appointed in accordance with that advice, or acting after consultation with the Belize Advisory Council in the case of a Senator appointed after such consultation, declares the seat of that Senator to be vacant; or
 
 

f. if he shall become a party to any contract with the Government for or on account of the public service, or if any firm in which he is a partner or any company of which he is a director or manager shall become a party to any such contract, or if he shall become a partner in a firm or a director or manager or a company which is a party to any such contract:
 
 

Provided that if in the circumstances it shall appear to him to be just so to do, the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, may exempt any Senator from vacating his seat under the provisions of this paragraph if such Senator shall, before becoming a party to such contract as aforesaid or before or as soon as practicable after becoming otherwise interested in such contract (whether as partner in a firm or director or manager of a company), disclose to the Governor-general the nature of such contract and his interest or the interest of any such firm or company therein.
 
 

(3) a. If circumstances such as are referred to in paragraph d. of subsection (2) of this section arise because a Senator is under sentence of death or imprisonment, or adjudged to be insane or otherwise of unsound mind, or declared bankrupt and is undischarged, or convicted of an offence relating to elections, and it is open to the Senator to appeal against the decision (either with the leave of a court or other authority of without such leave), he shall forthwith cease to perform his functions as a Senator but,subject to the provisions of this subsection, he shall not vacate his seat until the expiration of a period of thirty days thereafter:
 
 

Provided that the President of the Senate may from time to time extend that period for further periods of thirty days to enable the Senator to pursue an appeal against the decision, so, however, that extensions of time exceeding in the aggregate one hundred and fifty days shall not be given without the approval, signified by resolution, of the Senate.
 
 

b. If one the determination of an appeal, such circumstances continue to exist and no further appeal is pen to the Senator, or if, by reason of the expiration of any period for entering an appeal or notice thereof or the refusal of leave to appeal or for any other reason, it ceases to be open to the Senator to appeal, he shall forthwith vacate his seat.
 
 

c. If a any time before the Senator vacates his seat such circumstances as aforesaid cease to exist, his seat shall not become vacant on the expiration of the period referred to in paragraph a. of this subsection and he may resume the performance of his functions as Senator.
 

65. (1) The Governor-General may declare a Senator to be, by reason of illness, temporarily incapable of performing his functions as a Senator and thereupon such Senator shall not perform his said functions until he is declared by the Governor-General again to be capable of performing them.
 
 

(2) Whenever a Senator is incapable of performing his functions as a Senator by reason of his absence from Belize or by virtue of the provisions of section 64 of this Constitution or by reason of a declaration made under the last foregoing subsection, the Governor-General may appoint a person qualified for appointment as a Senator to be temporarily a member of the Senate.
 
 

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) of section 64 of this Constitution shall apply in relation to a person appointed as a Senator under this section as they apply in relation to a Senator appointed as a Senator under section 61 (except that paragraph d. of the said subsection (2) shall apply as if it were not expressed to be subject to subsection (3) of the said section 64) and an appointment made under this section shall in any case cease to have effect when the person appointed is notified by the Governor-General that the circumstances giving rise to his appointment have ceased to exist.
 
 

(4) In the exercise of the powers conferred on him by this section the Governor-General shall act-
 
 

a. in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister in relation to an appointment to be temporarily a member of the Senate in place of a Senator appointed in pursuance of paragraph a. of subsection (2) of section 61 of this Constitution;
 
 

b. in accordance with the advice of the Leader of the Opposition in relation to an appointment to be temporarily a member of the Senate in place of a Senator appointed in pursuance of paragraph b. of subsection (2) of the said section;
 
 

c. after consultation with the Belize Advisory Council in any other case.
 

66. (1) When the Senate first meets after any general election and before it proceeds to the despatch of any other business, it shall elect a person to be President of the Senate, and, of the office of President falls vacant at any time before the next dissolution of the National Assembly, the Senate shall, as soon as practicable, elect another person to that office.
 
 

(2) When the Senate first meets after any general election and before it proceed to the despatch of any other business except the election of the President, it shall elect a Senator. Who is not a Minister, to be Vice-President of the Senate: and if the office of Vice-President falls vacant at any time before the next dissolution of the National Assembly, the Senate shall, as soon as practicable, elect another Senator to that office.
 
 

(3) The President and the Vice-President shall be above the age of thirty years and the President may be elected either from among the Senators who are not Minister or from among persons who are not members of either House:
 
 

Provided that a person who is not a member of either House shall not be elected as President if-
 
 

a. he is not a citizen of Belize; or
 
 

b. he is a person disqualified for election as a member of the House of Representatives by virtue of section 58(1) of this Constitution.
 
 

(4) A person shall vacate the office of President or Vice-President of the Senate_
 
 

a. in the case of a President elected from among members of the Senate or in the case of the Vice-President-
 
 

(i) if he ceases to be a Senator; or
 
 

(ii) if he is appointed to be a Minister;
 
 

b. in the case of a President elected from among persons who are not members of either House-
 
 

(i) upon any dissolution of the National Assembly;
 
 

(ii) if he ceases to be a citizen of Belize; or
 
 

(iii) if any circumstances arise which would cause him to be disqualified for election as a member of the House of Representatives by virtue of section 58(1) of this Constitution;
 
 

c. in the case of the Vice-President, if he is elected to be President.
 
 

(5) a. If by virtue of section 64(3) of this Constitution, the President or the Vice-President is required to cease to perform his functions as a Senator he shall also cease to perform his functions as President or Vice-President, as the case may be, and those functions shall, until he vacates his seat in the Senate or resumes the performance of the functions of his office, be performed-
 
 

(i) in the case of the President, by the Vice-President or, if the office of Vice-President is vacant, by such Senator (not being a Minister) as the Senate may elect for the purpose;
 
 

(ii) in the case of the Vice-President, by such Senator (not being a Minister) as the Senate may elect for the purpose.
 
 

b. If the President or Vice-President resumes the performance of his functions as Senator,in accordance with the provisions of section 64(3) of this Constitution, he shall also resume the performance of his functions as President or Vice-president, as the case may be.
 

67. There shall be Clerk to the National Assembly (who shall be the Clerk of both Houses) and a Deputy Clerk and such other assistants as may be necessary.
 

68. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,the National Assembly may makes laws for the peace order and good government of Belize.
 

69. (1) The National Assembly may alter any of the provisions of this Constitution in the manner specified in the following provisions of this section.
 
 

(2) Until after the first general election held after Independence Day a Bill to alter nay of the provisions of this Constitution shall not be regarded as being passed by the National Assembly unless on its final reading in each House the Bill is supported by the unanimous vote of all member of that House.
 
 

(3) A Bill to alter this section, Schedule 2 to this Constitution or any of the provisions of this Constitution specified in that Schedule shall not be regarded as being passed by the House of Representatives unless on its final reading in the House the Bill is supported by the votes of not less than three-quarters of all the members of the House.
 
 

(4) A Bill to alter any of the provisions of this Constitution other than those referred to in subsection (3) of this section shall not be regarded as being passed by the House of Representatives unless on its final reading in the House the Bill is supported by the votes of nor less than two-thirds of all the members of the House.
 
 

(5) A Bill to alter any of the provisions of this Constitution referred to in subsection (3) of this section shall not be submitted to the Governor General for his assent unless there has been an interval of not less than ninety days between the introduction of the Bill in the House of Representatives and the beginning of the proceedings in the House on the second reading of the Bill.
 
 

(6) a. A bill to alter any of the provisions of this Constitution shall not be submitted to the Governor General for his assent unless it is accompanied by a certificate of the Speaker signed by him that the provisions of subsection (2), (3) or (4) of this section, as the case may be, have been complied with.
 
 

b. The certificate of the Speaker under this subsection shall be conclusive that the provisions of subsection (2), (3) or (4) of this section, as the case may be, have been complied with and shall not be enquired into by any court of law.
 
 

c. In this subsection, references to the Speaker shall, if the person holding the office of Speaker is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office and no other person is performing them, include references to the Deputy Speaker.
 
 

(7) In this section and Schedule 2 to this Constitution, references to any of the provisions of this Constitution include references to any law that alters that provision.
 
 

(8) In this section, references to altering this Constitution or any provision thereof include references -
 
 

a. to revoking it, with or without re-enactment thereof or the making of different provision in lieu thereof;
 
 

b. to modifying it, whether by omitting or amending any of its provisions or inserting additional provisions in it or otherwise; and
 
 

c. to suspending its operation for any period or terminating any such suspension.
 

70.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, each House may make, amend or revoke Standing Orders for the regulation and orderly conduct of its own proceedings and the despatch of business, and the passing, intituling and numbering of Bills and the presentation for the same to the Governor General for assent.
 
 

(2) A Minister shall be permitted to address the House of which he is not a member but shall have no vote in that House.
 

71.- (1) Except for the purposes of enabling this section to be complied with, no member of either House shall sit or vote therein, or be entitled to receive any salary or emoluments in respect of his office until he has made and subscribed before that House the oath of allegiance and office:
 
 

Provided that election of a Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives and the election of a President and Vice President of the Senate may take place before the members of the House of Representatives or of the Senate, as the case may be, have made and subscribed such oath.
 
 

(2) If between the time when a person becomes a member of the House of Representatives and the time when that House first meetsyhereafter, a meeting takes place of any committee of that House of which that person is a member, that person, may in order to enable him to attend the meeting and take part in the proceedings of the committee, make and subscribe the oath before the Speaker or, if the Speaker is absent from Belize or the office of Speaker is vacant, before the Deputy Speaker; and the making and subscribing of the oath in such manner shall suffice for all the purposes of this section.
 
 

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall apply in relation to a person who becomes a member of the Senate as they apply in relation to a person who becomes a member of the House of Representatives but as if references to the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker were references to the President and the Vice President.
 

72.- (1) The Speaker, or in his absence the Deputy Speaker, or, if the are both absent, a member of the House of Representatives (not being a Minister) elected by the House for that sitting shall preside at each sitting of the House.
 
 

(2) The President, or in his absence, the Vice President, or, if they are both absent, a Senator (not being a Minister) elected by the Senate for that sitting shall preside at each sitting of the Senate.
 
 

(3) References in this section to circumstances in which the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, President or Vice President is absent include references to circumstances in which the office of Speaker, Deputy Speaker, President or Vice President is vacant.
 

73.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, all questions proposed for decision in either House shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the members thereof present and voting.
 
 

(2) A speaker elected from among persons who are members of the House of Representatives or a President elected from among persons who are Senators or a member of either House presiding in that House shall have an original but not a casting vote.
 
 

(3) A speaker elected from among persons who are not members are equally divided the motion shall be lost.
 

74.- Without prejudice to any provision made by the National Assembly relating to the powers, privileges and immunities of the Senate or the House of Representatives and the committees thereof, or the privileges and immunities of the members and officers of either House and of other persons concerned in the business of either House or the committees thereof, no civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against any member of either House for words spoken before, or written in a report to, either House or a committee thereof or by reason of any matter or thing brought by him therein by petition, Bill, resolution, motion or otherwise.
 

75.- A House shall not be disqualified for the transaction of business by reason of any vacancy in the membership thereof (including any vacancy not filled when the House is first constituted or is reconstituted at any time) and any proceedings therein shall be calid notwithstanding that some person who was not entitled so to do sat and voted in the House or otherwise took part in the proceedings.
 

76.- (1) If at any sitting of either House nay member of the House who is present draws the attention of the person presiding a the sitting to the absence of a quorum and, after such interval as may be prescribed in the Standing Orders of that House, the person presiding at the sitting ascertains that a quorum of the House is still not present, the House shall be adjourned.
 
 

(2) For the purposes of this section -
 
 

a. a quorum of the House of Representatives shall consist of seven members of the House;
 
 

b. a quorum of the Senate shall consist of three Senators;
 
 

c. the person presiding at the sitting of either House shall not be included in reckoning whether there is a quorum of that House present.
 

77.- (1) A bill other than a money Bill may be introduced in either House. A money Bill shall not be introduced in the Senate.
 
 

(2) Except on the recommendation or with the consent of the Cabinet, signified by a Minister, neither House shall -
 
 

a. proceed with any Bill (including any amendment to a Bill) which, in the opinion of the person presiding, makes provision for any of the following purposes -
 
 

i. for imposing or increasing or reducing or abolishing any tax;
 
 

ii. for imposing or increasing any charge on the revenues or other funds of Belize or for altering any such charge otherwise than by reducing it; or
 
 

iii. for compounding or remitting any debt due to Belize;
 
 

b. proceed upon any motion (including any amendment to a motion) the effect or which, in the opinion of the person presiding would be to make provision for any of the purposes aforesaid; or
 
 

c. receive any petition which, in the opinion of the person presiding, requests that provision be made for any of the purposes aforesaid.
 

78.- (1) If a money Bill, having been passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate at least one month before the end of the session, is not passed by the Senate without amendment within one month after it is sent to that House, the Bill shall, unless the House of Representatives otherwise resolves be presented to the governor General for assent notwithstanding that the Senate has not consented to the Bill.
 
 

(2) There shall be endorsed on every money Bill when it is sent to the Senate the certificate of the Speaker signed by him that it is a money Bill; and there shall be endorsed on any money Bill that is presented to the Governor General for assent in pursuance of subsection (1) of this section the certificate of the Speaker signed by him that it is a money Bill and that the provisions of that subsection have been complied with.
 

79.- (1) If any Bill other than a money Bill is passed by the House of Representatives in two successive sessions (whether or not the National Assembly is dissolved between those sessions) and, having been sent to the Senate in each of those sessions at least one month before the end of the session, is rejected by the Senate in each of those sessions, that Bill shall, on its rejection for the second time by the Senate, unless the House of Representatives otherwise resolves, be presented to the Governor General for assent notwithstanding that the Senate has not consented to the Bill:
 
 

Provided that the foregoing provisions of this subsection shall not have effect unless at least six months have elapsed between the date on which the Bill is passed by the House of Representatives in the first session and the date on which it is passed by that House in the second session.
 
 

(2) For the purposes of this section a Bill that is sent to the Senate from the House of Representatives in any session shall be deemed to be the same Bill as a former Bill sent to the Senate in the preceding session if, when it is sent to the Senate, it is identical with the former Bill or contains only such amendments as are certified by the Speaker to be necessary owing to the time that has elapsed sin the date of the former Bill or to represent any amendments which have been made by the Senate int he former Bill in the preceding session.
 
 

(3) The House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, on the passage through that House of a Bill that is deemed to be the same Bill as a former Bill sent to the Senate in the preceding session, suggest any amendments without inserting the amendments in the Bill, and if agreed to by the Senate the said amendments shall be treated as amendments made by the Senate and agreed to by the House of Representatives; but the exercise of this power by the House of Representatives shall nor affect the operation of this section in the event of the rejection of the Bill in the Senate.
 
 

(4) There shall be inserted in any Bill that is represented to the Governor General for assent in pursuance of this section any amendments that are certified by the Speaker to have been made in the Bill by the Senate in the second session and agreed to by the House of Representatives.
 
 

(5) There shall be endorsed on any Bill that is presented to the Governor General for assent in pursuance of this section the certificate of the Speaker signed by him that the provisions of this section have been complied with.
 

80.- (1) In sections 77, 78 and 79 of this Constitution, "money Bill" means a public Bill which, in the opinion of the Speaker, contains only provisions dealing with all or any of the following matters, namely, the imposition, repeal, remission, alteration or regulation of taxation; the imposition, for the payment of debt or other financial purposes, of charges on public money or the variation or repeal of any such charges; the grant of money to the Crown or to any authority or person, or the variation or revocation of any such grant; the appropriation, receipt custody, investment, issue or audit of accounts of public money; the raising or guarantee of any loan or the repayment thereof, or the establishment, alteration, administration or abolition of any sinking fund provided in connection with any such loan; or subordinate matters incidental to any of the matters aforesaid; and in this subsection the expression "taxation", "debt", "public money" and "loan" do not include any taxation imposed, debt incurred or money provided or loan raised by any local authority or body for local purposes.
 
 

(2) For the purposes of section 79 of this Constitution a Bill shall be deemed to be rejected by the Senate if -
 
 

a. it is nor passed by the Senate without amendment; or
 
 

b. it is passed by the Senate with any amendment which is not agreed to by the House of Representatives.
 
 

(3) Whenever the office of Speaker is vacant or the Speaker is for any reason unable to perform any functions conferred on him by section 78 or 79 of this constitution or subsection (1) of this section; that function may be performed by the Deputy Speaker.
 
 

(4) A certificate of the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker under section 78 or 79 of this Constitution shall be conclusive for all purposes and shall not be questioned in any court of law.
 
 

(5) Before giving any certificate under section 78 or 79 of this Constitution the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker, as the case may be, shall consult the Attorney General or, if the Attorney General is absent from the seat of Government, such member of the Attorney General's staff as the Attorney General may designate for that purpose.
 

81.- (1) The power of the National Assembly to make laws shall be exercised by Bills passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives (or in the cases mentioned in sections 78 or 79 of this Constitution by the House of Representatives) and assented to by the Governor General.
 
 

(2) When a Bill is submitted to the Governor General for assent in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution he shall signify that he assents or that he withholds assent thereto.
 
 

(3) When the Governor General assents to a Bill that has been submitted to him in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution the Bill shall become law and the Governor General shall thereupon cause it to be published in the Gazette as law.
 
 

(4) No law made by the National Assembly shall come into operation until it has been assented to by the Governor General but the National Assembly may postpone the coming into operation of any such law and may make laws with retrospective effect.
 
 

(5) All laws made by the National Assembly shall be styled "Acts".
 

82.- (1) In every Bill presented to the Governor General for assent, other than a Bill presented under section 78 or 79 of this Constitution, the words of enactment shall be as follows: -
 
 

"Be it enacted, by and with the advice and consent of the House of Representatives and the Senate of Belize and by the authority of the same, as follows: - ".
 
 

(2) In every Bill presented to the Governor General for assent under section 78 or 79 of this Constitution, the words of enactment shall be as follows: -
 
 

"Be it enacted, by and with the advice and consent of the House of Representatives of Belize in accordance with the provisions of section 78 (o section 79, as the case may be) of the Constitution and by the authority of the same, as follows: -
 
 

(3) Any alteration of the words of enactment of a Bill made in consequence of the provisions of the preceding subsection shall not be deemed to be an amendment of the Bill.
 

83.- (1) There shall be a session of the National Assembly at least once in every year, and each session shall be held at such place within Belize and shall begin at such time (not being later than six months from the end of the preceding session if the National Assembly has been prorogued o four months from the end of that section if the National Assembly has been dissolved) as the Governor General shall appoint by proclamation published in the Gazette.
 
 

(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the sittings of each House shall be held at such time and place as that House may, by its Standing Orders or otherwise, determine:
 
 

Provided that the first sitting of each House after the National Assembly has at any time been prorogued or dissolved shall begin at the same time.
 

84.- (1) The Governor General may at any time prorogue or dissolve the National Assembly.
 
 

(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section the National Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date of the first sitting of the House of Representatives after any dissolution and shall then stand dissolved.
 
 

(3) At any time when Belize is at war, the National Assembly may by law extend the period of five years specified in subsection (2) of this section for not more than twelve months at a time:
 
 

Provided that the life of the National Assembly shall not be extended under this subsection for more than two years.
 
 

(4) In the exercise of his powers to dissolve the National Assembly, the Governor General shall act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister:
 
 

Provided that -
 
 

a. if the Prime Minister advises a dissolution and the Governor General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, considers that the government of Belize can be carried on without a dissolution and that a dissolution would not be in the interests of Belize, he may, acting in his own deliberate judgment, refuse to dissolve the National Assembly;
 
 

b. if a resolution of no confidence in the Government is passed by the House of Representatives and the Prime Minister does not within seven days either resign or advise a dissolution, the Governor General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, may dissolve the National Assembly; and
 
 

c. if the office of the Prime Minister is vacant and the governor General acting in his own deliberate judgment, considers that there is no prospect of his being able within a reasonable time to make an appointment to that office, the Governor General shall dissolve the National Assembly.
 
 

(5) If, between a dissolution of the National Assembly and the next ensuing general election of members of the House of Representatives, an emergency arises of such a nature that, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, it is necessary for the two houses or either of them to be summoned before that general election can be held, the Governor General may, by proclamation published in the Gazette, summon the two Houses of the preceding National Assembly and that National Assembly shall thereupon be deemed (except for the purposes of section 85 of this Constitution) not to have been dissolved but shall be deemed (except as aforesaid) to be dissolved on the date on which the polls are held in the next ensuing general election.
 
 

(6) During the period between the dissolution of the National Assembly and the appointment o f a Prime Minister after a general election, the government of Belize shall continue to be administered by the Prime Minister and the other Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the Government.
 

85.- (1) A general election of members of the House of Representatives shall be held at such time within three months after every dissolution of the National Assembly as the Governor General acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister shall appoint.

 (2) As soon as practicable after every general election, the Governor General shall proceed under section 61 of this constitution to the appointment of Senators.
 
 

(3) Where the seat of a member of the House of representatives or a senator falls vacant otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of the National Assembly -
 
 

a. if the vacant seat is that of a member of the House, a by election shall be held; or
 
 

b. if the vacant seat is that of a Senator, an appointment shall be made,
 
 

to fill vacancy within three months of the occurrence of the vacancy unless the National Assembly is sooner dissolved.
 

86.- (1) Any question whether -
 
 

a. any person has been validly elected as a member of the House of Representatives or validly appointed as a Senator;
 
 

b. any member of the House of Representatives or Senator has vacated his seat or is required, under the provisions of section 59(3) or section 64(3) of this Constitution, to cease to exercise any of his functions as a member of the House of Representatives or as a Senator; or
 
 

c. any person has been validly elected as Speaker of the House of representatives or President of the Senate form among persons who are not members of the House of Representatives or Senators, or, having been so elected, has vacated the office of Speaker or of President,
 
 

shall be determined by the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of any law.
 
 

(2) Proceedings for the determination of any question referred to in the preceding subsection shall not be instituted except with the leave of a justice of the Supreme Court.
 
 

(3) No appeal shall lie from the decision of a justice of the Supreme Court granting or refusing leave to institute proceedings in accordance with the preceding subsection.
 

87.- Any person who sits or votes in either House knowing or having reasonable cause for knowing that he is not entitled to do so shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars for every day upon which he so sits or votes in that House, which penalty shall be recoverable by action in the Supreme Court at the suit of the Attorney General.
 

88.- (1) There shall be an Elections and Boundaries Commission.
 
 

(2) The members of the Commission shall be a Chairman and four other persons appointed by the Governor General.
 
 

(3) No person shall be qualified to be appointed as a member of the Commission if he is a member of the National Assembly, or if he holds or is acting in any public office.
 
 

(4) If any member of the Commission dies or resigns or if the governor General is satisfied that any such member has become incapable of discharging his functions as such the Governor General shall, subject to the provisions of this section, appoint another person in his place.
 
 

(5) Subject to the provisions of this section the office of a member of the Commission shall become vacant -
 
 

a. at the expiration of five years from the date of his appointment; or
 
 

b. if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the Commission, would cause him to be disqualified for appointment as such:
 
 

Provided that in the event of the absence of the Chairman or any member of the Commission from Belize or his inability to act as Chairman or member of the Commission as the case may be the Governor General may appoint another person to act in his place.
 
 

(6) A member of the Commission may be removed from office by the Governor General if the Governor General is satisfied of the member's inability to discharge the functions thereof (whether arising form infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct in the performance of those functions.
 
 

(7) The Commission may regulate its own procedure and, with the approval of the Governor General, confer powers or impose duties on any public officer or authority of the Government for the purpose of the discharge of its functions.
 
 

(8) The Commission shall be responsible for the direction and supervision of the registration of voters and the conduct of elections, and all matters connected therewith.
 
 

(9) In the exercise of its functions under this Constitution the Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority and shall, consistently therewith, act in accordance with the Representation of the People Ordinance 1978.
 

89.- (1) For the purposes of the election of members of the House of Representatives, Belize shall be divided into eighteen electoral divisions, the names and boundaries of which ar set out in Schedule 1 to the Representation of the People Ordinance 1978.
 
 

(2) Each electoral division shall be represented in the House of Representatives by one elected member.
 

90.- (1) The Elections and Boundaries Commission shall, after considering the distribution of the population throughout Belize, make proposals from time to time for dividing Belize into electoral divisions in such a way that -
 
 

a. each electoral division shall have as nearly as may be an equal number of persons eligible t vote, but in any case shall have not less than two thousand, no more than three thousand, such persons, and
 
 

b. the total number of electoral divisions shall be not less than eighteen nor more than twenty nine.
 
 

(2) In fixing the boundaries of electoral divisions the Commission shall have regard to the transport and other facilities of the division, and to its physical features.
 
 

(3) The proposals of the Commission made pursuant to this section shall be laid before the National Assembly by the Chairman of the Commission, and the electoral divisions specified in those proposals shall be the electoral division of Belize for the purposes of any law for the time being in force relating to the election of members of the House of Representatives when and shall not be such electoral divisions until, enacted as law by the National Assembly.
 
 

(4) When the number of elected members of the House of Representatives has reached twenty nine, the National Assembly shall by a law enact such provisions to be followed thereafter by the Elections and Boundaries Commission for proposing to the National Assembly the number and boundaries of electoral divisions as may seem appropriate to the National Assembly in place of subsection (1) of this section.
 

91.- Any redivision of electoral divisions effected in accordance with section 90 of this Constitution shall, in respect of the election of members of the House of Representatives, come into operation at the next general election held after such redivision and not earlier.
 

92.- At any general election -
 
 

a. every citizen of Belize who has attained the age or eighteen years and who satisfies the requirements of the Representation of the People Ordinance 1978 shall have the right to vote;
 
 

b. no person shall be entitled to more than one vote; and
 
 

c. votes shall be cast in a secret ballot.
 

93.- Subject to the provisions of sections 88 to 92 inclusive of this Constitution, the provisions of the Representation of the People Ordinance 1978 shall apply to the franchise, registration of voters, the administration of the electoral system, offenses relating to the electoral system, the conduct of elections, and all matters connected therewith.
 
 

94.- There shall be for Belize a Supreme Court of Judicature and a Court of Appeal.
 

95.- (1) The Supreme Court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under any law and such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law.
 
 

(2) The justices of the Supreme Court shall be the Chief Justice and such number of other justices as may from time to time be prescribed by the National Assembly:
 
 

Provided that the office of a justice shall not be abolished while there is a substantive holder thereof.
 
 

(3) The Supreme Court shall be a superior court of record and, save as otherwise provided by any law, shall have all the powers of such a court.
 
 

(4) The Supreme Court shall sit in such places as the Chief Justice may appoint.
 

96.- (1) Subject to the provisions of sections 33(2), 34(4), 54(16), 69(6), 80(4) and 123(3) of this Constitution, where any question as to the interpretation of this Constitution arises in any court of law established for Belize (other that the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court or a court martial) and the court is of opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, the court shall refer the question to the Supreme Court.
 
 

(2) Where any question is referred to the Supreme Court in pursuance of this section, the Supreme Court shall give its decision upon the question and the court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with that decision or, if the decision is the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal of Her Majesty in Council, in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal or, as the case may be, Her Majesty in Council.
 

97.- (1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
 
 

(2) Justices of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice shall be appointed by the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial and Legal Services, section of the Public Services Commission and with the concurrence of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
 
 

(3) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a justice of the Supreme Court unless-
 
 

a. he is qualified to practice as an attorney-at-law in a court in Belize or as an advocate in a court in any other part of the Commonwealth having unlimited jurisdiction either in civil or criminal causes or matters; and
 
 

b. he has been qualified for not less than five years so to practice in such a court.
 
 

(4) If the office of Chief Justice is vacant or the Chief Justice is for any reason including his absence form Belize unable to exercise the functions of his office, then, until a person has been appointed to and has assumed the functions of that office or until the person holding that office has resumed those functions, as the case may be, they shall be exercised by the justice other than Chief Justice, or if there be more than one then by such one of the justices as may for the time being be designated in that behalf by the Governor General, acting in the manner prescribed in subsection (1) of this section.
 
 

(5) If the office of any justice other than the Chief Justice is vacant or if any such justice is appointed to act as Chief Justice or is for any reason unable to perform the functions of this office or if the Chief Justice advises the Governor General that the state of business in the Supreme Court so requires, the governor General, acting in the manner prescribed in subsection (2) of this section, may appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed as a justice of the Supreme Court to act as a justice of that court:
 
 

Provided that a person may act as a justice notwithstanding that he has attained the age of sixty two years.
 
 

(6) Any person appointed under subsection (5) of this section to act as a justice shall, subject to the provisions of subsections (4) and (6) of section 98 of this Constitution, continue to act for the period of his appointment or, if no such period is specified, until his appointment is revoked by the Governor General:
 
 

Provided that, notwithstanding the expiration of the period of his appointment or the revocation of his appointment, he may thereafter continue to act as a justice for so long as may be necessary to enable him to deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceedings that were commenced before him previously thereto.
 

98.- (1) Subject to the following provisions of this sections, a justice of the Supreme Court shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty two years:
 
 

Provided that -
 
 

a. he may at any time resign his office; and
 
 

b. the governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, amy permit a justice who attains the age of sixty two years to continue in office until he has attained such later age, not exceeding seventy years, as may (before the justice has attained the age of sixty two years) have been agreed between them.
 
 

(2) Notwithstanding that he has attained the age at which he is required by or under this section to vacate his office, a person holding the office or a justice of the Supreme Court may continue in office for so long after attaining that age as may be necessary to enable him to deliver judgment or to do any other thing in relation to proceeding that were commenced before him before he attained that age.
 
 

(3) A justice of the Supreme Court may be removed form office only for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehavior, and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
 
 

(4) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be removed from office by the Governor General if the question of the removal of that justice from office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council in accordance with the next following subsection ant the Belize Advisory Council has advised the Governor General that justice ought to be removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehavior.
 
 

(5) If the Governor General considers that the question of removing a justice of the Supreme -Court from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehavior ought to be investigated, then -
 
 

a. The Governor General shall rater the matter to the Belize Advisory Council which shall sit as a tribunal under the Chairman ship of a member of the Council who holds or has held office as a judge of a superior court of record and who has been deputed to act in that capacity by the Governor General, and
 
 

b. the Belize Advisory Council shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the Governor General and advise the Governor General whether that justice should be removed under this section.
 
 

(6) If the question of removing a justice of the Supreme Court form office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council under the preceding subsection, the Governor General may suspend the justice from performing the Functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the Governor General and shall in any case cease to have effect if the Belize Advisory Council advises the Governor General that the justice should not be removed from office.
 
 

(7) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the functions of the Governor General under this section shall be exercised by him in his own deliberate judgment.
 

99.- A justice of the Supreme Court shall not enter upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and office.
 

100.- (1) The Court of Appeal shall have such jurisdiction and powers to hear and determine appeals in civil and criminal matters as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law.
 
 

(2) The Judges of the Court of Appeal (hereinafter referred to as "Justices of Appeal") shall be a President and such number of other Justices as may be prescribed by the National Assembly:
 
 

Provided that the office of Justice of Appeal shall not be abolished while there is a substantive holder of that office.
 
 

(3) The Court of Appeal shall be a superior court of record and save as otherwise provided by any law, shall have all the powers of such a court.
 
 

(4) The Court of Appeal shall sit in such places as the President may appoint.
 

101.- (1) The Justices of Appeal shall be appointed by the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition for such period as may be specified in the instrument of appointment.
 
 

(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a Justice of Appeal unless either -
 
 

a. he holds or has held office as a judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from any such court; or
 
 

b. he is qualified to practice as an attorney - at - law in a court in Belize or as an advocate in a court in any other part of the Commonwealth having unlimited jurisdiction in either civil or criminal causes or matters and has been so qualified for not less than fifteen years.
 
 

(3) Any power exercisable by a single Justice of Appeal may, at any time when there is no such Justice present in Belize and able to perform the functions of his office, be exercised by a justice of the Supreme Court as if that justice were a Justice of Appeal.
 
 

(4) If the office of the President is vacant or he is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, then until some other person has been appointed to or has been appointed to act in, and has assumed the functions of, that office, or until the President has resumed those functions, as the case may be, those functions shall be performed by such one of the other Justices of Appeal as the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition may appoint for that purpose.
 
 

(5) If the office of a Justice of Appeal other than the President is vacant, or if any such Justice is appointed to act as the President, or is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, the Governor General acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, may appoint a person possessing such legal qualifications and experience as he, after consultation with the President, may deem appropriate to be temporarily a Justice of Appeal.
 
 

(6) Any person appointed under subsection (5) of this section to be temporarily a Justice of Appeal shall hold office until his appointment is revoked by the Governor General.
 

102.- (1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, the office of a Justice of Appeal shall become vacant upon the expiration of the period of his appointment to that office or if he resigns his office.
 
 

(2) A justice of Appeal may be removed from office only for inability to discharge the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehavior, and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
 
 

(3) A Justice of Appeal shall be removed from office by the Governor General if the question of the removal of that Justice from office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council in accordance with the next following subsection and the Belize Advisory Council has advised the governor General that Justice ought to be removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehavior.
 
 

(4) If the Governor General considers that the question of removing a Justice of Appeal from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehavior ought to be investigated, then -
 
 

a. the Governor General shall refer the matter to the Belize Advisory Council which shall sit as a tribunal under the Chairman ship of a member of the Council who holds or has held office as a judge of a superior court of record and who has been deputed to act in that capacity by the governor General; and
 
 

b. The Belize Advisory Council shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the Governor General and advise the Governor General whether that Justice should be removed under this section.
 
 

(5) If the question of removing a Justice of Appeal from office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council under the preceding subsection, the Governor General any suspend the Justice from performing the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the Governor General and shall in any case cease to have effect if the Belize Advisory Council advises the Governor General that the Justice should not be removed from office.
 
 

(6) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the functions of the Governor General under this section shall be exercised by him in his own deliberate judgment.
 

103.- A justice of Appeal shall not enter upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and office.
 

104.- (1) An Appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to Her Majesty in Council as of right in the following cases -
 
 

a. final decisions in any civil, criminal, or other proceedings which involve a question as to the interpretation of this Constitution; and
 
 

b. such other cases as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.
 
 

(2) An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to Her Majesty in Council with the leave of the Court of Appeal in the following cases -
 
 

a. decisions in any civil proceedings where in the opinion of the Court of Appeal the question involved in the appeal is one which by reason of its general or public importance otherwise ought to be submitted to Her Majesty in Council; and
 
 

b. such other cases as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.
 
 

(3) An Appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council with the special leave of Her Majesty from any decision of the Court of Appeal in any civil, criminal or other matter.
 
 

105.- (1) There shall be or Belize a Public Services Commission which shall consist of a Chairman and twelve other members who shall include as ex officio members the Chief Justice and justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, the Commandant of the Belize Defence Force, and the Commissioner of Police.
 
 

(2) The Chairman and other members of the Commission, other than the ex officio members, shall be appointed by the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
 
 

(3) No person shall be qualified to be appointed as a member of the Commission if he is a member of the National Assembly or, save in respect of the ex officio members, if he holds or is acting in any public office.
 
 

(4) Save in respect of the ex officio members, a person shall not, while he holds or is acting in the office or a member of the Commission or within a period of two years commencing from the date on which he last held or acted in that office, be eligible for appointment to any public office.
 
 

(5) Subject to the provisions of this section, the office of a member of the Commission shall become vacant -
 
 

a. at the expiration of three years from the date of his appointment or such earlier time, being not less than two years, as may be specified in the instrument by which he was appointed; or
 
 

b. if any circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the Commission, would cause him to be disqualified for appointment as such.
 
 

(6) A member of the Commission may be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising form infirmity of mind or body or from any other cause) or for misbehavior, and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
 
 

(7) A member of the Commission shall be removed form office by the Governor General if the question of the removal of that member from office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council in accordance with the next following subsection and the Belize Advisory Council has advised the Governor General that that member ought to be removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehavior.
 
 

(8) If the Prime Minister represents to the Governor General that the question of removing a member of the Commission under this section ought to be investigated, then -
 
 

a. the Governor General shall refer the matter to the Belize Advisory Council which shall sit as a tribunal under the Chairmanship of a member of the Council who holds or has held office as a judge of a superior court of record and who has been deputed to act in that capacity by the Governor General acting in his own deliberate judgment; and
 
 

b. the Belize Advisory Council shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the Governor General and advise the Governor General whether that member of the Commission should be removed under this section.
 
 

(9) If the question of removing a member of the Commission from office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council under the preceding subsection, the Governor General may suspend the member from performing the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the Governor General and shall in any case cease to have effect if the Belize Advisory Council advises the Governor General that the member should not be removed from office.
 
 

(10) If the office of a member of the Commission is vacant or a member is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office, the Governor General may appoint a person who is qualified for appointment as a member of the Commission to act as a member of the Commission, and any person so appointed shall, subject to the provisions of subsections (6), (7), (8) and (9) of this section, continue to act until he is notified by the Governor General that the circumstances giving rise to the appointment have ceased to exist.
 
 

(11) In the exercise of its functions the Commission shall be so organized that of the twelve members other than the Chairman -
 
 

a. four shall be responsible for matters relating to the public service other than the judicial and legal services and the Police Force;
 
 

b. two, being ex officio the Chief Justice and a justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, shall be responsible for matters relating to the judicial and legal services;
 
 

c. four, of whom the Permanent Secretary to the ministry of defence and the commandant of the Belize Defence Force shall be ex officio members shall be responsible for matters relating to the military service; and
 
 

d. two, of whom the Commissioner of Police shall be ex officio a member, shall be responsible of matters relating to the Police Force.
 
 

and in considering the matters referred to, the Commission shall comprise the member responsible for that matter and the Chairman.

 (12) A member of the Commission shall not enter upon the duties of his office unless he has taken and subscribed the oath of allegiance and office.
 
 

(13) The Commission shall, in the exercise of its functions under this Constitution not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.
 
 

(14) The Commission may by regulation make provision for regulating and facilitating the performance of its functions under this Constitution.
 
 

(15) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Commission may regulate its own procedure.
 
 

(16) Any decision of the Commission shall require the concurrence of a majority of all the members thereof and, subject to its rules of procedure the Commission may act notwithstanding the absence of any member other than the Chairman: provided that, in the exercise of its responsibilities for any matter referred to in subsection (11) of this section, any decision of the Commission shall require the concurrence of a majority of those persons comprising the Commission for the purposes of that matter.
 
 

(17) In subsection (11) of this section -
 
 

"judicial and legal services" means service in the offices of Registrar and Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court, Registrar and Deputy Registrar of the Court of Appeal, Magistrate, and such other public offices requiring a legal qualification as the National Assembly may prescribe;
 
 

"military service" means service in the Belize Defence Force or in any other military, naval or air force established for Belize.
 

106.- (1) The power to appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the public services (including the power to confirm appointments), and, subject to the provisions of section 111 of this Constitution, the power to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices and the power to remove such persons from office shall vest in the Public Services Commission constituted for each case as prescribed in section 105 (11) of this Constitution.
 
 

(2) In subsection (1) of this section "public service" includes the military service, as defined in section 105 (17) of this Constitution.

 (3) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Governor General may make regulations on any matter relating to -
 
 

a. the formulation of schemes for recruitment to the public service;
 
 

b. the determination of a code of conduct for public officers;
 
 

c. the fixing of salaries and privileges;
 
 

d. the principles governing the promotion and transfer of public officers;
 
 

e. measures to ensure displicine, and to govern the dismissal and retirement of public officers, including the procedures to be followed;
 
 

f. the procedure for delegation of authority by and to public officers; and
 
 

g. generally for the management and control of the public service.
 
 

(4) The Public Services Commission shall, in the exercise of its functions under this section, be governed by regulations made under subsection (3) of this section.
 
 

(5) The Public Services Commission may, by directions in writing and subject to such conditions as it thinks fit, delegate any of its powers under subsection (1) of this section to any one or more members of the Commission or, with the consent of the Prime Minister, to any public officer.
 
 

(6) The provisions of this section shall not apply in relation to the following offices, that is to say -
 
 

a. any office to which section 107 of this Constitution applies;
 
 

b. the offices of justice of the Supreme Court and Justice of Appeal;
 
 

c. the office of Auditor General;
 
 

d. the office of Director of Public Prosecutions; or
 
 

e. any office to which section 110 of this Constitution applies.
 
 

(7) No person shall be appointed under this section to or to act in any office on the Governor General's personal staff except with the concurrence of the Governor General, acting in his own deliberate judgment.
 
 

(8) A public officer shall not be removed from office or subjected to any other punishment under this section on the grounds of any act done or omitted by him in the exercise of a judicial function conferred on him unless the Judicial and Legal Services section of the Public Services Commission concurs therein.
 

107.- (1) This section applies to the offices of Commissioner of Police, Commandant of the Belize Defence Force, Secretary to the Cabinet, permanent secretary, head of a department of government, any office for the time being designated by the Public Services Commission as an office of a chief professional adviser to a department of government, any office of Ambassador, High Commissioner or other principal representative of Belize in any other county or accredited to any international organization and any other office designated by the Public Services Commission.
 
 

(2) The power to appoint persons to hold or to act in offices to which this section applies (including the power to confirm appointments) and the power to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices and the power to remove such persons from office shall vest in the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
 
 

(3) References in this section to a department of government shall not include the office of the Governor General the department of the Attorney General the department of the Director of Public Prosecutions the department of the Auditor general or the Police Force.
 

108.- (1) The Director of Public Prosecutions shall be appointed by the Governor General acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Services Commission and with the concurrence of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
 
 

(2) a person shall not be qualified for appointment to hold or act in the office of Director of Public Prosecutions unless he is qualified to be appointed as a justice of the Supreme Court.
 
 

(3) If the office of Director of Public Prosecutions is vacant or if the holder of that office is for any reason unable to exercise the functions of his office, the Governor General acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Services Commission and with the concurrence of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, amy appoint a person to act as Director.
 
 

(4) A person appointed to act in the office of Director of Public Prosecutions shall, subject to the provisions of subsections (5), (7), (8) and (9) of this section, cease so to act -
 
 

a. when a person is appointed to hold that office and has assumed the functions thereof or, as the case may be, when the person in whose place he is acting resumes the functions of that office; or
 
 

b. at such earlier time as may be prescribed by the terms of his appointment.
 
 

(5) Subject to the provision of subsection (6) of this section, the Director of Public Prosecutions shall vacate his office when he attains the age of sixty years or such other age as may be prescribed by the National Assembly;
 
 

Provided that any law enacted by the National Assembly, to the extent to which it alters the prescribed age after a person has been appointed to be or to act as Director of Public Prosecutions, shall not have effect in relation to that person unless he consents that it should have effect.
 
 

(6) The Director of Public Prosecutions may be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or from any other cause) or for misbehavior, and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
 
 

(7) The Director of Public Prosecutions shall be removed from office by the Governor General if the question of his removal from office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council in accordance with the next following subsection and the Belize Advisory Council has advised the Governor General that he ought to be removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehavior.
 
 

(8) If the Prime Minister represents to the Governor General that the question of removing the Director of Public Prosecutions under this section ought to be investigated, then -
 
 

a. The Governor General shall refer the matter to the Belize Advisory Council which shall sit as a tribunal under the Chairman-ship of a member of the Council who holds or has held office as a judge of a superior court of record and who has been deputed to act in that capacity by the Governor General acting in his own deliberate judgment; and
 
 

b. the Belize Advisory Council shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the Governor General and advise the Governor General whether he should be removed under this section.
 
 

(9) If the question of removing the Director of Public Prosecutions form office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council under the preceding subsection, the Governor General may suspend him from performing the functions of this office and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the Governor General and shall in any case cease to have effect if the Belize Advisory Council advises the Governor General that he should not be removed from office.
 

109.- (1) The Auditor General shall be appointed by the Governor General acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Services Commission and with the concurrence of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.
 
 

(2) If the office of Auditor General is vacant or if the holder of that office is for any reason unable to exercise the functions of his office, the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Services Commission and wit the concurrence for the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, may appoint a person to act as Auditor General.
 
 

(3) A person appointed to act in the office of Auditor General shall, subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (6), (7) and (8) of this section, cease so to act -
 
 

a. after a person is appointed to hold that office and has assumed the functions thereof or, as the case may be, when the person in whose place he is acting resumes the functions of that office; or
 
 

b. at such earlier time as may be prescribed by the terms of his appointment.
 
 

(4) Subject to the provisions o subsection (5) of this section, the Auditor General shall vacate his office when he attains the age of sixty years or such other age as may be prescribed by the National Assembly:
 
 

Provided that any law enacted by the National Assembly, to the extent to which it alters the prescribed age after a person has been appointed to be or to act as Auditor General, shall not have effect in relation to that person unless he consents that it should have effect.
 
 

(5) The Auditor General may be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or from any other cease) or for misbehavior, and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this section.
 
 

(6) The Auditor General shall be removed from office by the Governor General if the question of his removal from office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council in accordance with the next following subsection and the Belize Advisory Council has advised the Governor General that he ought to be removed from office for inability as aforesaid or for misbehavior.
 
 

(7) If the Prime Minster represents to the Governor General that the question of removing the Auditor General under this section ought to be investigated, then -
 
 

a. The Governor General shall refer the matter to the Belize Advisory Council which shall sit as a tribunal under the Chairmanship of a member of the Council who holds or has held office as a judge of a superior court of record and who has been deputed to act in that capacity by the Governor General acting in his own deliberate judgment; and
 
 

b. the Belize Advisory Council shall enquire into the matter and report on the facts thereof to the Governor General and advise the Governor General whether he should be removed under this section.
 
 

(8) If the question of removing the Auditor General from office has been referred to the Belize Advisory Council under the preceding subsection, the Governor General may suspend him from performing the functions of his office, and any such suspension may at any time be revoked by the Governor General and shall in any case cease to have effect if the Belize Advisory Council advises the Governor General that he should not be removed from office.
 

110.- (1) Power to appoint persons to hold or act in any office in the Police Force (including power to confirm appointments) below the rank of Inspector and to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices and to remove the persons from office shall vest in the Commissioner of Police.
 
 

(2) The Commissioner of Police may, subject to such conditions as he thinks fit, delegate any of his powers under this section, by directions in writing, to any other officer of the Police Force.
 

111.- (1) This section applies to -
 
 

a. any decision of the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Services Commission, in relation to the public service, or any decision of the Public Services Commission to remove a public officer (including a decision made on appeal from or confirming a decision of any person to whom powers are delegated under section 106(5) of this Constitution);
 
 

b. any decision of any person to whom powers are delegated under section 106(5) of this Constitution to remove a public officer from office or to exercise disciplinary control over a public officer (not being a decision which is subject to appeal to or confirmation by the Public Services Commission); and
 
 

c. if it is so provided by the National Assembly, any decision of the Commissioner of Police under subsection (1) of section 1110 of this Constitution, or of a person to whom powers are delegated under subsection (2) of that section, to remove a police officer from office or to exercise disciplinary control over a police officer.
 
 

(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie to the Belize Advisory Council from any decision to which this section applies at the instance of the public officer in respect of whom the decision is made:
 
 

Provided that in the case of any such decision as is referred to in subsection (1)(c) of this section, an appeal shall lie in the first instance to the Commissioner of Police if it is so provided by the National Assembly or, if it is not so provided, if the Commissioner so requires.
 
 

(3) Upon an appeal under this section the Belize Advisory Council may affirm or set aside the decision appealed against or may make any other decision which the authority or person from whom the appeal lies could have made.
 
 

(4) Subject to the provisions of section 54 of this Constitution, the Belize Advisory Council may by regulation make provision for -
 
 

a. the procedure in appeals under this section; or
 
 

b. excepting from the provisions of subsection (2) of this section decisions in respect of public officer holding offices whose emoluments do not exceed such sum as may be prescribed by the regulations or such decisions to exercise disciplinary control, other than decisions to remove from office, as may be so prescribed.
 
 

(5) Regulations made under this section may, with the consent of the Prime Minister, confer powers or impose duties on any public officer or any authority of the Government for the purpose of the exercise of the functions of the Belize Advisory Council.

 (6) In this section "public officer" includes any person holding or acting in an office in the military service as defined in section 105(17) of this Constitution.
 

112.- (1) The law to be applied with respect to any pensions benefits that were granted to any person before Independence Day shall be the law that was in force at the date on which those benefits were granted or any law in force at a later date that is not less favorable to that person.
 
 

(2) The law to be applied with respect to any pensions benefits (not being benefits to which subsection (1) of this section applies) shall -
 
 

a. in so far as those benefits are wholly in respect of a period of service as a public officer that commenced before Independence Day; be the law that was in force immediately before that date; and
 
 

b. in so far as those benefits are wholly or partly in respect of a period of service as a public officer that commenced after Independence Day, be the law in force on the date on which that period for service commenced.
 
 

or any law in force at a later date not less favorable to that person.
 
 

(3) Where a person is entitled to exercise an options as to which of two or more laws shall apply in his case, the law for which he opts shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be more favorable to him than the other law or laws.
 
 

(4) All pensions benefits shall (except to the extent to which, in the case of benefits under the Widows' and Orphans' Pensions Ordinance(a) or under any law amending or replacing that Ordinance, they are a charge on a fund established by that Ordinance or by any such law and have been duly paid out of that fund to the person or authority to whom payment is due) be a charge on the general revenues of Belize.
 
 

(5) In this section, "pensions benefits" means any pensions, compensation, gratuities or other like allowances for persons in respect of their service as public officer or for the widows, children, dependents or personal representatives of such persons in respect of such service.
 
 

(6) References in this section to the law with respect to pensions benefits include (without prejudice to their generality) references to the law regulating the circumstances in which such benefits may be granted or in which the grant of such benefits may be refused, the law regulating the circumstances in which any such benefits that have been granted may be withheld, reduced in amount or suspended and the law regulating the amount of any such benefits.
 

113.- (1) The power to grant any award under any pensions for the time being in force in Belize (other than an award to which, under that law, the person to whom it is payable is entitled as of right) and, in accordance with any provisions in that behalf contained in any such law, to withhold, reduce in amount or suspend any award payable under any such law, shall vest in the Governor General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Services Commission.
 
 

(2) In this section, "pensions law" means any law relating or the grant to any person, or to the widow, children, dependents or personal representatives of that person, of an award in respect of the services of that person in a public office, and includes any instrument made under any such law.
 
 

114.- (1) All revenues or other moneys raised or received by Belize (not being revenues or other moneys payable under this Constitution or any other law into some other public fund established for a specific purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Revenue Fund.
 
 

(2) No moneys shall be withdrawn form the Consolidated Revenue Fund except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the Fund by this Constitution or any other law enacted by the National Assembly or where the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an appropriation law or by a law made in pursuance of section 116 of this Constitution.

 (3) No moneys shall be withdrawn form any public fund other than the Consolidated Revenue Fun unless the issue of those moneys has been authorized by a law enacted by the National Assembly.
 
 

(4) No money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund except in the manner prescribed by law.
 

115.- (1) The Minister responsible for finance shall prepare and lay before the House o Representatives in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Belize for the next following financial year.
 
 

(2) The heads if expenditure contained in the estimates (other than expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund by this Constitution or any other law) shall be included in a Bill, to be knows as an Appropriation Bill, providing for the issue from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the sums necessary to meet that expenditure and the appropriation of those sums for the purposes specified therein.
 
 

(3) If in respect of any financial year it is found-
 
 

a. that the amount appropriated by the appropriation law for any purpose in insufficient or that a need has arisen for expenditure for a purpose for which no amount has been appropriated by that law or:
 
 

b. that any moneys have been expended for any purpose in excess of the amount appropriated for the purpose by the appropriation law or for a purpose for which no amount has been appropriated by that law.
 
 

a supplementary estimate showing the sums required or spent shall be laid before the House of Representatives and the heads of any such expenditure shall be included in a supplementary Appropriation Bill.
 

116.- Any law enacted by the National Assembly may make provision under which, if the appropriation law in respect of any financial year, the Minister responsible for finance may authorize the withdrawal of moneys form the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the purpose of meeting expenditure necessary to carry on the services of the Government until the expiration of four months from the beginning of that financial year or the coming into operation of the appropriation law, whichever is the earlier.
 

117.- (1) Any law enacted by the National Assembly may provide for the establishment of a Contingencies Fund and for authorizing the Minister responsible for finance, if satisfied that there has arisen an urgent and unforeseen need for expenditure for which no other provision exists, to make advances from the Fund to meet that need.

 (2) Where any advance is made in accordance with subsection (1) of this section a supplementary estimate shall be presented and a supplementary Appropriation Bill shall be introduced as soon as possible for the purpose of replacing the amount so advanced.
 

118.- (1) There shall be paid to the holders of the offices to which this sections applies such salaries and such allowances as may be prescribed by or under a law enacted by the National Assembly.
 
 

(2) The salaries and allowances prescribed in pursuance of this section in respect of the holders of the offices to which this sections applies shall be a charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
 
 

(3) The salary prescribed in pursuance of this section in respect of the holder of any office to which this sections applies and his other terms of service (other than allowances that are not taken into account in computing, under any law in that behalf, any pension payable in respect of this service in that office) shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.
 
 

(4) When a person's salary or other terms of service depend upon his option, the salary or terms for which he opts shall, for the purposes of subsection (3) of this section, be deemed to be more advantageous to him than any others for which he might have opted.
 
 

(5) This sections applies to the offices of the Governor-General, the Chief Justice, Justice of Appeal, justice of the Supreme Court, member of the Belize Advisory Council, member of the Public Services Commission, member of the Elections and Boundaries Commission the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Auditor General.
 
 

(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed as prejudicing the provisions of section 112 of this Constitution.
 

119.- (1) There shall be charged on the consolidated revenue fund all debt charges for which belize is liable.
 
 

(2) For the purposes of this section debt charges include interest, sinking fund charges, the repayment or amortization of debt, and all expenditure in connection with the raising of loans on the security of the Consolidated Revenue Fund and the service and redemption of debt created thereby.
 
 

AUDIT OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, ETC.

120.- (1) There shall be an auditor general whose office shall be a public office.
 
 

(2) The Auditor General shall-
 
 

a. satisfy himself that all moneys that have been appropriated by the National Assembly and disbursed have been applied to the purposes to which they were so appropriated and that the expenditure conforms to the authority that governs it; and
 
 

b. at least once in every year audit and report on the public accounts of Belize, the accounts of all officers and authorities of the Government, the accounts of all courts as law in Belize, the accounts of the Belize Advisory Council and every Commission established by this Constitution and the accounts of the Clerk to the National Assembly.
 
 

(3) The Auditor General and any officer authorized by him shall have access to all books, records, returns, reports and other documents which in his opinion relate to any of the accounts referred to in subsection (2) of this section.
 
 

(4) The Auditor - General shall submit every report made by him in pursuance of subsection (2) of this section to the Minister responsible for finance who shall, not later than seven days after the House of Representatives first meets after he has received the report, lay it before the House.
 
 

(5) If the Minister fails to lay a report before the House in accordance with the provision of subsection (4) of this section the Auditor General shall transmit copies of that report to the Speaker who shall, as soon as practicable, present them to the House.
 
 

(6) The Auditor General shall exercise such other functions in relation to the accounts of the Government or the accounts of other authorities or bodies established by law for public purposes as may be prescribed by or under any law enacted by the National Assembly.
 
 

(7) In the exercise of his functions under subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of this section, the Auditor General shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.
 
 

121.- (1) The person to whom this section applies shall conduct themselves in such a way as not-
 
 

a. to place themselves in positions in which the have or could have a conflict of interest;
 
 

b. to compromise the fair exercise of their public or official functions and duties;
 
 

c. to use their office for private gain;
 
 

d. to demean their office or position;
 
 

e. to allow their integrity to be called into question; or
 
 

f. to endanger or diminish respect for, or confidence in, the integrity of the Government.
 
 

(2) This section applies to the Governor General, members of the National Assembly, members of the Belize advisory Council, members of the Public Services Commission, members of the Elections and Boundaries Commission, public officers, officers of statutory corporations and government agencies, and such other officers as may be prescribed by law enacted by the National Assembly.
 

122.- The national symbols of Belize shall be those prescribed by the National Assembly.
 

123.- (1) Any reference in this Constitution to power to make appointments to any public office shall be construed as including a reference to power to make appointments on promotion and transfer to that office and to power to appoint a person to act in that office during any period which it is vacant or the holder thereof is unable to perform the functions of that office.
 
 

(2) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, a reference to the holder of an office by the term designating his office shall be construed as including a reference to any person who is for the time being lawfully acting in or performing the functions of that office.
 
 

(3) Where by this Constitution any person is directed, or power is conferred on any person or authority to appoint a person, to act in or otherwise to perform the functions of an office if the holder thereof is unable to perform the functions of that office, the validity of any performance of those functions by the person so directed or of any appointment made in exercise or that power shall not be called in question in any court of law on the ground that the holder of the office is not unable to perform the functions of the office.
 

124.- (1) Where any person has vacated any office established by this Constitution, he may if qualified again be appointed or elected to hold that office in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
 
 

(2) Whenever the holder of any office constituted by or under this Constitution, or any public office otherwise constituted, is on leave of absence pending relinquishment of his office -
 
 

a. another person be appointed to that office; and
 
 

b. that person shall, for the purpose of any function of that office, be deemed to be the sole holder of that office.
 

125.- (1) References in this Constitution to the power to remove a public officer form his office shall be construed as including references to any power conferred by any law to require or permit that officer to retire from the public service and to any power or right to terminate a contract on which a person is employed as a public officer and to determine whether any such contract shall or shall not be renewed:
 
 

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as conferring on any person or authority power to require any justice of the Supreme Court or Justice of Appeal, the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the Auditor General to retire from the public service.
 
 

(2) Any provision of this Constitution that vests in any person or authority power to remove any public officer from his office shall be without prejudice to the power of any person or authority to abolish any office or to any law providing for the compulsory retirement of public officers generally or any class of public officer on attaining an age specified therein.
 

126.- (1) A Senator or a member of the House of Representatives may resign his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the President or the Speaker, as the case may be, and the resignation shall take effect, and the seat shall accordingly become vacant, when the writing is received, as the case may be, by -
 
 

a. the President or Speaker;
 
 

b. if the office of President or Speaker is vacant or the President or Speaker is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office and no other person is performing the, Vice-President or Deputy Speaker; or
 
 

c. if the office of Vice-President or Deputy Speaker is vacant or the Vice-President or Deputy Speaker is for any reason unable to perform the functions of his office and no other person is performing the, the Clerk to the National Assembly.
 
 

(2) The President or the Vice-President or the Speaker or the Deputy Speaker may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Senate or the House, as the case may be, and the resignation shall take effect, and the office shall accordingly become vacant, chem the writing is received by the Clerk to the National Assembly.
 
 

(3) Any person who has been appointed to an office established by this Constitution (other than an office to which subsection (1) or (2) of this section applies) or any office of Minister established under this Constitution may resign that office by writing under his hand addressed to the person or authority by whom he was appointed and the resignation shall take effect, and the office shall accordingly become vacant-
 
 

a. at such time or on such date (if any) as may be specified in the writing; or
 
 

b. when the writing is received by the person or authority to whom it is addressed or by such other person as may be authorized to receive it,
 
 

whichever is the later:
 
 

Provided that the resignation may be withdrawn before it takes effect if the person or authority to whom the resignation is addressed consents or its withdrawal.
 

127.- No provision of this Constitution that any person or authority shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority in the exercise of any functions under this Constitution shall be construed as precluding a court of law from exercising jurisdiction in relation to any question whether that person or authority has performed those functions in accordance with this Constitution or any other law or should not perform those functions.
 

128.- Where any power is conferred by this Constitution to make any proclamation, regulation, order or rule, or to give any direction or instructions, the power shall be construed as including the power, exercisable in like manner, to amend or revoke any such a proclamation, regulation, order, rule, direction or instructions.
 

129.- (1) Where any person or authority is directed by this constitution to exercise any function after consultation with any other person or authority, that person or authority shall not be obliged to exercise that function in accordance with the advice of that other person or authority.
 
 

(2) Where any person or authority is directed by this Constitution or any other law to consult any other person or authority before taking any decision or action, that other person or authority before taking any decision or action, that other person or authority must be given a genuine opportunity to present his or its views before the decision or action, as the case may be, is taken.
 

130.- There shall be a national seal bearing on it such device as the National Assembly shall approve by resolution.
 

131.- (1) In this constitution, unless the context otherwise requires -
 
 

"Belize" means the land and sea areas defined in Schedule 1 to this Constitution;
 
 

"Commonwealth citizen" has such meaning as the National Assembly may prescribe;
 
 

"Court of Appeal" means the Court of Appeal established by this Constitution;
 
 

"Crown" means the Crown in right of Belize;
 
 

"financial year" means the twelve months ending on 31st March in any year or on such other date as may form time to time be prescribed by any law enacted by the National Assembly:
 
 

"the Gazette" means the Belize Government Gazette and includes any supplement thereto;
 
 

"the Government" means the Government of Belize;
 
 

"the House" means the House of Representatives or the Senate the context may require;
 
 

"the House of Representatives" means the House of Representatives established by this Constitution;
 
 

"Independence Day" means 21st September, 1981;
 
 

"law" means any law in force in Belize or any part thereof, including any instrument having the force of law and any unwritten rule of law, and "lawful" and "lawfully" shall be construed accordingly;
 
 

"Minister" means a Minister of the government;
 
 

"the National Assembly" means the National established by this Constitution;
 
 

"oath" of allegiance and office" means the oath prescribed in Schedule 3 to this Constitution;
 
 

"Police Force" means the Belize Police Force;
 
 

"President" and "Vice-President" mean the respective person holding office as President and Vice-President of the Senate;
 
 

"public office" means any office of emolument in the public service;
 
 

"public officer" means a person holding or acting in nay public office;
 
 

"the public service" means, subject to the provisions of this section, the service of the Crown in a civil capacity in respect of the Government;
 
 

"Senate" means the Senate Established by this Constitution;
 
 

"session" means, in relation to a House of the National Assembly, the sittings of that House commencing when it first meets after the prorogation or dissolution of the National Assembly at any time and terminating when the National Assembly is prorogued or is dissolved without having been prorogued;
 
 

"sitting" means, in relation to a House of the National Assembly, a period during which that House is sitting continuously without adjournment and includes any period during which the House is in committee;
 
 

"Speaker" and "Deputy Speaker" mean the respective persons holding office as Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives;
 
 

"Supreme Court" means the Supreme Court of Judicature established by this Constitution.
 
 

(2) Except in section 63(1) and 71 of this Constitution, references in this Constitution to a members of the House of Representatives or to a Senator or Senators do not include references to a person who, under section 56(2), is a member of the House by virtue of holding the office of Speaker, or who, under section 61(1), is a Senator by virtue of holding the office of President.
 
 

(3) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, references to an office in the public service shall be construed as including references to the offices of justice of the Supreme Court and Justice of Appeal, offices of members of the Police Force, and offices on the Governor General's personal staff.
 
 

(4) In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, references to an office in the public service shall not be construed as including references to the offices of Prime Minister or other Minister, Deputy Minister, Speaker or Deputy Speaker or member of the House of Representatives, President or Vice-President or Senator member of the Belize Advisory Council, or member's of any Commission established by this Constitution.
 
 

(5) For the purposes of this Constitution, a person shall not be regarded as holding a public office by reason only of the fact that he is in receipt of a pension or other like allowance in respect of service under the Crown.
 
 

(6) Save as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Interpretation Ordinance 1980 as in force immediately before Independence Day shall apply, with the necessary adaptations, for the purpose of interpreting this Constitution.

  </text>
</constitution> 

<a>

A taxi driver, the owner of a blue Ford LTD with license plate number BZ-0286, has been reported missing along with his vehicle.

Charlotte Bernard, 29, chief cook of the Belize/Lebanese Restaurant at the corner of Central American Boulevard and Vernon Street, reported to Police that her common-law husband, Peter Novelo, 36, left home from about 6 p.m. Tuesday, December 16, and has not returned since.     Bernard said she believes that Novelo, a taxi driver based at Belcan Taxi Stand, is the victim of foul play.

During the two years they have lived together at #274 Oleander Street, Novelo, said Bernard, has never gone for more than four hours during the night without informing her of his whereabouts, either directly or through a messsage left at the taxi stand.

"Peter would never go and leave me for so long without me knowing where he is, so he must be dead or in serious trouble," said Bernard.

Charlotte Bernard said she has heard a report that the disappearance of her common-law husband is linked to Julian Bush's accomplice or accomplices who fled the scene after Bush was fatally shot.  Anonymous telephone callers, she said, told her that Peter Novelo was last seen in his taxi in the company of two men at the Belcan Taxi Stand.

According to the anonymous callers, only Novelo's taxi was at the stand about 8:30 p.m. Tuesday, December 16, not long before Julian Bush was killed.

Bush and at least one known accomplice, whom Police have not yet identified, had attempted to rob Tang's Supermarket at #11 3rd Street.  Bernard is speculating that her common-law husband's taxi was the vehicle the robbers planned to get away in.

According to one of Novelo's fellow taxi men, Novelo was seen in his taxi in the company of the men who allegedly attempted to rob Tang?s Supermarket on the same night the robbery attempt took place.

Peter Novelo is described as being of medium build, weighing 145 pounds, and being 5' 7" in height. On the night he disappeared, Novelo was wearing a pair of maroon colored pants with a jacket, also of the same colour. </text>

 <note>

*Please note: The Amandala staff are taking a long Christmas vacation, so the newspaper will not be updated next week.

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  Advice, tips and tales.   

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  Safety, health, what to pack.

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Get tips for your    trip by reading the travel    stories of other adventurers.

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4. belize/www01/www_belize_org_mu.html
is the most complete and up to date listing of all Chamber businesses in Belize. The directory is searchable by name, contact person, location and product. 

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If you are planning on doing business in Belize, or currently are conducting business, then this BUSINESS GUIDE your complete source of information of everything you need to know to be successful.

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5. costarica/eco02/costaric_mu.htm



<text>osta Rica is one of the most stable and robust democracies in the region. Its per capita income of $2,590 in 1995 places it at the higher end of lower-middle income countries. Its population is estimated at 3.4 million, growing at 2.3 percent a year. Its extensive social programs have placed Costa Rica's social indicators among the best in Latin America. In 1995 agriculture represented 18 percent of GDP while industry and services represented 24 percent and 58 percent respectively. The agriculture sector has accounted for more than 63 percent of merchandise exports in the last five years, while non-traditional exports have grown at an average of about 11 percent in the last four years. Recently, Costa Rica has also seen a sharp increase in earnings from tourism, which for three consecutive years surpassed coffee as the largest source of foreign exchange earnings after banana exports. The services sector has been gradually expanding its share of GDP, and now employs the largest portion of the labor force.

In the early 1980s Costa Rica's economy was weakened by expansionary domestic policies and an overvalued exchange rate while terms of trade deteriorated and international interest rates increased. The economy plunged into the worst recession in 30 years: real GDP dropped by over 7 percent in 1982; open unemployment increased to 9.4 percent; and inflation reached 90 percent. Since the 1982 crisis successive governments have launched a series of stabilization and adjustment efforts, supported by the IMF and the World Bank, that reduced major macroeconomic imbalances and renewed growth, while minimizing the costs of adjustment and maintaining progress in poverty alleviation. Over 1983-88 real GDP grew at an annual average rate of 4.8 percent (then one of the highest rates in Latin America), inflation came down to 15 to 20 percent, and unemployment declined to under 5 percent. Costa Rica's external debt, however, increased rapidly throughout the 1980s from $1.7 billion in 1980 to $4.3 billion by 1988.

In fiscal 1990 the economy faced renewed macroeconomic difficulties, largely as a result of a deterioration in the fiscal accounts, which contributed to a worsening of the external position and higher inflation. In June 1990 the government moved to reduce the fiscal deficit and stem the loss in official international reserves through measures that reduced the consolidated public sector deficit (including central bank losses) from 5.4 percent of GDP to 2 percent in 1991 while building up the level of international reserves.

In 1991 GDP growth slowed to 3 percent, largely reflecting a sizable fiscal adjustment, while corrective price adjustments contributed to an increase in inflation to 29 percent. By 1992, however, the macroeconomic outlook improved considerably. GDP grew by 7.7 percent fueled by a strong increase in private investment and exports while inflation declined to 22 percent. Higher indirect tax revenue collections and lower total interest payments contributed to the decline of the consolidated public sector deficit to 1.1 percent of GDP. Although exports showed strong growth in 1992 (13.3 percent), imports grew even faster at 24.4 percent. As a result, the current account deficit increased from 4.1 to 8 percent of GDP and was financed mostly by large private capital inflows. </text>

<title>Recent Economic Developments </title>

<text>The economy continued to show a strong performance in 1993. GDP grew at 6.1 percent with private investment and exports as the main determinants of growth. Fiscal accounts continued to improve and the consolidated fiscal deficit declined to 0.9 percent of GDP—the lowest level in 10 years. Average inflation fell to 10 percent, stemming from improved public sector finances and tighter monetary policy. The current account deficit, however, remained large at 7.5 percent of GDP. Relatively large capital inflows continued in 1993. In 1994 macroeconomic conditions deteriorated sharply. The consolidated public sector deficit (including central bank losses) reached 8.5 percent of GDP (1.6 percent of which due to the closing of Banco Anglo, one of the four state banks) and inflation increased to 13.5 percent. The deterioration of public finances was mostly due to rapid increases in public expenditures—particularly the public sector payroll, public transfer programs, service of public domestic debt, and pension funds of public employees—and delays in tariff adjustment of some public utilities. GDP growth declined to 4 percent as private investment and exports slowed. The current account deficit, however, declined to 4 percent of GDP as a result of the slowdown in the economy and a temporary improvement in the terms of trade.

With tight fiscal and monetary policies in place, GDP growth slowed from 4.5 percent in 1994 to 2.5 percent in 1995. End-year inflation increased to 22.6 percent from 19.9 percent in 1994. The overall deficit of the combined public sector in 1995 fell to 3.8 percent, in line with the stabilization program. The current account deficit is estimated to have fallen to 2.3 percent of GDP and international reserves increased by $229 million, to 1.3 months of imports.

After a difficult first year-and-a-half in office, during the last six months the government has made important progress in structural reforms. Public sector reform—to increase its efficiency, strengthen the fiscal base, and open new opportunities for the private sector—is a key element of the government's structural adjustment program. The government is implementing reforms to strengthen tax administration, control public sector wages, downsize and restructure the public sector, increase the participation of the private sector in public infrastructure works and the power sector, and enforce strict monthly expenditure budgets in the nonfinancial public sector. In the financial sector, the recent approval of a financial system reform package constitutes an important step in the effort to modernize the financial sector by abolishing the state banks' monopoly on demand deposits, providing private bank access to central bank rediscount facilities, and reducing reserve requirements to 15 percent over a four-year period. The new regulatory framework also strengthens prudential and supervision institutions and the independence of the central bank. The government is also reforming pension funds to ensure an equitable and financially sustainable social security system. </text>
 

<title>Medium-Term Prospects </title>

<text>Costa Rica's 1996 program targets include GDP growth of 3 percent, inflation of 10 percent, and a combined public sector deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP. The current account deficit is expected to widen to 4.1 percent in 1996, largely due to worsening terms of trade (coffee and bananas), and weaker performance by nontraditional exports.

Although growth is only expected to increase to 3 percent in 1996, provided the stabilization effort is maintained and the government continues to make progress in its structural adjustment program, Costa Rica could sustain GDP growth rates of 5 to 6 percent over the longer term.
</text>

<title>External Debt </title>

<text>In May 1990 Costa Rica agreed with its commercial creditors on a debt reduction plan under which its large outstanding arrears were regularized, 62 percent of commercial bank debt was bought back at an 80 percent discount and the remainder was restructured with 20 years maturity. This Brady-style agreement reduced Costa Rica's external debt by about 20 percent and lowered the share of debt at floating interest to about 30 percent of the total, thereby greatly reducing its vulnerability to interest rate volatility. Another agreement was signed with the Paris Club in June 1992, rescheduling principal and interest due as of June 30, 1993 with participating creditor countries. External arrears were reduced to $45 million in December 1995, and were eliminated in January 1996. Costa Rica's remaining debt, however, at $3.3 billion at end-1994, is still relatively high and inflexible. The bulk of debt service is to multilateral lenders, and is expected to fluctuate around 50 to 60 percent of public debt service throughout the 1990s. This would limit severely the scope for maneuver in the event of future payments difficulties. </text>

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6. costarica/pol04/mlib_mu.html

<title>
<name-logo>

Federico Malavassi: "No somos derecha tradicional" 

</item>

</news>

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7. costarica/tra09/www_centralamerica_com_mu.html
Information about Costa Rica's climate, government, history, etc.

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Zoom in from a map of Costa Rica to detailed maps of each area.

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Descriptions of Costa Rica's most popular national parks.

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Beautiful photographs of Costa Rica by John Skiffington.

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Information by the owner of first Costa Rican butterfly farm.

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Official home pages for over 40 of Costa Rica's most popular hotels. 

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The four best rent-a-car companies.

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Costa Rican airline with scheduled & charter flights.

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Tours from San Jose to attractions in the central valley.

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Mainly to areas that cannot be reached by car.

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Nature Packages, Adventure and Self-Drive tours of Costa Rica.

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From scenic float trips to class 5 rapids.

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Extensive information with charter boats and fishing lodges

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Covers all scuba diving options in Costa Rica

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Break map, tide tables, Costa Rican surf packages

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Fascinating ballooning and other adventures

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Golf is coming to Costa Rica in a big way.

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Club Colonial - Casino, Bar & Restaurant.

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Conversa, Costa Rica's best language school

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8. costarica/tra12/netinc_mu.html
Costa Rica's most complete Information Source.   Learn about Costa Rica's culture, its people, beautiful beaches, products and everything else of interest in the most complete guide about the country. 

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9. crwww/bus03/www_incostarica_net_mu.html
Learn more about Costa Rica's nature, its people and just about everything else of interest.

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Products, Services, Investment, Real Estate; anything a business person needs to know about Costa Rica. 

---

The place to go to if you're thinking of traveling to and around our country. Find a number of helpful documents to make your visit more pleasant.

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Where to find more information about Costa Rica on the Internet.

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If this is your first visit to this site, it might be useful to get to know what you can find here and how to navigate it. You can also get information on advertising opportunities through the SuperSite

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Track changes in the site through the Recent Addition pages. Classified by center.

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10. crwww/gov04/www_rree_go_cr_mu.html

<text>*Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica.    *Organización del Gobierno.    *Perfil de Costa Rica.    *Web sites del Gobierno costarricense.
</text>

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<text>*Aspectos Generales de la Institución.   * Guía de Teléfonos y Correos     Electrónicos</text>

 
<text>*Perfil del Señor Ministro.  Perfil del Señor Viceministro. 
</text>

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<text>*Becas y Congresos. </text>

         <text>*Boletín de la    Oficina de Prensa (Setiembre-Octubre 1997)            *Resúmenes Informativos sobre Política Bilateral.   *Información Cooperación Internacional</text>

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<text>
*Organismos Internacionales con sede u oficina en Costa _ Rica. *Lista de Misiones Diplomáticas acreditadas en Costa _ Rica.  * Visas de Ingreso a Costa _ Rica.  * Lista de Embajadas y Consulados de Costa _ Rica.  *Lista de Traductores Oficiales.     *Asociaciones y Centros Culturales 
</text>

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<text>*Declaración de San José, Documento Final de la Conferencia Sur Sur.   *Plan of Action South South Conference.    *Declaración de San José, Visita de Presidente Clinton.</text>

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<text>
*Paginas Nacionales e Internacionales  *Motores de Búsqueda para Internet
</text>

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11. guatemala/art02/www_artemaya_com_mu.html


 

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12. guatemala/art04/syasturi_mu.html
- A Portrait Collection of Guatemala's People

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13. guatemala/bec08/default_mu.html
<item>Geography</item><item> People </item><item> Education </item><item> Health </item><item> Government </item><item> Economy </item><item> Manufacturing </item><item> Energy </item><item> Agriculture </item><item> Animals </item><item> Animal Products </item><item> Dairy Products </item><item> Miscellaneous Products </item><item> Agricultural Equipment </item><item> Communications </item><item> Travel </item>

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14. guatemala/bec09/GUACEN_mu.html
GUATEMALA: SELECTED ECONOMIC

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15. guatemala/etp05/~sisteru_mu.html
  - Pictures, Info, Journals and More.

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16. guatemala/nan10/zeta_mu.html

Las chicas de Z, un regalo de navidad para nuestros televidentes 

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Especial navideño 
Nuestro mensaje... 

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17. guatemala/otr01/index_mu.html
Photographs of the Mayan Indians of Guatemala.

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18. guatemala/otr02/iob_mu.htm

<introduction>

<title>INTRODUCTION </title>

<text>On March 30, 1995, the President directed the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) to conduct a government-wide review concerning allegations regarding the l990 death of US citizen Michael DeVine, the 1992 disappearance of Guatemalan guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, and related matters. Under terms of reference issued on April 7, 1995, the scope of this inquiry covers any existing intelligence bearing on the torture, disappearance, or death of US citizens in Guatemala since 1984, including the cases of Dianna Ortiz, Griffith Davis and Nicholas Blake. Other cases that have come to our attention and have been included in our review are those involving Peter Wolfe, Janey Skinner, Jennifer Roitman, Meredith Larson, June Weinstock, and Daniel Callahan. Because an investigation of the Dianna Ortiz case by the Department of Justice is still underway, our comments on that case will be limited at this time to our review of relevant intelligence reports. The terms of reference also include the US intelligence relationship with Guatemala, the coordination of intelligence and policy, and the asset validation process.

The IOB's charter is to review and report to the President on intelligence activities that we believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive. The Board has previously conducted its investigations and provided reports in a confidential manner. The Guatemala review is unprecedented as a publicly announced inquiry.

The Board received reports on the matters under review from the Inspectors General of the Departments of State and Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and from the Inspector General and General Counsel of the Department of Defense. These reports covered those agencies and their subordinate agencies, such as the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Over the course of the review, the IOB has received excellent cooperation from the inspectors general and their departments and agencies, as well as from innumerable others both in and out of the government, and has benefited greatly from the extensive follow-up investigations conducted by the Department of Justice on certain matters. The IOB believes that the investigations conducted by the inspectors general in this review process demonstrate the important, though often unpopular, roles they play.

The IOB also conducted its own inquiry in evaluating relevant facts and circumstances in order to reach its own conclusions. In this inquiry, IOB members and staff interviewed scores of witnesses in the United States and Guatemala and examined many thousands of documents. The Board also requested a CIA IG review of all clandestine assets in Guatemala since 1984 for allegations of human rights abuse.

The Board would like to note that agencies have already taken several remedial actions as a result of investigations conducted by the agency inspectors general, the IOB, and the Congress.

In this report, we provide an executive summary and our conclusions and recommendations, and we address the following subjects: the context of US relations with Guatemala, US intelligence objectives in Guatemala, asset involvement in human rights violations, the asset validation system, intelligence agencies' interaction with the policy community, Congressional oversight, a crimes report to the Department of Justice, human rights reporting, and intelligence bearing on the cases of victims of violence in Guatemala reviewed by the IOB.

This public version of the report is essentially the same as the classified version submitted to the President. This report omits, for example, some highly sensitive information, such as the identities of those who came forward with information --individuals whose lives could be endangered if they were identified. </text>
</introduction> 

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<executive>

<title>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY </title>

<text>

Policy objectives

US policy objectives in Guatemala from l984 to the present--the period we reviewed--included supporting the transition to and strengthening of civilian democratic government, furthering human rights and the rule of law, supporting economic growth, combating illegal narcotics trafficking, combating the communist insurgency, and advancing the current peace process between the government and the guerrillas.

Intelligence activities

US intelligence officials in Guatemala as well as in Washington endeavored to support all of these policy objectives. For the CIA, the principal means to accomplish this consisted of working closely with Guatemala's security and intelligence services and developing human sources of intelligence--known as assets. These assets provided intelligence that assisted officials at the embassy and in Washington in achieving US policy objectives. The CIA station's liaison relationships with the security services also benefited US interests by engendering cooperation in such areas as countering attempts to overthrow Guatemala's constitutional government, providing protection to US citizens at risk in Guatemala and reversing a dramatic early 1990's increase in narcotics transshipment through Guatemala.

Although the CIA's goals in Guatemala were legitimate, achieving them and maintaining influence in Guatemala required that the CIA deal with some unsavory groups and individuals. The human rights records of the Guatemalan security services were widely known to be reprehensible, and although the CIA made efforts to improve the conduct of the services, probably with some limited success, egregious human rights abuses did not stop.

Our clandestine intelligence capability will clearly remain essential to our national security. However, although the conduct of clandestine intelligence collection at times requires dealing with unsavory individuals and organizations, the value of what we hope to gain in terms of our national interests must outweigh the costs of such unseemly relationships and be worth the risks always inherent in clandestine activity.

The CIA's successes in Guatemala in conjunction with other US agencies, particularly in uncovering and working to counter coups and in reducing the narcotics flow, were at times dramatic and very much in the national interests of both the United States and Guatemala. We found, however, two areas in which the CIA's performance was unacceptable. First, until late 1994, insufficient attention was given to allegations of serious human rights abuse made against several station assets or liaison contacts. Second, the CIA failed to provide enough information on this subject to policy-makers and the Congress to permit proper policy and Congressional oversight. Other US intelligence agencies also made valuable contributions to US interests and policy in Guatemala, but fell short in some areas as noted in our report; we did not find, however, that the impact of their deficiencies was of the same magnitude as that of the CIA.

Human rights abuses by assets or liaison contacts

In the course of our review, we found that several CIA assets were credibly alleged to have ordered, planned, or participated in serious human rights violations such as assassination, extrajudicial execution, torture, or kidnapping while they were assets--and that the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) headquarters was aware at the time of the allegations. A number of assets were alleged--with varying levels of credibility--to have been involved in similar abuses before their CIA asset relationships began; in several other cases, the alleged abuses occurred or came to light only after the CIA was no longer in contact with the assets. A few assets were reportedly present as others engaged in acts of intimidation, and another engaged in such an act before becoming an asset. A further asset was the subject of an unspecific allegation of human rights abuse. Several of the above assets were also involved in covering up human rights abuses, as was an additional asset. In addition, a number of the station's liaison contacts--Guatemalan officials with whom the station worked in an official capacity--were also alleged to have been involved in human rights abuses or in covering them up. In many of the cases noted above, however, we learned of the allegations only by virtue of relationships with other assets or liaison contacts alleged to have engaged in similar abuses.

None of the assets alleged to have committed serious human rights abuses now have asset relationships with the CIA. Relationships with all but a few such assets had been terminated prior to September 1994 for a variety of reasons. Only one of the terminations of relationship was principally the result of a human rights allegation. In September 1994, because of a human rights issue unrelated to Guatemala, the DO's Latin America Division conducted a review of its then-current assets throughout Latin America to determine if any may have violated human rights. As a result of this review, the CIA in early 1995 terminated relationships with the few remaining Guatemalan assets alleged to have been involved in serious abuses such as assassination and kidnapping.

As noted earlier, the IOB believes that US national interests, with respect to Guatemala and elsewhere, can in some cases justify relationships with assets and institutions with sordid or even criminal backgrounds. We believe that a careful balance must be struck on a case-by-case basis between the value and uniqueness of contributions from the relationship, on the one hand, and the seriousness and credibility of the allegations of abuse, on the other. We note that in carrying out law enforcement activities in the United States, the FBI, police, and other authorities regularly weigh such considerations in establishing informant relationships with persons having criminal backgrounds. Among the potential costs to be considered, however, in continuing or establishing such relationships with foreign intelligence assets are: the moral implications, the damage to US objectives in promoting greater respect for human rights, the loss of confidence in the intelligence community by the Congress and the American people, and the effect of such relationships upon the ethical climate within US intelligence agencies. In February 1996, largely as a result of the inquiries related to Guatemala, the CIA issued guidance for dealing with serious human rights violations or crimes of violence by assets and liaison services. We believe that this guidance strikes an appropriate balance: it generally bars such relationships, but it permits senior CIA officials to authorize them in special cases when national security interests so warrant. We are disturbed, however, that until the recent Guatemala inquiries, the CIA had failed to establish agency-wide written guidance on such an important issue.

We found no evidence that Guatemala station was a "rogue" station operating independently of control by its headquarters; it generally kept the DO headquarters well-informed of developments, negative or otherwise, including allegations implicating CIA assets as each allegation surfaced. DO headquarters officials, generally on an ad hoc basis, provided guidance to Guatemala station in the late 1980's and early 1990's advising it to avoid assets against whom human rights violations had been alleged, but the number of such assets retained or recruited without any evident deliberation suggests that this guidance was neither strictly enforced by headquarters nor observed by the station. DO managers rarely focused on specific allegations and did not systematically review assets in Guatemala for allegations of human rights abuse until the September 1994 review. Moreover, the balancing of allegations against contributions, on those occasions it was done, was conducted exclusively by division-level managers and chiefs of station, whose performance and rewards systems were principally based on establishing and maintaining relationships with productive assets and who had little incentive to give great weight to allegations of abuse.

Asset validation

The asset validation system, through which the CIA should have periodically reexamined its relationship with each asset, did not address human rights allegations against the assets in question. This validation system, even if it had been functioning as intended, would not have highlighted human rights issues because it had been designed to focus almost exclusively upon assets' vulnerability to counterintelligence and upon dropping non-producing assets from the payroll. The CIA has recently modified its asset validation system to take into account all derogatory information on assets, including allegations of human rights abuse.

Executive oversight

Out of a general concern for the protection of its sources, out of neglect, or for other reasons, the CIA informed neither State Department officials, at the embassy or in Washington, nor National Security Council officials of alleged abuses by assets until late l994 and early 1995. Because significant activities and relationships--such as those involving assets implicated in assassination, kidnapping, or torture--raised broad policy considerations, policy officials outside the CIA (such as representatives of the National Security Council and the Departments of State and, when appropriate, Justice) should have been notified promptly.

During the period we reviewed, the DO, from its leadership down to its case officers, interpreted a 1977 CIA agreement with the Department of State to obligate the CIA to reveal to ambassadors the identities of only those assets with whom senior embassy officers were in high-level official contact. The IOB recommends that the State-CIA agreement be amended to say explicitly that ambassadors must be informed of all intelligence activities that have significant policy implications, including reasonably credible allegations of asset involvement in the deaths of US citizens or other serious human rights violations. If there is concern over an ambassador's handling of such intelligence information, the CIA should convey the information directly to appropriate senior level officials at the Department of State.

The Board believes, however, that the system for collecting and disseminating intelligence information can function properly only if US executive and legislative branch officials are held accountable should they compromise or improperly handle classified information. A lack of accountability puts sources of intelligence at risk. The effect is to discourage the proper provision of information by intelligence agencies to intelligence consumers and the oversight community, and ultimately to jeopardize the ability of the United States to recruit sources and to collect intelligence in the furtherance of its national interests around the world. Ample avenues exist by which well-intentioned officials can raise grievances concerning intelligence activities--either through the executive branch to the National Security Advisor or the President, or through the Congressional oversight committees to the Congressional leadership--without publicly revealing sensitive intelligence information.

During this review and others, we have observed a general atmosphere of distrust between the State Department and the CIA. We recognize that tension between these entities is to a certain extent inevitable, given that their different institutional missions will occasionally come into conflict. We believe, however, that some of the distrust could be alleviated. We recommend, therefore, that the State Department, at an appropriately senior level, ensure that ambassadors devote sufficient time and attention to receiving detailed initial training and follow-up briefings on intelligence activities in their countries of posting. The CIA, for its part, must ensure that these briefings cover all activities and relationships of policy significance.

Congressional oversight

The IOB concluded that the CIA leadership violated its statutory obligation to keep the Congressional oversight committees "fully and currently informed" under Section 413 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code. Though this statute is not criminal and the standard is too broad to be fulfilled to the letter, CIA officers--particularly senior leaders at CIA headquarters--were derelict in failing to provide information that should have been provided under even the narrowest reading of the statute. In examining specific instances in which information was not provided to Congress, the IOB considered conflicting evidence and judged that CIA officials did not act with intent to mislead Congress--though they did intentionally withhold some information, in substantial part because of concern for the protection of sources.

We found the primary causes for this failure in Congressional notification to have been the absence of a systematic notification process and inadequate emphasis from the CIA's leadership. The ad hoc manner in which notifications were handled, combined with the DO's predisposition against volunteering sensitive information, even to authorized recipients, created an environment that bred notification failures. For this we fault the CIA and DO leadership back to the 1980 enactment of the oversight statute. Although we found no failures as significant as those by the CIA, we found that Department of Defense intelligence agencies also lacked a systematic process for Congressional notification during the period we reviewed. The CIA, DIA, and NSA recently instituted processes designed to implement and document Congressional notification more systematically.

The IOB found that in the CIA's semi-annual reports to Congress on its efforts to improve respect for human rights in Guatemala, the CIA created a misleading impression of the status of human rights by focusing on positive contributions without mentioning ongoing abuses by the services with which the station had a liaison relationship. The IOB believes that despite the narrow language of the reporting requirement, CIA managers at headquarters should have recognized this effect and ensured that Congress received, whether through the reports or other means, an accurate portrayal of the human rights situation in Guatemala.

In reviewing all of the facts surrounding the CIA's failures in notifying Congress, the IOB did not find sufficient basis for a criminal referral to the Attorney General. The Department of Justice did examine the issue of the CIA's notifications to Congress at the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), but it found that the facts posited by the SSCI did not constitute a sufficient basis upon which to premise a criminal prosecution. Pursuant to Executive Order 12863, which governs the IOB, the Board has notified DOJ of its belief that in the past the CIA violated Title 50 of the U.S. Code by failing to keep Congress "fully and currently informed." The Board notes, though, that this likely violation was not criminal, that the CIA has taken remedial action, and that there appears to be no threat of a continuing violation.

CIA funding levels

There have been public allegations that CIA funds were increased to compensate for the cut-off of almost all overt military aid to Guatemala in 1990. We did not find this to have been the case. CIA funding levels to the security services dropped consistently from about $3.5 million in FY 1989 to about $1 million in 1995.

Human rights reporting

The station was aware of US policy-makers' interest in learning of human rights violations and it disseminated intelligence reports on the topic. Although these reports were of varying utility and reliability, some were instrumental--becoming the bases for diplomatic protests to the Guatemalan government and contributing to the decision to suspend overt military assistance in 1990. A concern for how negative allegations against the Guatemalan security services would be received, however, appears in a few instances to have affected how these allegations were reported. Although intelligence reports with clearly credible allegations seem generally to have been disseminated appropriately, those of questionable credibility that were favorable to the liaison services appear to have been disseminated beyond the DO more often than similarly dubious unfavorable ones.

Victim cases

The Board found that the widely publicized allegation based on a CIA intelligence report that US citizen Michael DeVine was killed in the presence of Guatemalan Colonel Alpirez was, by the clear preponderance of evidence, not true. We believe that the most likely scenario is that the soldiers currently imprisoned for the crime killed DeVine while interrogating him about a missing army rifle. We believe that their superiors ordered them to recover the rifle, but we found no persuasive evidence that the orders included killing Michael DeVine. Colonel Alpirez was, however, involved in the broad cover-up of Guatemalan army involvement--a cover-up that we believe involved several CIA assets and liaison contacts. We have found no indication that CIA officials were in any way complicitous in the death of DeVine, and no credible evidence that any CIA assets or liaison contacts ordered or had prior knowledge of DeVine's death.

The CIA in November 1991 referred the October 1991 allegation of Colonel Alpirez's involvement in DeVine s death to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Although the CIA initially conveyed this crimes report in a manner designed to set it apart from routine reports, the report apparently was treated as routine by DOJ, which investigated the allegation, but did not uncover all of the relevant background information. DOJ did not find US jurisdiction under the anti-terrorism statute, but never formally closed the case. We found the performance of both the CIA and DOJ in connection with this referral to have been less thorough than warranted. DOJ, however, recently conducted an exhaustive reinvestigation of the DeVine case in light of all the information now available to the US government, and again found no adequate basis for US jurisdiction. DOJ has since implemented new internal procedures in an effort to ensure that such criminal referrals are handled in a more systematic manner. DOJ has also recently entered into a new agreement with the agencies involved in intelligence that is designed to strengthen the crimes reporting process.

Another widely publicized allegation based on a CIA intelligence report--that Colonel Alpirez killed guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez--is contradicted by numerous other intelligence reports and accounts. We conclude, however, that Alpirez participated in at least part of Bamaca's interrogation. We believe, but lack definitive proof, that Bamaca's interrogation included torture and that Bamaca was killed within about a year of being captured. It has not been possible for us to conclude whether Bamaca was killed at the San Marcos base near where he was captured or elsewhere, such as in Guatemala City. We found that no CIA officials were involved in or were contemporaneously aware of the torture or death of Bamaca. Some then-active assets or liaison contacts were, however, alleged in various, often-contradictory accounts to have been involved in or to have known of Bamaca's interrogation and death. Although the Board believes that assets or liaison contacts were likely involved or knowledgeable, it found no indication that the CIA was aware of these links during the course of its relationships with these individuals.

Concerning the death, abduction, or torture of other US citizens in Guatemala since 1984, the Board found no evidence that CIA assets or liaison contacts were implicated. We also found that--contrary to what may be publicly supposed--intelligence provides little insight into the circumstances of these cases. Our intelligence agencies are not all-knowing. What intelligence we did find is described in this report and, to the maximum extent appropriate, is being provided to the victims or their relatives. We may never know definitively what happened in the cases we reviewed. In one particular case, Dianna Ortiz has described someone she believes to be North American who rescued her from her torturers and appeared to have some authority over them. Ortiz says the person warned her to tell no one about the incident and told her that he was taking her to a friend at the US embassy, raising the possibility that he had some association with the US government. The Ortiz case is still under investigation by the Department of Justice; the IOB will accordingly refrain from drawing conclusions on the case at this time. We found no indication of involvement by CIA or other US officials in any of the harm that befell the other US citizens.

Informing families and victims

As intelligence on the cases was reported to US government officials, very little of it was shared with victims or their surviving family members. The IOB believes, however, that in such cases the United States should provide its citizens more information whenever possible. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes the only legal requirement to provide such information, yet that process is often an unsatisfactory way through which to communicate the information to the families and victims. The redactions necessary to protect sensitive information in documents released under FOIA naturally give the reader the impression-usually mistaken--that relevant information is being withheld. Further, the reader is usually given no indication as to the reliability of the information. Victims and family members who seek intelligence information outside the FOIA process, however, usually find that it is not within the authority of policy agencies, such as the State Department, to share intelligence originating in another agency, and that it is not within the intelligence agencies' charter to communicate directly with victims and families. We believe the State Department should demonstrate more initiative in seeking authorization from intelligence producers to share their intelligence in briefings (oral or written) to family members and victims. The briefings need not identify that the information came from intelligence, but they should attempt to convey some indication of its reliability.

Among the cases of victims in Guatemala we reviewed, in only the DeVine and Bamaca cases were there numerous intelligence reports--though they were often conflicting and inconclusive--that shed light on what happened. In the DeVine case, we believe the State Department should have given greater consideration to sharing intelligence-based information with Carole DeVine. In the Bamaca case, as the State Department went to great lengths in pressing the Guatemalan government on the issue, it used intelligence-based information in the process and in briefing Jennifer Harbury. We found no indication, however, of any request by the State Department for a search of past intelligence on the case until October 1994. If it had done so in early 1993, when Jennifer Harbury first raised the issue of her husband's fate, the Department might have been able at a much earlier date to provide her with useful information about her husband's fate--that is, a report that he had been taken alive.

We also found that the NSA conducted an inadequate search in response to the Blake family's FOIA request for all documents related to the 1985 death of Nicholas Blake in Guatemala. NSA's initial response indicated that there were no relevant documents, but it had not searched the database that contains its own reporting. After an appeal, NSA conducted a search of this database and responded that it had uncovered six relevant documents. The broader search used in connection with our review identified an additional sixteen documents that were equally relevant, though none of them revealed who killed Nicholas Blake or whether the army was involved. NSA has since notified the Blake family of the existence of these additional documents. NSA similarly found only one out of five documents that were covered by the FOIA request from Meredith Larson, another victim of Guatemalan violence. None of these documents, however, provided greater insight to the circumstances and perpetrators of the stabbing attack against her.

NSA has recently made efforts to make its FOIA searches more responsive, but it faces a special challenge in releasing information because anything it releases will be known to have come from signals intelligence. For agencies whose intelligence comes from human sources, released intelligence could come from a variety of persons who may have had first-, second-, or third-hand access to the information. We recommend that appropriate NSC staff study this problem in an effort to devise a system through which NSA can release useful information without jeopardizing its sensitive methods (perhaps, if necessary, by amending the FOIA to permit the consolidation of DOD or intelligence community responses so that information is not identified as having come from a particular agency).

Alleged NSA records destruction

We found no evidence to support the late March 1995 allegation that NSA and Army officials altered records on Guatemala to prevent scrutiny in any investigation, and we believe that there is no foundation to this charge. The allegation, communicated to a member of Congress in an anonymous letter telecopied to his office and also communicated to the press, appears to have been fabricated. Detailed analysis of the relevant databases indicates that no records on Guatemala were deleted or destroyed. Moreover, the officials identified in the anonymous letter, Lieutenant General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and Colonel Daniel D. Day, an Army officer assigned to NSA, either did not have or did not utilize the access necessary to make the alleged alterations. Finally, the anonymous letter, which purported to be on NSA letterhead, does not match any letterhead used by NSA in at least the last twenty years. An investigating US Attorney also found no basis for the allegation.

Document storage and retrieval

The State Department and CIA Inspectors General, respectively, found shortcomings in the document storage and retrieval systems of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the CIA's Directorate of Operations. In the case of the State Department, retrieval shortcomings complicated its own IG's investigation. Within the DO, retrieval shortcomings contributed directly to DO headquarters' failure to recognize that an asset whose recruitment it approved was alleged to have planned an assassination. The DO has been improving its retrieval system and has corrected the specific deficiency that led to this failure. The IOB recommends that the DO continue its ongoing modernization and that the State Department promptly correct its own deficiencies in this area.
</text>
</executive>

---

<conclusions><title>
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

</title>

<text>l. Intelligence activities

The intelligence community carried out activities in support of US policy objectives. These objectives included supporting the transition to and strengthening of civilian democratic government in Guatemala, encouraging respect for human rights, combating illegal narcotics trafficking, fighting the communist insurgency, and, in recent years, advancing the peace process.

For its part, CIA established a liaison relationship with Guatemalan security services widely known to have reprehensible human rights records, and it continued covert aid after the cutoff of overt military aid in 1990. This liaison relationship and continued covert aid occurred with the knowledge of the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Congressional oversight committees.

Contrary to public allegations, CIA did not increase covert funding for Guatemala to compensate for the cut-off of military aid in 1990.

2. Relationships with assets who may have violated human rights

Credible allegations of serious human rights abuse were made against several then-active CIA assets. In addition, allegations of varying seriousness, specificity, and credibility were made against persons who later became assets, as well as against a number of CIA liaison contacts.

Recommendation:

US intelligence agencies should, while maintaining the ability to use key assets with such histories when national interests warrant, establish clear guidance on the recruitment and retention of assets with human rights or criminal allegations.

Actions taken:

Guidance has been recently issued for dealing with serious human rights violations or crimes of violence by assets and liaison services. We believe this guidance strikes an appropriate balance by generally barring such relationships but permitting appropriately senior officials to authorize them in special cases when national security interests warrant.

3. Notification of ambassadors and other policy-makers

CIA did not inform ambassadors and other policy-makers before late l994 of allegations of human rights abuse by Guatemalan assets as such claims came to light.

Recommendations:

The Department of State and CIA should amend the State-CIA agreement to ensure that ambassadors and other policy-makers are informed of station activities and asset and liaison relationships that have significant policy implications. Notification of such activities and relationships should, at a minimum, include reasonably credible allegations of asset or liaison involvement in assassination, kidnapping, or torture, and particularly any involvement in the death or abuse of a US citizen.

CIA should provide ambassadors detailed initial and continuing briefings on intelligence activities in their countries. The Department of State, at a level of sufficient authority, should ensure that ambassadors attend such briefings and that they receive continuing instruction on the importance of protecting intelligence sources and methods.

Actions taken:

In October 1995, CIA disseminated a guidance cable in an effort to clarify the State-CIA agreement of 1977. We believe, however, that a more durable and effective solution would be to amend the agreement itself.

4. Provision of information to families and survivors

Although none of the intelligence we reviewed conclusively identified the perpetrators in any of the cases involving American victims, the State Department should have sought authorization from intelligence agencies to include in its briefings to family members or surviving victims more information drawn from intelligence reports.

NSA's inadequate responses to FOIA requests by the Blake family and Meredith Larson were the result of data searches that were overly narrow and the lack of a system that would allow NSA to provide more information without compromising its sources and methods.

Recommendations:

The Department of State should implement a program to ensure that its bureaus consider including appropriate intelligence-based information in briefings to US citizens (or US relatives of those) who are killed, abducted, or tortured abroad-perhaps without identifying the information as being intelligence-based. The bureaus should work with intelligence agencies to ensure that sources and methods are not compromised in this process.

NSA, with assistance from DOD and the NSC, should explore how to develop a system by which information from signals intelligence can usefully be shared without compromising NSA's sensitive methods. This could perhaps be achieved by amending the FOIA to permit the consolidation of DOD or intelligence community responses so that NSA information can be released without being identified as signals intelligence.

Actions taken:

An interagency group is now studying ways to improve the provision of information to US citizens in human rights cases.

The current leadership at NSA has recently improved the agency's responsiveness to FOIA requests by substantially reducing their processing time and by attempting to release more useful information in such responses.

5. Accountability for those who compromise intelligence information

The system for collecting and disseminating intelligence information can function properly only if US executive and legislative branch officials are held accountable should they compromise or improperly handle classified information. A lack of accountability puts sources of intelligence at risk. The effect is to discourage the proper provision of information by intelligence agencies to intelligence consumers and the oversight community, and ultimately to jeopardize the ability of the United States to recruit sources and to collect intelligence in the furtherance of its national interests around the world. Ample avenues exist by which well-intentioned officials can raise grievances concerning intelligence activities--either through the executive branch to the National Security Advisor or the President, or through the Congressional oversight committees to the Congressional leadership--without publicly revealing sensitive intelligence information.

Recommendation:

The executive and legislative branches should hold accountable any officials known to have compromised or improperly handled classified information.

6. Involvement by US officials

Dianna Ortiz has described a man who she believes to be North American who she said rescued her from her torture but warned her to tell no one about it and told her that he was taking her to a friend at the US embassy. This raises the possibility that the man had some association with the US government. The Ortiz case is still under investigation by the Department of Justice; the IOB will accordingly refrain from drawing conclusions on the case at this time. Subject to resolution of the Ortiz investigation, we uncovered no indication that US government officials were involved in or had prior knowledge of the death, torture, or disappearance of US or Guatemalan citizens.

7. Headquarters knowledge of station activities

We found no evidence that Guatemala station was a "rogue" station operating independently of control by its headquarters. Rather, the station generally kept CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) headquarters well-informed of all developments, negative or otherwise, including allegations against assets as they surfaced.

8. Congressional notification

Congress was not appropriately "fully and currently" informed by the CIA, particularly concerning the death of Michael DeVine. Though the evidence is conflicting, we do not believe that CIA officials acted with an intent to mislead Congress. Rather, the primary reasons for this failure to inform were the absence of a systematic notification process and inadequate emphasis upon reporting issues by CIA management.

CIA's semi-annual human rights reports to Congress were incomplete and created a misleading impression. CIA managers at headquarters should have recognized this effect and ensured that Congress received an accurate portrayal of the human rights situation in Guatemala.

Although we found no failures in Congressional notification by Department of Defense intelligence agencies as significant as those by CIA, we did find that during the period we reviewed, DOD agencies also lacked a systematic notification process.

Recommendation:

CIA and DOD should both implement a systematic process by which timely decisions on Congressional notification of intelligence issues are made, carried out, and recorded.

Actions taken:

CIA, DIA, and NSA have implemented new systems to review their activities to determine which issues should be briefed to Congress. The information is now usually provided to Congress in written memoranda, and a record is made of such notifications. We believe these new systems will improve performance and accountability in Congressional notification.

9. Referral of Alpirez allegation to DOJ

The performance of both CIA and DOJ was less thorough than was warranted with regard to the criminal referral of the allegation that Colonel Alpirez was present at DeVine's death. CIA failed to communicate information that would have led to a more vigorous DOJ investigation. We do not believe, however, that this failure violated the law, nor do we believe that it affected DOJ's ultimate determination in the case.

Recommendation:

DOJ and the intelligence agencies should institute new internal and inter-agency procedures to ensure significant criminal referrals receive appropriate attention.

Actions taken:

DOJ has implemented new internal procedures to improve tracking of crimes reports that it receives from intelligence agencies, and it has reached a new Memorandum of Understanding with the agencies to ensure that significant crime reports receive special attention. We believe these improvements will reduce the chances of the sort of breakdown in the process that occurred with regard to the DeVine crimes report.

10. Asset validation system

In part because performance in asset validation was not significantly reflected in the CIA DO's promotion and rewards systems, there was a lack of emphasis on validation at station level. Even if the asset validation system had been functioning as intended, however, it would not have highlighted human rights issues, because this system had been designed to focus almost exclusively upon assets' vulnerability to counterintelligence and upon eliminating non-producing assets from the payroll.

Recommendation:

US intelligence agencies should ensure that their asset validation systems are accorded appropriate weight in internal performance-appraisal and rewards systems. Additionally, they should ensure that their validation systems consider not only counterintelligence and productivity issues, but also derogatory information on assets (including allegations of human rights abuse) from both governmental and nongovernmental sources.

Actions taken:

CIA recently expanded its asset validation system to consider derogatory allegations against assets and increased the importance of asset validation in performance appraisals.

11. Reliability of allegations against Alpirez

The widely publicized allegation that Guatemalan Colonel Alpirez directed or was present at the murder of US citizen Michael DeVine appears to have been based upon information that was unreliable and was contradicted by other evidence. Alpirez, however, clearly participated in the cover-up of the military's role in DeVine's death. Numerous other reports also contradict the subsequent allegation that Colonel Alpirez killed guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez or was present at his death. We are convinced, however, that Alpirez participated in at least part of Bamaca's interrogation. We believe, but lack definitive proof, that Bamaca's interrogation included torture and that Bamaca was killed within about a year of being captured. We believe assets or liaison contacts were likely involved or knowledgeable, but we found no indication that the CIA was aware of these links during its relationships with these individuals.

12. Alleged NSA document destruction

The allegation that NSA and Army officials destroyed records related to the activity of US intelligence agencies in Guatemala (which was communicated to a member of Congress purportedly on NSA letterhead) appears to have been fabricated. An investigating US Attorney has also found no basis for the charge.

13. Storage and retrieval of intelligence information

The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) lacked--and still lacks--an adequate capability for document storage and for the retrieval of intelligence information from its electronic database.

CIA's Directorate of Operations records system was inadequate and degraded the ability of headquarters and station officers to have access to all relevant and available information.

Recommendation:

The State Department and CIA should promptly examine and remedy the shortcomings in their systems for storing and retrieving intelligence information.

Actions taken:

The DO has improved its records system to facilitate more thorough searches of its database and is currently working to digitize all of its nonelectronic holdings.

14. Follow-up evaluation of implementation

Recommendation:

Agency inspectors general should evaluate the implementation of these recommendations and any actions taken thereupon, and should report the results of their evaluations to the IOB within one year of the date of this report.
</text>
</conclusions> 

---

<the>

<title>THE CONTEXT: US RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA </title>

<text>In 1954, as the communist party gained increasing influence in the Guatemalan government headed by President Jacobo Arbenz, the US assisted in the overthrow of the Arbenz government. Following this coup, the US was closely allied to successive Guatemalan governments. In the 1960's, a left-wing guerrilla movement with ties to Cuba emerged in Guatemala and carried out violent attacks, including the 1968 assassination of the US ambassador. This insurgency continued throughout the 1960's and intensified in the late 1970's.

Relations between the US and Guatemalan governments came under strain in 1977, when the Carter administration issued its first annual human rights report on Guatemala. The Guatemalan government rejected that report's negative assessment and refused US military aid. The human rights situation deteriorated further in the late 1970's and early 1980's, as the Guatemalan army--in which the intelligence and security services played a central role--waged a ruthless scorched-earth campaign against the communist guerrillas as well as noncombatants. In the course of this campaign in a country with a population that has never been more than approximately 10 million, more than 100,000 Guatemalans died. Through the 1980's and into the 1990's, the human rights situation gradually improved as the insurgency waned, but successive Department of State human rights reports continued to document egregious violations, including murders of political opponents.

Relations between the two countries warmed in the mid-1980's with gradual improvements in human rights and the Reagan administration's emphasis on curbing the spread of communism in Central America. After a civilian government under President Cerezo was elected in 1985, overt non-lethal US military aid to Guatemala resumed. In December 1990, however, largely as a result of the killing of US citizen Michael DeVine by members of the Guatemalan army, the Bush administration suspended almost all overt military aid.

Guatemala inaugurated a new democratically-elected president, Jorge Serrano, in January 1991. In May 1993, however, President Serrano, claiming to be frustrated by congressional corruption, illegally dissolved the congress and supreme court and tried to restrict civil freedoms. In the face of strong protests by Guatemalan citizens and the international community (including the United States) and--most importantly--in the face of the Guatemalan army's refusal to support him, President Serrano's Fujimori-style "auto-coup" failed. In June l993, following President Serrano's flight from the country, the Guatemalan congress elected the human rights ombudsman, Ramiro De Leon Carpio, to be president.

The US worked with the De Leon government in attempting to strengthen democracy and human rights. Both governments also cooperated in the fight against the transnational shipment of illegal narcotics, which had become a major problem in Guatemala in the early 1990's. The US also joined the "Group of Friends of the Peace Process," which continues to work to bring an end to Guatemala's 35-year-old internal conflict. In January 1996, Guatemalans elected a new President, Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen.

There has been some improvement over time in the Guatemalan military's accountability with regard to human rights violations. Whereas in the 1980's the army acted with total impunity, in the 1990's military personnel were for the first time charged, convicted, and imprisoned for some of their crimes. Senior officers, however, are still rarely charged for their roles in ordering or covering up such crimes. Human rights problems, including cases involving US citizens, remain a serious concern in US-Guatemalan relations.

US policy objectives in Guatemala since 1984 have included supporting the transition to and strengthening of civilian democratic government, encouraging respect for human rights and the rule of law, supporting economic growth, combating illegal narcotics trafficking, fighting the communist insurgency, and, in recent years, advancing the peace process.
</text>
</the> 

---

<us>

<title>US INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS IN GUATEMALA </title>

<intelligence>

<title>Intelligence objectives and activities </title>

<text>US intelligence officials in Guatemala and Washington worked to support overall US policy objectives in Guatemala. For the CIA in particular these objectives entailed recruiting human sources of intelligence, called "assets," and developing a close liaison relationship with the Guatemalan security services.

The station's traditional foreign intelligence collection activities continued fundamentally unchanged over the period we examined. The intelligence produced by the station (as well as by other collectors) proved valuable at times to the embassy and other policy makers. In particular, these intelligence consumers found some of the reporting helpful in providing information not available to embassy political officers. Several reports on human rights violations also served as the bases for US diplomatic protests and other diplomatic actions. </text>

</intelligence>
<liaison>

<title>Liaison relationship </title>

<text>The close liaison relationship the CIA maintained with the Guatemalan security services helped to counter the communist insurgency in Guatemala and to combat the flow of illegal narcotics through Guatemala to the United States. For example, cooperation between the Guatemalans, the CIA, and the Drug Enforcement Administration resulted in the seizure of forty-eight metric tons of cocaine from 1990 through 1993 as it was being shipped through Guatemala to the United States by Colombian drug cartels. After these seizures, the amount of narcotics transiting Guatemala appears to have dropped dramatically. The CIA's liaison relationship with the Guatemalan services also benefited US interests by enlisting the assistance of Guatemala's primary intelligence and security service--the army's directorate of intelligence (D-2)--in areas such as reversing the "auto-coup" of 1993 and protecting US citizens at risk, including the 1994 rescue of a kidnapped American girl. Because the D-2 was widely considered to be the elite within the Guatemalan military and government, the station also often requested and received administrative and logistical assistance from the D-2 on behalf of the embassy.

The human rights records of the Guatemalan security services--the D-2 and the Department of Presidential Security (known informally as "Archivos," after one of its predecessor organizations)--were generally known to have been reprehensible by all who were familiar with Guatemala. US policy-makers knew of both the CIA's liaison with them and the services' unsavory reputations. The CIA endeavored to improve the behavior of the Guatemalan services through frequent and close contact and by stressing the importance of human rights -- insisting, for example, that Guatemalan military intelligence training include human rights instruction. The station officers assigned to Guatemala and the CIA headquarters officials whom we interviewed believe that the CIA's contact with the Guatemalan services helped improve attitudes towards human rights. Several indices of human rights observance indeed reflected improvement--whether or not this was due to CIA efforts--but egregious violations continued, and some of the station's closest contacts in the security services remained a part of the problem.

The end of the Cold War gradually led to lower funding levels for the station, but had only a limited effect upon the mechanics of how the CIA carried out its business and upon the mind-set of the CIA officers dealing with Guatemala. Station officers continued to view the communist insurgents--who seemed to threaten a more democratic government--as the primary enemy, and they viewed the Guatemalan government and security services as partners in the fight against this common foe and against new threats such as narcotics and illegal alien smuggling. </text>

</liaison>

<funding>

<title>Funding issues </title>

<text>The funds the CIA provided to the Guatemalan liaison services were vital to the D-2 and Archivos. This funding was seen as necessary to make these services more capable partners with the station, particularly in pursuing anti-communist and counternarcotics objectives. The CIA, with the knowledge of ambassadors and other State Department and National Security Council officials, as well as the Congress, continued this aid after the termination of overt military assistance in l990.

There have been public allegations that CIA funds were increased to compensate for the cutoff of military aid in 1990. We did not find this to have been the case. Overall CIA funding levels to the Guatemalan services dropped consistently from about $3.5 million in FY 1989 to about l million in l995.
</text>
</funding>
</us>

---

<asset>

<title>ASSET INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS </title>

<do>

<title>DO Guidance on Human Rights </title>

<text>The CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) and Guatemala station were clearly aware of the potential for human rights violations by assets and liaison contacts. In November 1988, the DO's Latin America (LA) division provided a guidance cable to its Central American stations, in which it noted that human rights violations were being used politically by Washington opponents of CIA programs in Central America, but went on to state:

Point we would like to make is that we must all become sensitized to the importance of respecting human rights, and we must ensure that those assets and resources we direct and/or fund are equally sensitive. The issue will only become more important, and we serve our objectives best if we remember that if we ignore the importance of the human rights issue in the final analysis we do great damage to our mission. We are under great scrutiny. Finally, aside from the legal and policy considerations which are constant in any allegations concerning violation's [sic] of human rights we also recognize a basic moral obligation. We are Americans and we must reflect American values in the conduct of our business. We are all inherently opposed to the violation of human rights. Those who work with us in one capacity or another must also respect these values.

DO instructions on warning targets of assassination issued in September 1989 stated, "Participation of an asset in an assassination may constitute a violation of US law or regulations and is grounds for immediate termination of the Agency's relationship with the asset. Thus, complete information of any such incident should be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible."

In 1990, the LA division chief warned the Guatemala chief of station (COS) that human rights performance was high on the agenda for the executive and legislative branches, with Guatemala seen as second only to El Salvador among human rights violators in the region.

In August 1992, the Latin American division chief provided guidance to his stations to check all new liaison contacts carefully for possible human rights violations. The guidance cable also directed stations to follow up on all accusations of human rights violations in order to corroborate or refute them.

In May l993, the Guatemala COS initiated a review of many of his assets "to ensure that no station unilateral asset is, or has been involved in human rights violations." The station started by questioning some of its assets and planned to polygraph them. No station personnel recall, however, what prompted this review or why it was apparently never completed. It may have been overtaken by Serrano's "auto-coup" later that month and by the COS's departure soon thereafter.

In September 1994, because of a human rights issue unrelated to Guatemala, the LA division directed all of its stations to review their current assets for human rights violations. In Guatemala, this review ultimately identified a few asset relationships for termination. All but one of these terminations of relationship were carried out in early 1995--before this IOB review had been ordered--and the last occurred soon thereafter. Relationships with a few more assets identified as possible human rights abusers had already been ended prior to September 1994 for various reasons.

Apart from the guidance to Guatemala station and other Latin American stations that is described above, there was no CIA-wide policy before 1995 that spelled out in detail the danger of human rights abuse by assets and what specific actions were to be taken by the stations and at CIA headquarters in such circumstances.
</text>
</do>

<allegations>

<title>Allegations of human rights abuse by assets </title>

<text>In the course of our review, we learned that in the period since 1984, several CIA assets were credibly alleged to have ordered, planned, or participated in serious human rights violations such as assassination, extrajudicial execution, torture, or kidnapping while they were assets--and that the CIA was contemporaneously aware of many of the allegations. A number of assets were alleged--though with varying degrees of reliability--to have been involved in similar abuses before their CIA asset relationships began. In several other cases, the alleged abuses occurred or came to light only after the CIA was no longer in contact with the asset. A few assets were reportedly present while non-assets engaged in acts of intimidation, and another engaged in such an act before becoming an asset. Another asset was the subject of an unspecified allegation of human rights abuse. Several of the above assets were also involved in covering up human rights abuses, as was one additional asset. In addition, a number of the station's liaison contacts--Guatemalan officials with whom the station worked in an official capacity--were also alleged to have been involved in human rights abuses or in covering them up.

In many of these cases, however, US intelligence learned of the allegations only by virtue of reports from other assets who were themselves alleged to have engaged in similar abuses. Some of these sources, though, had grudges against those about whom they reported and thus may have had an incentive to fabricate or exaggerate allegations.

The IOB notes that US national interests, with respect to Guatemala and elsewhere, can in some cases justify relationships with assets who have sordid or even criminal backgrounds, including human rights violations. In fact, it will often be the case that the best placed sources of information on nefarious activities are not entirely clean themselves. There should be, however, an effort explicitly to balance the value and uniqueness of an asset's contributions against the seriousness and reliability of any allegations against him. We believe it critical that this balancing process take place in the context of broad US interests. It should be noted that, in carrying out domestic law enforcement activities, US authorities regularly weigh such considerations in entering into informant relationships with persons who have criminal backgrounds. Among the potential costs to be considered in establishing or continuing such relationships with foreign intelligence assets are: their moral implications, the damage to US objectives in promoting greater respect for human rights, the loss of confidence in the intelligence community among members of the Congress and the public, and the effect of such relationships on the ethical climate within US intelligence agencies. In February 1996, largely as a result of the inquiries related to Guatemala, the CIA did issue guidance for dealing with allegations of serious human rights violations or crimes of violence by assets and liaison services. We believe this new policy strikes an appropriate balance: it generally bars such relationships, but it permits senior CIA officials to authorize them in special cases when national interests so warrant, We are disturbed, however, that until the recent Guatemala inquiries, the CIA had failed to establish agency-wide written guidance on such an important issue.

Among the most serious examples of credible allegations against a then-active CIA asset were those involving an asset who was the subject of allegations that in multiple instances he ordered and planned assassinations of political opponents and extrajudicial killings of criminals, as well as other, less specific allegations of unlawful activities. Although some of these allegations were from sources of undetermined or suspect reliability, one was from a source considered credible by the station at the time. Another asset was alleged to have planned or to have had prior knowledge of multiple separate assassinations or assassination attempts before and during his asset relationship. A third asset has been alleged to have participated in assassination, extrajudicial killing, and kidnapping during and before his time as an asset.

The station informed DO headquarters through intelligence reports or operational cables of those allegations against its assets and liaison contacts of which it was aware. (In one significant instance, though, when the station requested authority to recruit a particular asset, it failed to remind headquarters of an assassination allegation previously made against him.) DO headquarters, however, appeared in practice to attach too little weight to human rights issues and reacted contemporaneously to human rights allegations against only a few of the assets. This conduct was probably the predictable result of an arrangement in which the necessary balancing, when done, was conducted informally, and was done exclusively by CIA DO division-level managers and chiefs of station--whose performance and awards systems emphasized recruiting and maintaining productive intelligence assets.

Of great concern to the IOB is the apparent lack of sensitivity before September 1994 by DO headquarters or the station to the series of allegations against a particular asset, especially in light of a reliable report that he was directly involved in an assassination. No CIA officials we interviewed recalled this asset as having presented a human rights problem, nor could any officials provide an explanation for the absence of an reaction to the allegations. We found no cable traffic or other written record of deliberation concerning the asset prior to late 1994. The CIA maintained its relationship with the asset despite his egregious record of human rights abuse allegations until the relationship was finally terminated as part of the September 1994 review.

Of those assets alleged to have committed serious human rights violations, relationships with all but a few were terminated prior to September 1994 for a variety of reasons; of these, only one relationship was ended principally because of a human rights allegation. After the September 1994 review of Latin American assets, relationships with the few remaining such assets were terminated because of allegations of human rights abuse such as assassinations and kidnapping.
</text>
</allegations>
</asset>

---

<asset>

<title>ASSET VALIDATION SYSTEM </title>

<text>In analyzing the apparent breakdown of the process for identifying assets against whom allegations of human rights abuse had been made we reviewed the functioning of the "asset validation system." CIA's Directorate of Operations instituted this system in 1989 in order to advance two primary objectives unrelated to human rights: to cut ties to assets believed to be counterintelligence risks and to end relationships with assets whose information production was not worth the payments they received. Stations were directed to test and to polygraph assets continually and to analyze their likely intelligence contributions. This process was to be completed for existing assets within two years of the system's implementation, but in practice the process usually took much longer or was never completed.

We found that the CIA showed an inadequate commitment to the asset validation system. Although we understand that validating assets will never take on the same cachet as recruiting new ones, we believe it requires greater emphasis in the field. Despite repeated statements by DO managers on the importance of asset validation, a 1994 survey by the CIA Inspector General found that only 9 percent of DO personnel surveyed believed that promotion panels rewarded quality work in asset validation. Even when one makes allowances for the amount of time it takes to validate new assets and the difficulties of validating tenuously controlled assets by excluding such assets from the pool of unvalidated assets, only two-thirds of the assets in Guatemala had been "validated" by late 1994.

Because the validation system's nearly exclusive focus, at that time, was upon counterintelligence concerns and the purging of non-performing assets, even more vigorous asset validation would not have identified those assets involved in human rights abuses. The asset validation system has recently been changed to take into consideration all derogatory allegations against assets, including allegations of human rights abuse. With this change, it will be important for the DO to review all sources of derogatory information, including reporting from the embassy, other agencies, the press, and human rights groups.
</text>
</asset> 

---

<notification>

<title>NOTIFICATION TO POLICY-MAKERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY ASSETS </title>

<text>Although National Security Council officials and State Department officials at the embassy and in Washington were generally aware of the CIA's activities and liaison relationships in Guatemala, the CIA did not inform these officials until the end of 1994 and early 1995 that any of its assets or contacts were alleged to have committed human rights abuses. These policy officials were thus denied information relevant to their decision-making and lost any opportunity to express possible concerns that such asset relationships undermined US policy on human rights.

The rules for information-sharing between station and embassy are set forth in a 1977 State-CIA agreement, which states that chiefs of station should keep ambassadors "fully and currently informed about all CIA programs and activities," but also that the chief of station is responsible, at the same time, "for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Concerning the disclosure of asset identities in particular, the agreement states that the COS will "identify to the chief of mission individuals and organizations within the host country with which CIA maintains covert relationships and with which he and senior embassy officers that he may designate have official contacts." CIA officers we interviewed, from former DDOs down to case officers in Guatemala, uniformly expressed the view that the l977 agreement called upon them to inform ambassadors of asset identities only when assets were cabinet level officials or otherwise in frequent contact with the ambassador. State Department officials have told us, however, that they understood ambassadors would be informed of asset identities in cases of frequent contact or if the asset relationship was of "policy" or "political" significance.

In the case of Guatemala, based on the CIA's understanding of the 1977 agreement and despite knowing about the high emphasis policy-making officials placed on human rights, the COS chose not to inform the ambassador or other policy makers of relationships with assets alleged to have been involved in significant human rights abuses. Given ambassadors' positions as the President's personal representatives and their need to be aware of US government activities that have significant policy ramifications, the IOB strongly believes that the State-CIA agreement should be amended to state explicitly that ambassadors will be informed of intelligence activities, including asset and liaison relationships (including, when appropriate, the names of the assets or contacts in question) that have significant policy implications. The determination of policy significance will require judgment by CIA officials, but at a minimum notification should be made in instances of reasonably credible allegations of involvement by CIA assets in the death or abuse of US citizens or in incidents of assassination, kidnapping, or torture. If there is concern over an ambassador's handling of intelligence information, the CIA should convey the information to the appropriate senior officials at the Department of State. Policy officials in Washington, such as representatives of the National Security Council, the Department of State (and when appropriate) the Department of Justice, should be similarly notified.

Although ambassadors and other senior policy-makers are often pressed by heavy workloads, it must be their responsibility to devote appropriate time to receiving intelligence briefings. Prior to and during their postings, all ambassadors should receive mandatory briefings on intelligence programs in their countries. The IOB believes that high level State Department emphasis will be required to ensure that all ambassadors attend such briefings and receive adequate initial and recurring training on intelligence activities and on the importance of safeguarding intelligence sources and methods. At the same time, CIA must ensure that ambassadors receive in these briefings all appropriate information on CIA activities and relationships in their countries.

The system for collecting and disseminating intelligence information can function properly, however, only if US executive and legislative branch officials are held accountable should they compromise or improperly handle classified information. A lack of accountability puts sources of intelligence at risk. The effect is to discourage the proper provision of information by intelligence agencies to intelligence consumers and the oversight community, and ultimately to jeopardize the ability of the United States to recruit sources and to collect intelligence in the furtherance of its national interests around the world. Ample avenues exist by which well-intentioned officials can raise grievances concerning intelligence activities-either through the executive branch to the National Security Advisor or the President, or through the Congressional oversight committees to the Congressional leadership--without publicly revealing sensitive intelligence information. </text>
</notification> 

---

<congressional>

<title>CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT </title>

<conclusions>

<title>Conclusions concerning CIA Congressional notification </title>

<text>
The IOB found the CIA's performance in notifying Congress to have been inadequate. Specifically, the IOB concluded that the CIA leadership violated its statutory obligation to keep the Congressional oversight committees fully and currently informed under Section 413 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code. Though this statute is not criminal and the standard is too broad to be fulfilled to the letter, CIA officers, particularly senior leaders at CIA headquarters, were derelict in failing to provide information they should have provided under even the narrowest reading of the statute. In examining specific instances in which information was not provided to Congress, the IOB considered the available evidence and, on balance, judged that CIA officials did not act with intent to mislead Congress--though they did intentionally withhold some information, in substantial part due to concerns for the protection of sources.

We found the primary causes of this failure in Congressional notification to have been the absence of a systematic notification process and inadequate emphasis from the CIA's leadership. The ad hoc manner in which Congressional notifications were handled--combined with the DO's general disinclination to volunteer sensitive information even to authorized recipients--created an environment that bred notification failures. For this we fault the CIA and DO leadership back to the enactment of the oversight statute in 1980. The CIA has recently instituted a new system to review its activities for issues that should be briefed to Congress. Such information is now usually provided to Congress in written memoranda, and a record is made of such notifications. This new system should improve performance and accountability in Congressional notification.

The IOB also found that semi-annual reports from the CIA to Congress on what the CIA was doing to improve respect for human rights in Guatemala created a misleading impression on the status of human rights by focusing exclusively on positive contributions. The IOB believes CIA headquarters managers should have recognized this effect and ensured, whether through the reports or through other means, that Congress received an accurate portrayal of the human rights situation.

With respect to criminal liability concerning these CIA nondisclosures, we have found no adequate basis to conclude that the conduct of any of the relevant CIA officials violated any criminal statute. First, the statute requiring "full and current" disclosure is not a criminal statute.

Second, it appears that section 1505 of Title 18 of the US Code, the statute that criminalizes the obstruction of a Congressional "inquiry or investigation," was not violated. It is doubtful that an "inquiry or investigation" within the meaning of the statute was underway during the period of time at issue. It also appears that, at least within the D.C. Circuit, this statute is violated only if an official encouraged, influenced, or conspired with another to mislead Congress, see United States v. Poindexter , 951 F.2d 369, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1991 ); we have found no persuasive evidence of this element and believe none can be found.

Third, the false statement statute, section 1001 of Title 18, is likely inapplicable because a recent Supreme Court decision strongly suggests that statements to Congress are outside the statute's coverage, see Hubbard v. United States , 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1995). In addition, we note that, as a general proposition, "knowingly" withholding information from a congressional committee is not sufficient to establish the mental state necessary to constitute the criminal offense of misleading Congress. Rather, the action must also be "willful." Thus, even if the false statement and obstruction of Congress statutes were available in this context, both would require that the defendant acted "knowingly"--that is, voluntarily and purposely and not because of mistake, inadvertence, or accident. Both would also require that the defendant acted "willfully"--that is, with the intent to bring about a particular result or to do something that the law forbids. The Board does not believe that the available facts are sufficient to constitute a violation of either of these statutes.

Fourth, we have concluded that there is an insufficient basis to believe that a violation of section 371 of Title 18 occurred. Section 371, as construed by the federal courts, proscribes, among other things, conspiracies to interfere with a governmental function by dishonest means. An agreement to defeat or interfere with the congressional intelligence oversight process by lying to or misleading the Congress, or by withholding information without statutory justification, could, under certain circumstances, amount to a criminal conspiracy. Under the circumstances we examined, however, we do not believe it likely that an offense occurred. In particular, there is no evidence that information was withheld from the Congress as a result of the concerted effort or agreement to interfere with the congressional oversight process. Even though there was an affirmative obligation to disclose the particular information not provided to Congress, and the incomplete briefings and reports provided to committee staffs over the years had the effect of misleading them and interfering with the oversight process, we do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to establish that this conduct was the result of any agreement.

For these reasons, the IOB has not found sufficient basis for a criminal referral to the Attorney General of this failure in disclosure to the Congress. The Department of Justice also considered this issue at the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and found that the facts posited by the SSCI did not constitute a sufficient basis upon which to premise a criminal prosecution. However, pursuant to Executive Order 12863, which governs the IOB, the Board has notified DOJ of its belief that in the past the CIA has violated Title 50 of the U.S. Code by failing to keep the Congress "fully and currently informed." The Board notes, however, that this violation was not criminal, that the CIA has taken remedial action, and that there appears to be no threat of a continuing violation. </text>
</conclusions>

<failure>

<title>Failure to notify Congress on receipt of the Alpirez allegation </title>

<text>Although we now consider the allegation to have been inaccurate, the significance of the October 1991 claim of Colonel Alpirez's presence at the death of US citizen Michael DeVine leaves no doubt that the oversight committees should have been notified at the time. Indeed, none of the CIA officials involved dispute that this allegation should have been briefed to Congress. There is no record that the CIA notified Congress of the allegation of Alpirez's involvement in DeVine's death until after the January 1995 allegation that Alpirez killed guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez; none of the officials with whom responsibility lay can recall any earlier notification. Thus the issue becomes: was this failure to notify intentional or was it unintentional? Unfortunately, we have found no record that definitively answers this question, and there are facts that support both possibilities.

Among the evidence that the CIA intended to notify Congress was the inclusion of a note on a question and answer (Q&A) page in the acting DCI's October 1991 briefing book indicating that CIA was trying to brief the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) regarding the Alpirez allegation. The acting DCI believes he saw the Q&A, but that, given the assertion in the Q&A that arrangements to brief the HPSCI were then under way, he probably assumed that they were already being carried out. The Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) recalls that he too saw the Q&A and that the allegation of Alpirez's involvement in the death of a US citizen was the reason for the DO's action to notify DOJ and the basis upon which the DO intended to notify Congress. The CIA's decision to refer the allegation to DOJ, while not directly indicating an intent to notify Congress, does indicate that there was no intent to try to keep the allegation within the CIA. Moreover, a lawyer from the CIA Office of General Counsel assigned to the Latin America division ended his notes on a November 18,199l meeting with DOJ on this subject with "Brief committees on this." The lawyer does not recall, however, whether this reflected the discussion or merely his own thoughts. Finally, we found no evidence of any instructions or conspiracy to withhold the Alpirez information.

On the other hand, the LA Central America branch chief recalled that he and others in the division realized in November or December l991 that Congress had not yet been notified of the Alpirez allegation. (The General Counsel official's November 18 note to "Brief committees on this" suggests that he too believed in mid-November that the matter had not yet been briefed.) The lack of action upon this realization leaves open the possibility that these officials may have consciously delayed notification. Numerous events brought the Alpirez allegation to the attention of relevant CIA branch, group, and division managers over the next several months. Significant among these are: the referral of the matter to DOJ (including a November 18 meeting with DOJ officials to discuss the report, which was attended by the deputy Central America branch chief); two or three instances recalled by the group chief at which he asked the lawyer assigned to LA division to check on the status of DOJ s deliberations; the April 15, 1992 CIA semi-annual human rights report to Congress on Guatemala, which mentioned the DeVine case, was edited by the deputy branch chief, and was reviewed by the rest of branch, group, division, and directorate management; the May 19, 1992 meeting with SSCI staff at which the Guatemala chief of station discussed the DeVine case; and the discussion of the DeVine case that occurred during a June 26 meeting with the SSCI staff attended by the Assistant Deputy Director for Operations (ADDO), LA division chief, and Guatemala COS. Each of these events brought the Alpirez-DeVine issue to the minds of CIA officials, though these events may not necessarily have reminded them that Congress had not yet been notified.

Because of the contradictory indicators of intent, conflicting and vague recollections, and a paucity of documentary evidence, no one, we believe, can conclude with certainty whether the failure to notify Congress of Alpirez's alleged presence at DeVine's murder was intentional or unintentional. After careful consideration, however, we have concluded that the failure was most likely unintentional. We believe that, among other things, the decision to refer the allegation to DOJ and the inclusion of the above-mentioned note in the acting Director's Congressional briefing materials stating that CIA officers were attempting to notify Congress of the allegation against Alpirez make it unlikely that the failure to provide the information to Congress in 1991 was intentional.

The question of intent aside, however, the CIA's performance in this area reflects a dereliction of responsibility and a violation of its statutory obligation to keep its oversight committees "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence activities as required under Title 50 of the U.S. Code. The failure to notify Congress of Alpirez's alleged presence at DeVine's death would not have occurred had CIA managers and officers attached the required importance to Congressional notification. Proper attention to notification responsibilities by the DCI, DDO, and ADDO should have resulted in the establishment of a systematic process by which notification decisions were considered, made, carried out, and recorded.

</text>

</failure>

<semi->

<title>Semi-annual CIA human rights reports to Congress </title>

<text>
Between 1989 and 1994, the DCI was required to report to the intelligence and appropriations committees on how programs in Guatemala had been used "to further the objective of greater respect for human rights and what specific action will be taken in the ensuing period to further that objective." The requirement's language did not call explicitly for reporting on human rights abuses by the Guatemalan security services; nor did it call for a comprehensive report on the status of human rights in the country--in contrast, for example, to the requirement for the annual State Department human rights report. The CIA's semi-annual reports appear to have satisfied the letter of the requirement to report on how the program had been used "to further the objectives of greater respect for human rights." For CIA officials, the emphasis was clearly to be on the positive contributions of their activities. As several CIA officers have noted, in fact, the requirement to report was perceived to be an opportunity for the CIA to put its best foot forward. The officers preparing the reports believed, and still believe, that the program was a positive force for human rights in Guatemala and that the human rights situation had improved. The reports offered examples to support both convictions, such as the new human rights instruction offered at the Guatemalan intelligence school and the D-2's investigatory role in the unprecedented arrest of a senior naval officer for human rights violations.

The semi-annual reports did not include information in the possession of the CIA concerning significant allegations of human rights abuses by the D-2 and Archivos. The omission of some of this information in reports that repeatedly referred to the security services roles in protecting human rights painted an incomplete picture of the Guatemalan security services. Although several of the reports, particularly before 1992, acknowledged significant continuing human rights violations, there was only one explicit reference in all the reports to an alleged violation by the D-2 or Archivos--and this reference dismissed the allegation in question. The station and DO were aware of a number of other allegations against the D-2 and Archivos from 1989 to 1994 that were not mentioned in the semi-annual reports.

We conclude that the semi-annual reports' emphasis upon the program's positive contributions and their exclusion of much negative information were intentional and resulted from a number of factors. Principal among these were: the narrow language of the reporting requirement, the DO officers' perception that the requirement was an opportunity to emphasize the positive, the DO's general predisposition to supply only specifically-requested information, and the erroneous belief expressed by station officers that the oversight committees were receiving the full picture through other channels. These factors were exacerbated by the station's faulty discounting of some allegations out of a loss of objectivity towards its liaison services, a human inclination to focus upon the positive, and the lack of priority the CIA gave its semi-annual reports. (One of the cables from DO headquarters to the station demonstrated this lack of priority by stating, "We regret to inform you that it is once again time for the update for the SSCI on the effect of the . . . program on the human rights attitudes of the . . . [government of Guatemala]. . . . Apparently since there was no 'ending date' in the FY 90 budget approval that started this requirement, we are forced to carry it on forever.")

We believe that, through a pattern of omissions and hyperbole, those responsible for the reports did present Congress with reports that were not comprehensive and balanced--and that were therefore misleading. However, given the narrow requirement from the Congress, we do not find an adequate basis to conclude that CIA officials intentionally sought to mislead Congress. Those drafting and reviewing the reports believed the program was a positive force for human rights in Guatemala, and they saw that as the issue raised by the requirement. We would view this issue differently if the Congressional requirement had asked for reporting on activities of or allegations against the Guatemalan security services, or if we had found CIA officials to have knowingly lied in the reports. (Although the SSCI staff appeared to have had different expectations, one of the principal recipients and readers of the reports then on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) staff has told us that he understood at the time that these reports were to focus on the positive contributions and were not expected to present a balanced picture of human rights in Guatemala.) We fault CIA managers, specifically including former DCIs, DDOs, and ADDOs, for not recognizing the misleading impression their reports gave, for not ensuring that this impression was balanced by other reporting, and for not giving the reports the attention they warranted.
</text>
</semi->

<1992>

<title>1992 Briefings to oversight committee staff on human rights in Guatemala </title>

<text>
A series of meetings occurred between CIA officers and the oversight committees in 1992 concerning Guatemalan human rights. In the course of these meetings, CIA briefers failed to provide some clearly relevant information. In some cases we believe the withholding was unintentional; in others we believe it was intentional. In at least one of the intentional cases notification subsequently occurred, but in others it did not.

One instance of intentional withholding that was followed by timely notification resulted from meetings between CIA officers and HPSCI staff on August 5 and SSCI staff on August 7,1992. Briefers from the DO (the branch chief and division chief, respectively) deliberately declined to identify an asset despite specific requests by the staff directors. The briefers did so because CIA policy (which we consider appropriate) limited authority for such disclosures to the DCI and DDO. The briefers did, however, alert their superiors, and ADDO Price then notified at least the SSCI.

A probable example of intentional withholding that was not followed by notification occurred when the Guatemala COS intentionally, we believe, did not mention Colonel Alpirez's alleged involvement in the death of Michael DeVine when he discussed the DeVine case with the SSCI staff in a May 19 meeting (and possibly also in a June 26 meeting). We believe it improbable that he could have forgotten the Alpirez-DeVine linkage, since his headquarters had reminded him of it in a cable he received only a week earlier. He apparently did not alert his superiors to the omission from his briefing and did not feel it his responsibility to do so. Although responsibility for notifying the committees rests with headquarters--not chiefs of station--we believe that, by participating in the meeting, he incurred an obligation to inform his superiors.

In the other instances we examined in which information was not provided to committee staff during the meetings, we believe that the failures were likely unintentional. Intent, however, is not required for the withholding of information to have been a violation of the CIA's obligation to keep the oversight committees "fully and currently informed" under Section 413 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code.

</text>

</1992>

<dod>
<title>DOD Congressional notification </title>

<text>In the course of our review, we uncovered no significant developments related to the Department of Defense's intelligence collection in Guatemala that were not briefed to the Congressional oversight committees. Congress was also notified of the l991 discovery by DOD that the School of the Americas and Southern Command had used improper instruction materials in training Latin American officers, including Guatemalans, from 1982 to 1991. These materials had never received proper DOD review, and certain passages appeared to condone (or could have been interpreted to condone) practices such as executions of guerrillas, extortion, physical abuse, coercion, and false imprisonment. On discovery of the error, DOD replaced and modified the materials, and instructed its representatives in the affected countries to retrieve all copies of the materials from their foreign counterparts and to explain that some of the contents violated US policy.
</text>
</dod>
</congressional> 

---

<crimes>

<title>CRIMES REPORT TO DOJ </title>

<text>Upon learning of the allegation of Colonel Alpirez's involvement in the death of Michael DeVine, CIA officials within the DO and the Office of General Counsel agreed that the matter should be referred to DOJ. This was done on November 18, 1991. Although the CIA initially conveyed the crimes report in a manner designed to set it apart from the routine, the report apparently was considered routine by the Department of Justice. DOJ investigated the allegation, but did not uncover all of the relevant background information. DOJ did not find the matter to fall within US jurisdiction, though it never formally closed the case. We find the performance of both the CIA and DOJ to have been less thorough than warranted. In particular, we believe that the CIA failed to communicate information that would have led to a more vigorous DOJ investigation, though we believe that this failure did not violate a legal obligation, nor do we believe that it affected DOJ's ultimate determination in the case. As a result of its Inspector General's investigation, DOJ has implemented new internal procedures to track crimes reports better and has entered into a new Memorandum of Understanding with the intelligence agencies to ensure that significant crimes reports receive special attention in the future. DOJ has also thoroughly reinvestigated the DeVine case and found no basis for US jurisdiction. </text>
</crimes> 

---

<human>

<title>HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING </title>

<priority><title>Priority and performance in reporting </title>

<text>The intelligence community realized the importance its consumers placed on human rights reporting and treated the issue as one of its top priorities over the period we reviewed. Our interviews with intelligence officers and our review of cables confirmed that intelligence on human rights violations by the Guatemalan government had been considered a particularly high priority by US intelligence collectors since 1984. Intelligence officers noted that some assets feared the consequences if the US government learned of human rights abuses and that these fears made it difficult for the assets to discuss such matters candidly. Many of the reports of human rights abuses that intelligence officers did receive were second- or thirdhand, and some of the sources were known to have grudges against those about whom they reported. Nevertheless, assets were often the only sources capable of learning the details of abuses.

Several of these reports, however, proved valuable to the embassy and served as the bases for diplomatic protests to the Guatemalan government. Among these were a report confirming that Guatemalan soldiers had killed Michael DeVine and that the government was engaged in a cover-up. A subsequent report corroborated the embassy's suspicions that the government had still not undertaken an earnest investigation six months after the murder and that the government did not intend to do so. This contributed to the ambassador's recommendation that resulted in the termination of almost all US military aid to Guatemala in December 1990. In 1994 and 1995, clandestine reporting served as the bases for protests over the reported illegal detention of guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez after his apparent capture.

Other reports now appear to have been inaccurate--most prominently the October 1991 report that DeVine s interrogation and death took place on Colonel Alpirez's base and that Alpirez was himself present. The evidence uncovered by Mrs. DeVine's private investigator at the time and by a US Attorney recently reinvestigating the case indicates that DeVine was killed away from the base and that Alpirez was probably not present. </text>
</priority>

<perceived>
<title>Perceived loss of objectivity </title>

<text>With the benefit of hindsight, the IOB has reviewed the facts available to the station and to headquarters and believes that in certain instances station and headquarters judgments were affected by a loss of objectivity. This was not a uniform problem; many of the same officers in other instances warned headquarters of the self-serving nature of some sources' information. It would not be fair to say that the station was unquestioning in its support of the liaison services. Nevertheless, news that reflected negatively on the services was clearly seen as bad news. As such, there was a natural tendency to scrutinize such news more carefully than reports that exonerated the Guatemalan services. This is a tendency to which all overseas missions--whether diplomatic, military, or clandestine--must be alert.

The station did report human rights violations by the Guatemalan liaison services, even though it knew that this reporting could complicate the station's relationships with these services and hence the station's ability to accomplish its missions, particularly in gathering intelligence and fighting narcotics trafficking. DO headquarters at times commended the station for such reporting and requested more. We found that when clear and reliable allegations of abuse by the Guatemalan services or assets were received, the station almost always appropriately forwarded the information to its headquarters for dissemination in intelligence reports to consumers throughout the executive branch. In one significant exception, however, the CIA IG concluded in 1994 that the COS had delayed, diluted, and suppressed some reports because he feared they would hurt the reputation of the Guatemalan security services and his ability to work with them. The chief of station was subsequently reprimanded for these actions. It is worth noting, however, that the CIA IG investigation was triggered by a complaint from station officers who were alarmed by the COS's actions.

In the cases of reports that were of questionable reliability, we found that more searching scrutiny was given to reports unfavorable to the security services than to favorable ones and that favorable reports were more likely to be disseminated beyond the DO. There was often also a failure to follow up on unfavorable reports by seeking out corroborating information or by polygraphing the sources.

Perhaps the clearest example of apparently giving inappropriate weight to favorable over unfavorable information was the way in which the station and DO headquarters handled reporting on the July 1992 politically motivated kidnapping of Maritza Urrutia, the former common law wife of a guerrilla. In October and November 1992, the station reported in two operations cables to DO headquarters that the D-2 was alleged to have been involved in this kidnapping. Later in November 1992, the station learned of rumors that Urrutia had been "voluntarily sequestered" and had willingly made propaganda tapes while under detention. The station reported this to CIA headquarters as a clarification of what had happened to Urrutia and used it as the basis for an intelligence report disseminated to executive branch agencies. The intelligence report mentioned the earlier allegations but substituted the word "detention" for "kidnapping," rendering them compatible with the more benign account. A headquarters officer in a March 1993 semi-annual report to Congress apparently drew on this watered-down version in writing that "The [Central Intelligence] Agency investigated the [Maritza Urrutia] situation immediately and based on well-sourced unilateral reporting, concluded that the D-2 had not acted improperly." Subsequent intelligence disseminated in November 1994, however, further corroborated the original allegation that it had indeed been a kidnapping.
</text>
</perceived>

<source>

<title>Source characterization and protection </title>

<text>Another factor that affected some human rights reporting was the occasional omission--driven by the need to protect intelligence sources--of relevant information about sources or about those cited in the reports. In some cases the source's identity was clearly relevant to any assessment of the report's credibility. The Board recognizes that the DO must regularly make difficult decisions in balancing the need to protect sources against the need to share more meaningful information with intelligence consumers. Based on the evidence we reviewed, we found no significant examples in which the motivation for withholding information seems to have been to downplay "bad news" rather than to protect source identities. </text>
</source>

<dissemination>

<title>Dissemination and retrieval of intelligence reports </title>

<text>Concerns for source protection also led the DO to restrict the dissemination of some reports to a very limited number of recipients at the Department of State and other agencies. This at times denied lower-level officers access to important information affecting issues on which they were working. Some of the DO's concerns over the State Department's handling of intelligence appeared, however, to be well-founded. One former ambassador had been cited often for not appropriately safeguarding classified documents; he had also relayed sensitive intelligence to the State Department via an unauthorized cable channel--but there is no indication that these lapses resulted in the compromise of any intelligence sources or methods. A State IG investigation of another State Department official, however, found that he had passed Guatemala-related classified information to a member of Congress without proper authorization, may have also provided- classified information to members of the press, and had prepared classified documents on his home computer that he then telecopied over unsecure telephone lines.

DIA overly restricted the dissemination of some reports, apparently unintentionally. Twenty reports related to Guatemala with special handling classification were not sent to the State Department or CIA headquarters because of a mistaken assumption that reports transmitted to DIA headquarters would automatically be readdressed to other agencies. All of the reports, however, were shared with embassy and station officers in Guatemala. DIA now checks the proper dissemination of specially handled reports daily.

The computer retrieval systems at three agencies also posed problems at times. When the DO conducted a records search on a potential asset, it failed to uncover an earlier intelligence report alleging that the individual in question had been involved in a serious abuse of human rights. This apparently occurred because intelligence reports were not normally retrievable in a standard DO record search unless the originator had "indexed" the report with the names of those mentioned in it. The station had failed to do so for the report in question. The DO has since upgraded its retrieval system to search the full texts of intelligence reports rather than just indexed terms and is now working to digitize all nonelectronic holdings.

At the State Department, the Inspector General noted that the department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) lacked a systematic method for document storage and for the retrieval of intelligence information. The IG noted that this complicated its own investigations for this review, because INR repeatedly failed to retrieve relevant documents from its electronic database. The IOB recommends that the State Department promptly examine and correct this shortcoming.

At the Department of Justice, intelligence relevant to the investigation of the DeVine murder was not uncovered despite being available in DOJ records. The attorney investigating the case in 1991 requested information from the FBI, but there is no evidence that the FBI ever checked its own computerized files. The DOJ attorney did not seek information on DeVine from any other DOJ elements, such as the Office of International Affairs, which had relevant information in its files. The Department of Justice has since implemented a new system to track classified documents received by DOJ and has requested that the FBI take appropriate action to ensure better responsiveness to inquiries from DOJ attorneys for information within FBI files. In addition, as noted above, DOJ has recently completed a second investigation into the DeVine case that incorporated the information not located in its initial investigation. </text>
</dissemination>
</human>

---

<alleged>

<title>ALLEGED NSA RECORDS DESTRUCTION </title>

<text>We found no evidence to support the March 1995 allegation that NSA and Army officials altered records pertaining to Guatemala in order to prevent scrutiny in any investigation, and we believe that there is no foundation to the charge. The allegation, communicated to a member of Congress in an anonymous letter telecopied to his office and also communicated to the press, appears to have been fabricated. Detailed analysis of the relevant databases indicates that no records on Guatemala were deleted or destroyed. Moreover, the officials identified in the anonymous letter, Lieutenant General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and Colonel Daniel D. Day, an Army officer assigned to NSA, either did not have or did not utilize the access necessary to make the alleged alterations. Finally, the anonymous letter, which purported to be on NSA letterhead, does not match any letterhead used by NSA within at least the last twenty years. An investigating US Attorney also found no basis for the allegation. </text>
</alleged> 

---

<victims>

<title>VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA REVIEWED BY THE IOB </title>

<text>The IOB was asked to review the cases of Michael DeVine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez (a Guatemalan citizen) and intelligence bearing on the torture, disappearance, or death of other US citizens in Guatemala since 1984, including Sister Dianna Ortiz, Griffith Davis, and Nicholas Blake. In addition to these specified individuals, the IOB examined nine other instances of unusual deaths or assaults involving US citizens that have occurred in Guatemala since 1984: Peter Wolfe, Janey Skinner, Jennifer Roitman, Meredith Larson, Josh Zinner, Peter Tiscione, Melissa Larsen, June Weinstock, and Daniel Callahan. Because an investigation of the Dianna Ortiz case by the Department of Justice is still underway, we will not draw conclusions on that case at this time. Our charter was to review intelligence bearing on these cases, not to solve them. Where our study of the intelligence allows us to provide helpful insight, however, we do offer our conclusions. At the IOB's request, the Inspectors General of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and the CIA examined their respective agencies for any information pertaining to the above-named cases and provided that information for this review.

Dianna Ortiz has described a man she believes to have been a North American who rescued her from torture but warned her to tell no one about it and told her that he was taking her to a friend at the US embassy. This raises the possibility that this person had some association with the US government. Subject to resolution of the Ortiz investigation, we found no indication, however, that any US officials were involved in or had prior knowledge of the harm that befell these US citizens or the Guatemalan guerrilla leader Bamaca. Other than allegations related to the DeVine and Bamaca cases, which are discussed below, we found no allegations or evidence that US intelligence assets or liaison contacts were responsible for or had prior knowledge of the attacks against the Americans whose cases we reviewed.

As intelligence on these cases was reported to US government officials, very little of it was shared with victims or their surviving family members. In most cases, this was because there was no intelligence or the intelligence was conflicting and inconclusive. The IOB believes, however, that in such cases the United States should provide its citizens more information whenever possible. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes the only legal requirement to provide such information, yet that process is often an unsatisfactory way through which to communicate the information to the families and victims. The redactions necessary to protect sensitive information in documents released under FOIA naturally give the reader the impression--usually mistaken--that relevant information is being withheld. Further, the reader is usually given no indication as to the reliability of the information. Victims and family members who seek intelligence information outside the FOIA process, however, usually find that it is not within the authority of policy agencies, such as the State Department, to share intelligence originating in another agency, and that it is not within the intelligence agencies' charters to communicate directly with victims and families. We believe the State Department should demonstrate more initiative in seeking authorization from intelligence producers to share their intelligence in briefings (oral or written) to family members and victims. The briefings need not identify that the information came from intelligence, but they should attempt to convey some indication of its reliability. </text>
 

<michael>

<title>Michael DeVine </title>

<text>Michael DeVine was an expatriate US citizen who had lived in Guatemala since 1977, running an inn, restaurant, and farm until he was murdered on June 8, 1990, near his property. Largely through the work of Carl West, a private investigator hired by Michael's wife, Carole DeVine, six Guatemalan army enlisted men were convicted of Michael DeVine's murder and are in prison. Their direct superior, Captain Hugo Contreras, was convicted on May 13, 1993, but escaped the same day and is still at large.

Significant intelligence bearing on the murder of Michael DeVine:

More than forty reports from intelligence sources relate directly to the DeVine murder. These reports contain varying and even conflicting accounts of the incident. We have included descriptions of most of this reporting in Appendix A. Three of the reports, described below, were of particular significance because they provided new information and prompted US government actions.

In August 1990, the CIA station disseminated its first intelligence report on the murder from a source who reported that Colonel Garcia Catalan, the military zone commander, had ordered the surveillance of DeVine and that it was carried out by five enlisted men. The source added that the Ministry of Defense was engaged in a cover-up, which included the destruction of a white Toyota pickup used to conduct the surveillance. (By the time of this report, the embassy, through Carl West's investigation, already strongly suspected that members of the army killed DeVine.)

In December I990, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who stated that he believed that Captain Bohr Avendano and all but perhaps one of the arrested soldiers were innocent, and that those who had actually killed DeVine had not acted under official orders. (All but one of the soldiers in fact appear to have been innocent; in February 1991, they identified the soldiers later convicted of the murder.)

The source also reported that the Minister of Defense, against the advice of the Army Chief of Staff, was an obstacle to a proper investigation. (This intelligence contributed to the US ambassador's recommendation that almost all military aid to Guatemala be suspended; this suspension was implemented almost immediately.)

In October 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source stating that Colonel Alpirez, who commanded the Kaibil training base near DeVine's farm, had been present when DeVine died during interrogation conducted by Captain Contreras at the base. Colonel Garcia Catalan had reportedly ordered Contreras to recover a missing rifle believed to be in DeVine's possession. Another source reported at the same time that Alpirez was an extremely violent man and had exhibited bizarre behavior. (The CIA passed this information to the DOJ to determine if the crime fell under US jurisdiction. The handling of that crimes report by the CIA and DOJ, and the CIA's failure to notify the ambassador, other policymakers, and the Congressional oversight committees of this allegation were described earlier in this report.)

Many other reports offered conflicting accounts of various aspects of DeVine's death. They suggest several possible motives, but the most frequently cited was that the murder occurred during an attempt to recover one or two missing army rifles. Different reports identified numerous officers as the intellectual authors of the murder, as other reports cleared the same officers. Several of the reports stated that the enlisted men convicted of the crime gad not been under orders to kill DeVine. The only respect in which the reporting was generally consistent came in its frequent corroboration of the military cover-up.

IOB conclusions:

During the IOB's review, the Department of Justice undertook an extensive reinvestigation of the DeVine case in order to determine whether US jurisdiction existed. In June 1996, DOJ determined that there was no basis for jurisdiction under the anti-terrorism statute or any other US law. DOJ determined that (1) the murder most likely occurred as the later-convicted enlisted men interrogated DeVine over a missing rifle (or rifles), and (2) there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the killing had been ordered, but that (3) the Guatemalan military launched a massive cover-up of its role in the affair. The IOB has found no reason to question these DOJ findings.

The widely publicized October 1991 allegation that DeVine was killed on Colonel Alpirez's base and that Alpirez was present runs counter to the substantial evidence gathered by Carl West and by DOJ. We note, however, that there is no doubt that Alpirez participated in the Guatemalan army's broad cover-up of the murder--a cover-up that also involved several CIA assets and liaison contacts.

Provision of intelligence to the DeVine family:

Although embassy officers met frequently with Mrs. DeVine, essentially no intelligence information was shared with her. Embassy officers state that Mrs. DeVine had access, through her private investigator, to more detailed information than did the embassy, and hence information more often flowed from her to the embassy than in the other direction. Nonetheless, we believe that the State Department should have given greater consideration to sharing intelligence-based information with Mrs. DeVine. </text>

</michael>

<efrain>

<title>Efrain Bamaca Velasquez </title>

<text>
Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, also known as "Commandante Everardo," was a Guatemalan guerrilla leader and the husband of Jennifer Harbury, a US citizen. Bamaca disappeared in a battle with the Guatemalan army on March 12, 1992. He was presumed to have died in combat until Santiago Cabrera Lopez--a captured guerrilla who had been forced to work for the army before escaping in December 1992--testified in early 1993 that he had seen Bamaca being interrogated by Colonel Alpirez and others between March and July 1992.

Significant intelligence bearing on the disappearance of Efrain Bamaca:

More than fifty reports from intelligence sources pertain to Bamaca's disappearance, but they offer greatly differing accounts of what happened. We have included descriptions of most of this reporting in Appendix B. About half of these reports stated that Bamaca was captured; several claimed that he had died in combat or committed suicide to avoid capture, and the balance did not specify what had happened. In the reports that claimed Bamaca was captured, there were various accounts of his subsequent fate. Several reports stated that he later died of his wounds, that he was taken to Guatemala City, that he was taken to an unspecified location, that he was killed by Alpirez, that he was killed on the slopes of a volcano, or that he was executed in unspecified circumstances. A number of reports indicated that Alpirez was involved in or supervised questioning of Bamaca.

Among the many reports on Bamaca's fate, we believe six were especially significant because of the information they provided at the time. Because some of these accounts are contradictory--particularly with respect to Alpirez's role in Bamaca's death--they cannot all be accurate.

In March 1992, the station disseminated an intelligence report based on a source's information that on March 12, 1992, the Guatemalan army had captured "Everardo," the commander of the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) Luis Ixmata Battalion, in an ambush near San Marcos. The source said that Everardo, although lightly wounded in the arm, was in good condition, being well treated by the army, and cooperating fully with his captors. According to this source, the news of Everardo's capture had not been publicized and would probably be kept secret, or even concealed by a claim that he had been killed, in order to maximize his intelligence value. The source also stated that Everardo had told his captors that Cuba was providing training and weapons to his guerrillas, and that the latest weapons shipment had come six months earlier. (There was no mention in the report of Everardo's actual name, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, and thus this report apparently received little or no attention until it was rediscovered in early November 1994.)

In May 1993, the station learned from a source recounting the apparent accuracy of the stories being told by "Willy" and "Carlos" (escaped guerrillas Jaime Adalberto Augustin Recinos and Santiago Cabrera Lopez) regarding captured guerrillas being held in clandestine prison cells by the Guatemalan military, including their descriptions of particular captured insurgents--including Bamaca. The source reported an allegation that Bamaca was alive, but he could neither confirm nor refute the allegation.

In May 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who claimed that unidentified D-2 officers took Bamaca away shortly after his capture and that this was the last the source had heard anything about Bamaca's whereabouts or status. The source had also suggested that Bamaca had been in good health at the time. In early November 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report saying that Bamaca had reportedly received a relatively minor wound in the arm in a firefight near Retalhuleu, was captured, and was interrogated at Retalhuleu and later at San Marcos. Because of Bamaca's importance and repeated attempts to escape, he was encased in a full body cast to immobilize him. The report indicated that Bamaca was questioned for about a month in San Marcos by military intelligence division officers, and that he had talked freely about the guerrillas' policies, personnel, and activities, though he provided false information about arms caches. After the military intelligence division decided Bamaca was no longer of use, it issued an order that he be killed and sent a D-2 helicopter which took Bamaca away from San Marcos while he was still alive. The report speculated that Bamaca had probably been dumped at sea, which may be why the government could not now produce the body. (The DOD had disseminated a report in April 1994 which suggested that in the mid-1980's, the D-2 often dumped captured guerrillas into the sea from aircraft to eliminate evidence that prisoners had been tortured and killed.)

In late January 1995, the station disseminated a report from a source who said that he had been told that it was known within the senior ranks of the army that Alpirez had killed Bamaca.

In April 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who had heard that Bamaca was said to be buried at the Cabanas army detachment, which was located in the village of Montanita, on the Cabuz River. The source was unable, however, to provide any other details on what had happened to Bamaca.

IOB conclusions:

After reviewing all available information, the IOB believes that Bamaca was captured on March 12, 1992 after a firefight and was interrogated by numerous Guatemalan officers, including those identified by Santiago Cabrera Lopez. We believe that Bamaca was killed at some point between approximately four months and a year after his capture. The available evidence does not allow us to conclude who killed him, where he was killed, or where his remains are, but we believe it plausible that his execution would have been ordered at the highest levels of the Guatemalan military and that his interrogation at times included torture. The widely publicized allegation that Alpirez killed Bamaca was at best third-hand and has been contradicted by numerous other accounts. We do, however, believe that Alpirez participated in at least part of Bamaca's interrogation. Some then-active CIA assets or liaison contacts have been alleged in various, often-contradictory accounts to have been involved in or to have known of Bamaca's interrogation and death. Although the Board believes that assets or liaison contacts were likely involved or knowledgeable, it found no indication that the CIA was aware of these links at the time.

Provision of intelligence to Jennifer Harbury

As the State Department went to great lengths in pressing the Guatemalan government on the case, it used intelligence-based information in the process and in briefing Jennifer Harbury. In November 1994, the US ambassador to Guatemala, on instructions from the State Department, provided to Harbury the department's intelligence-based conclusions about Bamaca's fate: that Bamaca had suffered non-life-threatening wounds and had been captured, but that the US government had no information suggesting that he remained alive much beyond the first few weeks after- his capture. In February l995, the State Department again told Harbury that information suggested that Bamaca was killed following his capture. In May 1995, the State Department provided Harbury intelligence information from the April 1995 report on the alleged location of Bamaca's remains--with appropriate cautions about the report's potential unreliability.

Nonetheless, although the intelligence information concerning Bamaca was conflicting and offers no proof of his fate, we believe the State Department should have sought authority from the intelligence-originating agencies to include more information from the most credible intelligence reports in briefings given to Jennifer Harbury (preferably, however, without revealing that this information came from intelligence). Further, we found no indication that the State Department conducted or requested a search of previously collected intelligence on Bamaca until October 1994. If it had done so in early 1993, when Jennifer Harbury first raised the issue of her husband's fate, the Department might have been able at a much earlier date to provide her with useful information about him--that is, a report that he had been taken alive.

The Department of Defense provided 38 declassified intelligence reports to Ms. Harbury under FOIA in May 1995. The CIA released 105 documents to her under FOIA in February 1996. </text>
</efrain>

<sister>

<title>Sister Dianna Ortiz </title>

<text>Sister Dianna Ortiz, a US citizen, lived in Guatemala from 1987 to 1989, where she taught indigenous children. She says that after receiving repeated verbal and written threats, she was abducted on November 2, l989, from a religious retreat in Antigua, Guatemala, by two armed men. She reports that she was taken by bus and police car to a location where she was accused of supporting the guerrillas, interrogated, raped, and tortured. She says a man called "Alejandro," whom she believes to be a North American and who appeared to exercise authority over her torturers, finally interceded the next morning and was taking her to a friend he claimed to have at the US embassy when she escaped from his vehicle in traffic in Guatemala City and ultimately made her way to the Papal Nuncio's residence. Sister Ortiz departed Guatemala on November 5, 1989, and was treated for more than 100 apparent cigarette burns on her back. No suspects have ever been identified or charged.

At the request of the embassy, the FBI in December 1989 opened an investigation into this matter, but closed the case in March 1991 after it was unable to interview Ortiz, who was apparently incapable of discussing her experience at that time. The case was briefly reopened later in 1991 in order to incorporate the affidavit that Ortiz had provided to the Guatemalan government, but there was no further attempt to interview her. DOJ reopened the Ortiz again case in 1995 in conjunction with the government-wide Guatemala review.

Significant intelligence bearing on the case of Sister Ortiz:

In early November 1989, the station reported to DO headquarters on a November 4 meeting between the COS and the Guatemalan Minister of Defense (MOD). At the US ambassador's request, the COS raised the issue of Ortiz's desire to leave Guatemala. The MOD noted that the police had asked to interview Ortiz and that, having been denied permission to do so, they had obtained a court order to force Ortiz to speak with them. After the COS pointed out that this would lead to unfavorable publicity for the Guatemalan government, the MOD suggested that the COS talk to the chief of police. When the COS did so later that day, the chief of police agreed to let the matter pass.

A DOD intelligence report stated that in response to concerns about international criticism and accusations of possible military involvement, Guatemalan authorities in early November 1989 agreed to step up their investigation into the kidnapping of a U.S. person (presumably Ortiz) from a Guatemalan religious retreat, even though the victim allegedly refused to provide details of the kidnapping. Guatemalan authorities maintained that the military played no role in the kidnapping.

At some time prior to October 15, 1991, a source told the station that Ortiz had in fact been kidnapped as she claimed and that it was probably done by the S-2 (Intelligence) office of Military Zone 302, which covers Antigua. This source said that Ortiz had been in contact with the guerrillas, and this contact led to her arrest. The source, however, said that he did not believe that Ortiz had been raped because women prisoners were not normally sexually molested. Instead, he said, women were usually either stabbed to death to make it look like an ordinary criminal incident, or drugged and released in a disoriented state. This report was not sent to DO headquarters or disseminated as intelligence. Station personnel, while not remembering seeing the report at the time, told the IOB upon reviewing it that the report would not have been disseminated because it was not reliable intelligence in that there was no chain of information explaining how the source claimed to have knowledge of it.

In late December 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report indicating that President Serrano had dismissed Minister of Defense Mendoza due to Mendoza's blocking of the investigations of several human rights cases, two of which involved US citizens. The source said these two cases were those involving Ortiz and DeVine. The new Minister of Defense, Garcia Samayoa, had promised to immediately advance the DeVine investigation.

In early April 1992, the station sent DO headquarters a cable reviewing Ortiz's account of the incident, adding that the Guatemalan military did not take the incident seriously and believed that Guatemalan Catholic Church officials were using the incident for political purposes.

A DOD intelligence report stated that a U.S. person (presumably Ortiz) was in Guatemala in early April 1992 to make a deposition to the Guatemalan courts regarding her alleged kidnapping by Guatemalan police in 1989. A Guatemalan official was aware that people in Antigua, Guatemala had said that they had seen this US person meet alone with two men at a bridge and get into a police car. The location of one of the witnesses was also reportedly known.

In 1992, the station reported to DO headquarters that a source had stated that two guerrillas, captured two days before Sister Ortiz left Huehuetenango, had told the army that they had been waiting for Sister Ortiz to bring them food and ammunition.

In mid-February 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who stated that the old Guatemalan Military Academy could not possibly have been the location where Ortiz was held and tortured as she had said. The source said the D-2 had moved out of that building in early 1985 and had completely dismantled all of its detention cells at that time.

In early November 1994, a source told the station about a foreign journalist who had reportedly stated during one of Ortiz's later visits to Guatemala that he had learned from a URNG source that the Ortiz story was fabricated and had been intended to provoke an end to US funding for the Guatemalan security services. The source could remember no details concerning the journalist's identity, however. The station added that it too had doubts about the Ortiz story, but it did not disseminate this report beyond DO headquarters.

In early November 1994, the station disseminated a report from a source who stated that the D-2 headquarters had been at the old Guatemalan Military Academy from 1978 to 1984, and that there were D-2 holding cells there then, but that these cells were dismantled when the D-2 moved out in 1984. (The source did say, however, that from about 1984 to July 1994, the D-2 had holding cells near the Mobile Military Police (PMA) compound in Zone 6 of Guatemala City.) The station commented that this inconsistency in Sister Ortiz's story was viewed by Guatemalans as proof that her claims were fabricated.

IOB conclusions:

Based on our inquiry to date, the IOB believes that Sister Ortiz was subjected to horrific abuse on November 2, l989, but US intelligence reports provide little insight into the details of her plight. Because the Department of Justice is still conducting an extensive reinvestigation of the incident, we do not draw any conclusions on the case at this time.

Provision of intelligence to Sister Ortiz:

Prior to the IOB review, no intelligence on the incident was provided to Sister Ortiz by the US government. On May l0, 1996, pursuant to White House authorization, Sister Ortiz was given declassified versions or summaries of the ten intelligence reports the IOB identified during its review as shedding light on the facts and circumstances of her case. None of this intelligence, however, offers any reliable insight into the matter, and none addresses the identity of "Alejandro."
</text>
</sister>
 

<nicholas>
<title>Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis </title>

<text>Nicholas Blake was a US citizen and free-lance journalist visiting Guatemala, and Griffith Davis was an expatriate US photographer living in Guatemala. They both disappeared in late March I985 while trying to find guerrillas to interview. The two men were presumed to have been killed by the guerrillas until September 1987, when a local school teacher claimed that they had been killed by members of the Civil Defense Patrol (PAC)--a community-based paramilitary force loosely controlled by the army. The teacher later said the army knew that the PAC had detained the two men and had been involved in a cover-up of the PAC's role in their disappearance. In May and June 1992, a regional PAC commander helped the families recover the men's remains.

Significant intelligence bearing on the Blake/Davis case:

Between April 1985 and June 1985, there were twelve separate DOD intelligence reports that related to the disappearance of Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis. These reports indicated that a coordinated search was being conducted by the military patrols and checkpoints, but with little progress. By mid-April, the military began to conclude that Blake and Davis had indeed found the guerrillas and were either still interviewing them or had been killed by them. The guerrillas claimed, however, that the military was afraid that the PAC may have killed the two Americans. (Other DOD intelligence reports continued, however, to convey the Guatemalan military's stated belief that the two Americans were with the guerrillas.)

In May 1985, the station reported that relatives of the missing US citizens and an embassy officer had visited the commander of the Quiche military zone to inquire about the search for Blake and Davis. Despite persistent efforts, no additional information had turned up on the two Americans' whereabouts.

A DOD intelligence report stated that, approximately a year after the disappearance of Blake and Davis, several U.S. reporters had attempted to uncover more information about their disappearance. A Guatemalan military commander was reported to have become concerned about possible negative publicity and to have speculated that the two men could have been killed by insurgents who believed all US and European journalists are really CIA agents. The two journalists were last seen by the villagers of Las Majadas as they left for the village of Palob. The reporters, however, reportedly believed the journalists were killed by Civil Defense Forces for their valuables.

A DOD intelligence report suggested that in early September 1992 a Guatemalan military officer had become concerned that contradictory reports regarding his whereabouts during the 1985 murders of the two US citizens in the E1 Quiche area might wrongly link him to the murders.

IOB conclusions:

We have little doubt that Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis were killed by the Civil Defense Patrol. It is possible that army officials subsequently learned the truth of the PAC's involvement and engaged in a cover-up, but intelligence provides no evidence of this, nor of any army involvement in or prior knowledge of the killings.

Provision of intelligence to the Blake and Davis families:

The US embassy in Guatemala made vigorous efforts to find Blake and Davis when they disappeared in 1985, and later helped to locate their remains in 1992. The embassy did not provide any intelligence-based information to the families, but none of the intelligence available indicated what had happened or who had been involved.

In April 1993, the Blake family submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to NSA for all documents related to the death of Nicholas Blake. NSA's initial response was that it had found no relevant NSA-generated documents. NSA had not, however, searched the database that contains NSA-generated intelligence. After an appeal, NSA conducted a second search, which included that database; NSA then responded that it had uncovered six relevant documents. The broader search conducted in connection with our review, however, identified an additional sixteen documents that were relevant, though none of these additional documents identified who killed Nicholas Blake or whether the Guatemalan army had been involved. In December 1995, NSA informed the Blake family of the correct number of relevant reports. </text>

</nicholas>

<peter>
<title>Peter Wolfe </title>

<text>Peter Wolfe was a US citizen and Peace Corps volunteer who was shot to death near his home in Guatemala City early in the morning of October 28, 1984. A witness later identified Boris Rene Acosta Diaz as the killer. Acosta was arrested, initially confessed that he had committed the murder as part of a robbery, and then claimed on national television that he had killed Wolfe in self-defense. In his televised confession, Acosta also implicated Julio Cesar Gramajo Castillo. By the time of the trial, however, Acosta had recanted, both he and Gramajo had produced alibis, and the principal witness had disappeared--all of which led the judge to release both suspects. The Peace Corps office in Guatemala received an anonymous letter and an anonymous visitor in the year after the murder, both claiming that the military had intimidated witnesses to the killing. The office also learned that Gramajo was related to two Guatemalan Supreme Court magistrates and was apparently also a distant relative of Colonel Hector Gramajo, who later became the Minister of Defense. Additionally, Acosta was reported by one anonymous source to be the godson of the chief of D-2. After strong intervention by the US embassy, a new arrest order was issued for both suspects, but neither man was ever re-apprehended. According to a Guatemalan death notice, Acosta died in a motorcycle accident on April 5, 1987.

Significant intelligence bearing on the Wolfe case:

We found no significant intelligence bearing on the murder of Peter Wolfe.

IOB conclusion:

The absence of any meaningful intelligence on this case does not permit us to reach firm conclusions, but we see no reason to doubt the implication from publicly available information indicating that Boris Acosta in the company of Julio Gramajo killed Peter Wolfe. The Guatemalan judiciary's handling of the case and the reported intimidation of witnesses do appear to demonstrate that the government wished to shield Acosta and Gramajo from prosecution.

Provision of intelligence to the Wolfe family:

We know of no intelligence-based information that sheds any light on this case.
</text>
</peter>

<janey>
<title>Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman </title>

<text>Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman were US volunteers working in Guatemala with the human rights groups Peace Brigades International and the Mutual Support Group for Families of the Disappeared (GAM). On August 15, 1989, explosives were thrown at the GAM headquarters building, and minutes later two grenades were thrown at the building that housed the Peace Brigades office and residence. There were no injuries in either incident.

Significant intelligence bearing on the Skinner and Roitman cases:

In August I989, DOD disseminated an intelligence report stating that the "Special Operations" section of the D-2 was reportedly responsible for the grenade attacks against the Peace Brigades and GAM headquarters.

According to a DOD intelligence report, communications problems in the aftermath of the September 1989 attack on the Peace Brigade Headquarters alerted foreign organizations to the unreliability of the phone system and to the possibility of intentional interference.

A DOD intelligence report indicated that in September 1989, Guatemalan security forces were conducting intense investigations of recent terrorist acts and had made it known that there were enough suspects to enable new arrests in the near future. This news had a significant impact on public opinion, producing a general feeling of relief, even though the alleged right-wing kingpin, Leonel Sisniega Otero, had escaped capture. All the recent grenade attacks had been generally attributed to Sisniega's group, including those against the GAM, the Peace Brigades, and a US-owned hotel. Another DOD intelligence report stated that in the autumn of 1989, Second Captain Rodolfo Leonel Sisniega Otero Cordero, the son of Leonel Sisniega, had been sent to a post in Venezuela until the situation concerning his father had been cleared up. According to the report, his father was apparently implicated in recent terrorist activity in Guatemala City, including grenade-throwing incidents.

IOB conclusions:

Neither the intelligence suggesting D-2 complicity nor that suggesting unofficial rightwing responsibility is sufficient to enable the IOB to conclude who perpetrated the attacks on GAM and the Peace Brigades.

Provision of intelligence to Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman:

No intelligence-based information was provided to Janey Skinner or Jennifer Roitman, but we do not believe any of the available intelligence was reliable enough that it should have been provided. </text>
</janey>

<meredith>
<title>Meredith Larson </title>

<text>Meredith Larson, a US citizen, was working in Guatemala as a member of Peace Brigades International, an international human rights organization. On December 20, 1989, while walking to her residence with two colleagues, she and the others were stabbed by two men. The attackers said nothing and did not attempt to rob the victims. Members of the Peace Brigades had received death threats in May 1989, and their residence had been the target of the August 15 grenade attack described above. Meredith Larson was hospitalized in Guatemala and left for the United States on December 28, 1989. The US ambassador lodged a protest with senior Guatemalan government officials, but no suspects were ever charged.

Significant intelligence bearing on the Meredith Larson case:

We did not find any significant intelligence bearing on the attack upon Meredith Larson. The only reference to the assault was in a DOD intelligence report that cited the attack as one of several recent incidents of violence. Intelligence relating to the earlier grenade attack on the Peace Brigades is described in the section above concerning Janey Skinner and Jennifer Roitman.

IOB conclusions:

The circumstances of the attack upon Meredith Larson suggest that it was carried out either by the Guatemalan security services or by unofficial right-wing elements. Given the absence of intelligence on the attack, however, we have no basis from which to draw any further conclusions.

Provision of intelligence to Meredith Larson:

No intelligence-based information was shared with Meredith Larson. In July 1995, she submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Act for any documents referring to the attack upon her, the threats and grenade attack against the Peace Brigades, or her visits to Guatemala in 1994 with Jennifer Harbury. NSA responded in October 1995 that it had found only one responsive NSA-originated record, which concerned the Peace Brigades portion of her request. In the course of our review, the IOB learned of three more NSA-originated reports referring to the grenade attack on the Peace Brigades, and one containing a passing reference to the December 1990 stabbing attack. These reports were apparently not uncovered in the NSA's FOIA search. None of these reports, however, provide reliable insight into the attacks on Meredith Larson or on the Peace Brigades headquarters. </text>
</meredith>

<josh>

<title>Josh Zinner </title>

<text>Josh Zinner, a US citizen, was a social worker assisting homeless children in Guatemala City when he reported that he and a co-worker were assaulted on January 18, 1990 by gunmen who attempted to force them into a car. The Guatemalan police reportedly intervened, but released the assailants, who were said to have displayed military identification. The police then allegedly detained Zinner and his co-worker, drove them around in a police car, and threatened them, before eventually releasing them.

Significant intelligence bearing on the Josh Zinner case:

We did not find any intelligence bearing on the attack on Josh Zinner.

IOB conclusions:

Although the assault appears to have been carried out by members of the Guatemalan military (either under orders or on their own), or possibly by right-wing extremists with false identification, we have no special insight as to who was responsible.

Provision of intelligence to Josh Zinner:

We know of no intelligence that sheds any light on the case.

</text>

</josh>

<peter>
<title>Peter Tiscione </title>

<text>Peter Tiscione, an American citizen, was an archaeologist conducting field research on Mayan pottery in Guatemala in August 1992. On the morning of August 22, Tiscione contacted the embassy duty officer and told her that he feared being detained by the authorities when he tried to leave Guatemala the next day as planned. He also said that he had run out of his anti-depressant medication and was suffering "withdrawal and cosmic doubts." Tiscione had also reportedly tried to visit the US embassy. When the duty officer talked to him later in the afternoon, after receiving a call from Mrs. Tiscione in the United States, Peter Tiscione stated that he had suffered a reaction but was feeling better and declined the duty officer's offer to help him get more medication. When Tiscione spoke to his wife in the evening, however, he again expressed concern for his safety. After he failed to answer his wife's phone call later that night, Mrs. Tiscione asked the night clerk to check his room, at which time the clerk found Tiscione's fully clothed body in his bathtub with machete wounds to the neck.

The Guatemalan police ruled the death a suicide. The only door to Tiscione's room had been chained closed from the inside; the two closed windows were too small for anyone to enter; there was no sign of a struggle; the only finger prints on the machete were Tiscione's; and a receipt for the machete's purchase was found among Tiscione's possessions. A US Department of Justice official and a consultant who had previously been Costa Rica's chief medical examiner reviewed the Guatemalan police investigation and agreed that the death appeared to be a suicide.

Significant intelligence bearing on the Tiscione case:

We did not find any intelligence bearing on Peter Tiscione's death.

IOB conclusions:

The evidence surrounding his death leads us to believe that it was, as initially concluded, a suicide.

Provision of intelligence to the Tiscione family:

We found no intelligence-based information that could have been provided to shed light on the case.
</text>
</peter>

<melissa>

<title>Melissa Larsen and June Weinstock </title>

<text>On March 8, l994, Melissa Larsen, a tourist from the United States, was chased by a mob of villagers in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, Guatemala, who apparently believed that she was engaged in baby stealing. Larsen was taken from the town by the police and held for two weeks in protective custody before being released. The Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman concluded that the riot had been encouraged by outside agitators, and several townspeople reportedly said they had been warned about impending violence.

On March 29, 1994, June Weinstock, another tourist from the United States, was stoned, stabbed, and beaten to unconsciousness in the town of San Cristobal by a mob of Guatemalans who falsely accused her too of child stealing. Weinstock fled the mob and found refuge in the local courthouse until a group of striking and apparently intoxicated highway workers arrived on the scene and led an assault on the building. In the assault, Weinstock suffered brain damage and has still not recovered all of her faculties. As the situation developed, US embassy, defense attache, and station officers exhorted their Guatemalan counterparts to act quickly to defuse the crisis. Soldiers were dispatched, but because of a series of delays, they arrived too late to help.

The Guatemalan mobs in both incidents were responding to a malicious rumor that US citizens stole Guatemalan children in order to sell their body parts for US transplant operations. The rumor had apparently surfaced in Honduras in 1987 and was soon repeated throughout the region, partly through a propaganda campaign directed against the United States by the Soviet Union and its allies, including the Guatemalan insurgents. This rumor received renewed publicity in Guatemala in November 1993 after an irresponsible British and Canadian television broadcast, which was followed by equally inaccurate and unhelpful comments by a Guatemalan official. In an apparently coordinated campaign, graffiti appeared overnight in many parts of Guatemala City denouncing American "gringo baby stealers."

Significant intelligence bearing on the Larsen and Weinstock cases:

A DOD intelligence report in April 1994 mentioned the attack on a US citizen in San Cristobal in the midst of rumors that US citizens were kidnapping children to use their organs in transplants. The report noted that this rumor had, as perhaps intended, put the US embassy on the defensive by forcing it to issue statements denying these allegations. The rumor was also reported to have created conditions which made the work of international observers of the Human Rights Agreement difficult.

In April 1994, DOD disseminated a report that the Guatemalan minister of defense had stated that he believed the attack on June Weinstock to have been part of a joint effort by the guerrillas and the Public Workers Union to destabilize the government of Guatemala.

The other US intelligence reports that mentioned the Weinstock incident discussed the Guatemalan government's fear of a US travel advisory or relayed updates on Guatemalan government investigations of the attack. The account provided through these investigations largely mirrored publicly known information. There was also, however, a suggestion that some of the striking highway workers may have had a personal interest in the destruction of court files that occurred during the riot.

IOB conclusions:

The mobs that attacked Melissa Larsen and June Weinstock were motivated by the false rumor of kidnapping for body parts. We do not know why the false rumor resurfaced in the Guatemalan press in 1994, but we do not dismiss the possibility that it was raised by elements opposed to the De Leon government and to US policy.

Provision of intelligence to Melissa Larsen and the Weinstock family:

We know of no intelligence on these cases that offers significant insight into the attacks.

</text></melissa>

<daniel><title>Daniel Callahan </title>

<text>Daniel "Sky" Callahan, a US citizen, was filming a documentary in Guatemala City for a human rights organization when on July 4, 1995, a soldier hit his legs with a baton or rifle butt while he was filming. On July 7, Callahan was forced into a car, beaten, and threatened with additional harm if he did not leave Guatemala. One of his attackers also made reference to the July 4 attack. Callahan returned to the United States for medical treatment on July 10, 1995. The Department of Justice is currently investigating the Callahan case to determine whether it falls under US jurisdiction.

Significant intelligence bearing on the Callahan case:

The station made inquiries, but it learned no new information about what had happened to Callahan.

In July I995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting the allegation that the abduction of Callahan did not result from army policy, but that it was possibly perpetrated by "off duty" army elements operating without the knowledge of the senior leadership. Another DOD report related a claim that although soldiers may have "nudged" Callahan on July 4 and off-duty army personnel may have been involved in his later abduction, the army as an institution was not implicated and was anxious to bring the Callahan case to a swift conclusion.

In late July 1995, a DOD intelligence report indicated that Guatemalan military officials wanted to show the US that they were actively investigating alleged attacks by Guatemalan soldiers on a US citizen on July 4 and 7, 1995. The officials believed it important for Guatemala to demonstrate to the US that it was interested in resolving the case. One military official reportedly suspected that the assailant in the first attack may have been an off duty soldier working as a bank guard near the scene. The officials seemed, however, to have no evidence that the military was involved in the second attack, and noted that the police sketch of one of the assailants did not look like a Guatemalan soldier.

IOB conclusions:

The circumstances of the abduction lead us to believe that it was conducted either by military (either under orders or on their own) or by right-wing elements, but we found no intelligence reports that provide greater insight.

Provision of intelligence to Daniel Callahan:

No intelligence-based information has been provided to Callahan, but none provides reliable insight as to the perpetrators of the abduction. </text>
</daniel>
</victims> 

---

<a>
<title>APPENDIX A: INTELLIGENCE BEARING ON THE MURDER OF MICHAEL DEVINE </title>

<text>
In late June 1990, the Department of Defense (DOD) disseminated a report suggesting that the army "definitely" did not kill DeVine. The report also indicated that the army had issued orders to find out promptly who had committed the murder, which may have been connected to robbery. DOD cautioned that this report "was anything but a definitive report" but was optimistic that the army's vigorous investigation to clear itself would produce the killers.

In August 1990, the station disseminated its first intelligence report on the murder from a source who reported that Colonel Garcia Catalan, the military zone commander, had ordered the surveillance of DeVine and that it was carried out by five enlisted men. The source added that the Ministry of Defense was engaged in a cover-up, including the destruction of a white Toyota pickup used to conduct the surveillance of DeVine. (By the time of this report, the embassy, because of Carl West's investigation, already strongly suspected that members of the army killed DeVine.)

Also in August 1990, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who reported that President Cerezo, under pressure from the US ambassador, had ordered a proper investigation by the Ministry of Defense. The source also stated that rumors that DeVine had been somehow involved with the guerrillas were apparently unfounded and perhaps part of the military cover-up.

In September 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report which suggested that DeVine may have been killed by soldiers from Military Zone 23. It had been rumored that DeVine had been providing support to the guerrillas, but this report speculated that the murder had not been officially ordered. By another account related in this report, the Ministry of Defense was blocking any investigation and had already executed the killers.

Later in September 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report suggesting that President Cerezo and the military high command intended to placate the U.S. embassy as much as possible on the DeVine case, but did not really expect to bring the case to any particular conclusion.

Another DOD report disseminated in September 1990 provided an account of the investigation being carried out by the new commander of Military Zone 23, Colonel Ortega.

In October 1990, the station learned from a source that five army suspects had been arrested, and that although they had not been ordered to kill DeVine, they had been ordered to surveil him in order to recover one or two missing Galil rifles believed to be in his possession. The source opined that the soldiers had gotten into an altercation with DeVine and went too far. The source repeated these findings to the station again in October. In that second cable the station also stated that it had been told that DeVine drank heavily and practiced his karate moves on troops from the Poptun base beating them senseless, though the station had not verified this.

In mid-October 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report claiming that several soldiers had been charged with DeVine's killing as a result of US embassy pressure, but that those charged were not believed to be guilty. The report said that the assistant G-2 of Military Zone 23, Second Captain Santos Bohr Avendano, had been in charge of the operation, and that another officer may also have been involved. It also reported that the motive for the killing remained unclear, but DeVine was said to have been involved in providing logistical support to the insurgents and possibly in arms smuggling. This DOD report also referred to an anonymous phone call to the embassy that fingered Captain Bohr as the officer on the scene.

In December 1990, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who stated that he believed that Captain Bohr Avendano and all but perhaps one of the arrested soldiers were innocent, and that those who had killed DeVine had not acted under official orders. (All but one of the soldiers in fact appear to have been innocent, and in February 1991 they identified the soldiers who were eventually convicted.) The source also reported that the Minister of Defense, against the advice of the Army Chief of Staff, was an obstacle to pursuing a proper investigation. (This intelligence contributed to the US ambassador's recommendation that almost all military aid to Guatemala be suspended; the suspension was implemented almost immediately.)

In late December 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report saying that DeVine had reportedly tried illegally to buy two army rifles for 1,000 quetzales. Soldiers from the military zone G-2 section reportedly were attempting to bring him in for questioning when he punched one of them in the face; the soldiers then knocked DeVine to the ground and killed him. By this account, the zone commander had not ordered a murder, but certainly knew about the events. The report said the army recovered the two rifles but did not say from whom. It also recounted the rumor that DeVine's killers had been executed by the army, but that the other soldiers who had been charged for the crime might be convicted anyway.

In early January 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting that at the time he was killed, DeVine was being investigated for providing medical supplies and food to the guerrillas. The report stated that the zone commander knew of the investigation--and became part of the cover-up--but that he had not intended that DeVine be killed.

In April 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report with a source's information that the soldiers had killed DeVine while interrogating him about a missing Galil rifle. The military zone had heard that the rifle had been sold by a deserter to DeVine, and the D-2 had instructed the military zone commander, Colonel Garcia Catalan, to recover it. One of Colonel Garcia's subordinates, Captain Contreras, had sent a group of four sergeants and eight soldiers on the mission. When DeVine either did not know anything or refused to talk, one of the sergeants killed him with a machete. Contreras was now being criticized for having failed to supervise the enlisted men. Many officers reportedly believed that Contreras, who was known for his temper and abuse of soldiers, probably frightened the soldiers into taking extreme actions out of a fear that they would be severely punished if the rifle were not recovered.

Also in April 1991, the station obtained a copy of a report relating to the De Vine case. It included a personality profile of DeVine, which was generally positive, but noted a sometimes aggressive manner and a readiness to denounce people involved in narcotics trafficking. It recounted various claims or rumors that provided possible motives for the killing: that DeVine was an army informant, that he had denounced drug traffickers, that he was a victim of guerrilla extortion, that he was killed by persons who wanted to acquire his property, that he had personal problems with two army deserters, and that it was revenge by someone DeVine had shot years before. The station noted that the report contained nothing that directly incriminated the army (whose involvement was by then well-established) and did not disseminate the information in the report as intelligence.

In May 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report recounting that a source stated that President Serrano apparently blamed the chief of the D-2 for blocking the investigation. The source stated that the D-2 chief was indirectly responsible for DeVine's death since he had ordered that a missing rifle be recovered--and directly responsible for the subsequent cover-up--but that there was no evidence that he had intended harm to DeVine.

Also in May 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source stating that Captain Contreras and five sergeants had been arrested in the DeVine case. Contreras was identified as having issued the order to stage the operation, although he did not accompany the men, but the source was not certain if the order was to kill DeVine or to just "teach him a lesson." Colonel Garcia Catalan was reportedly not in Peten at the time and neither involved in nor aware of the operation. Contreras' immediate supervisor, Major Paiz, was also reportedly uninvolved. The source said that preliminary investigative findings indicated that Colonel Portillo Gomez had been aware that some operation was planned against DeVine, but it was not yet known if he was more deeply involved.

In late May 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report in which Colonel Portillo was described as being very concerned at being reported in the press as having been involved in the DeVine killing. He reportedly maintains that he was not in the area at the time and that he is being framed.

In early June 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report with a claim that Colonel Portillo was being used as a scapegoat for the DeVine murder and that it may have been Colonel Garcia Catalan who was actually involved.

In June 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from multiple sources that the Minister of Defense was attacking the D-2 for doing more work for US intelligence agencies than for the Guatemalan defense ministry. The minister was reportedly likely to replace the chief of the D-2 for this, and because he believed the D-2 had informed the US government that Guatemalan soldiers had killed DeVine.

In July 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who stated that Colonel Portillo, who had been alleged to have been in temporary command of Military Zone 23 at the time of the murder, had not in fact been in command of this area. The source also said that it was apparently common knowledge that there was some kind of personal or business relationship between Colonel Garcia Catalan and DeVine.

In August 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report that a source believed the killing was the result of the enlisted soldiers carrying out their mission in an inappropriately hostile manner and that there was no evidence that DeVine was involved in any significant illegal activity other than occasionally smoking marijuana. The source stated that Colonel Portillo knew nothing until after the killing. The source stated that senior army officers were covering up army involvement because they felt that if they admitted involvement, the US government would react angrily, which would hurt the army's image, provide propaganda to the insurgents, and jeopardize military aid. According to the source, the case had become so charged with nationalism that the army could not see a way to back away from its actions without an enormous loss of prestige.

In October 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source stating that Colonel Alpirez, who commanded the Kaibil training base near DeVine's farm, had been present when DeVine died during interrogation conducted by Captain Contreras at the base. Colonel Garcia Catalan had reportedly ordered Contreras to recover a missing rifle. The report also indicated that Alpirez was an extremely violent man and had exhibited bizarre behavior. (The CIA passed the information to the Department of Justice to determine if the crime fell under US jurisdiction. The handling of that crimes report by the CIA and DOJ was described earlier in this report.)

In December 1991, the station disseminated two intelligence reports from sources stating that President Serrano had relieved Minister of Defense Mendoza at least in part for his obstruction of the investigation in the DeVine case (as well as the Ortiz case). The new Minister of Defense, Garcia Samayoa, had promised to immediately advance the DeVine investigation.

In April l992, the station learned from a source a view that the military should allow some of the military officials implicated in "less significant" human rights cases to be prosecuted in order to end the army's reputation for covering-up to protect its own. The DeVine case was reportedly cited as an example of a "less significant" case. This information was not disseminated beyond the CIA.

In early May 1993, DOD disseminated a report recounting that Colonel Garcia Catalan may have given "the order" in the DeVine case. (It was not clear, however, what "the order" actually meant.)

In late May 1993, the station reported that a source claimed that Contreras had been heard to say that he had picked up DeVine, had informed the armed forces general staff "through channels" that he had DeVine in custody, and asked for instructions. Contreras had then reportedly been instructed to "do whatever it takes to resolve the situation." The source explained that "the situation" meant recovering the missing rifle, and that "through channels" meant that he had advised the general staff of DeVine's apprehension and had received this response through D-2 channels. The source believed that the order must have come from the general staff.

In late May 1993, DOD disseminated a report claiming that Contreras had been sighted in north central Honduras.

In February 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report indicating that Contreras may have been hiding in Venezuela. A March 1995 report from the DOD corroborated this. In April l995, the DOD disseminated a report of rumors that Contreras had returned to Guatemala from Venezuela and that the D-2 had put out an order for his death.

In April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report in which it was suggested that Lieutenant Colonel Felipe Alfonso Ochoa Montero, the assistant director of the D-2 under Colonel Ortega (who was abroad at the time), may have ordered Contreras to kill DeVine. The report also related that Colonels Garcia Catalan, Portillo, and Alpirez were reportedly not aware of the order (though all three had participated in the cover-up). The DOD report also said that Ochoa was reported to have since died of cancer. (This report appears to be of dubious credibility in that in June 1990 neither Ortega nor Ochoa was in the D-2, and Ochoa was not in Contreras' chain of command.)

In April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report that included the allegation that Colonel Garcia Catalan had sent Captain Contreras and two or three soldiers to investigate reports that DeVine was involved in arms and narcotics trafficking. According to the report, DeVine was murdered by one of the soldiers who wanted to rob him during the interrogation.

In early May 1995, DOD disseminated a report which said that Alpirez had an audio tape that proves that he had no prior knowledge of the DeVine murder, that he had been ordered to participate in the cover-up, and that former ministers of defense had been involved in the cover-up. The report recounted one individual's belief that Colonel Cabrera, chief of D-2 at the time, had ordered the interrogation of DeVine. Knowledge of the existence of Alpirez' tape was reportedly becoming increasingly widespread, and Alpirez had been heard to say that it would be made public should anything happen to him.

In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who stated that he believed that the Ministry of Defense was using Colonels Alpirez and Garcia Catalan as scapegoats to protect more senior retired officers. The source did not believe Alpirez knew about the killing until after the fact and felt Alpirez had participated in the cover-up only on orders. The source also recounted that Contreras had reportedly claimed not to have killed DeVine, but said that an enlisted soldier had done so.

In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source recounting that the Guatemalan government would probably postpone investigation of the cover-up of the DeVine murder at least until after the conclusion of a peace accord with the insurgents, since some 20 military officials were suspected to have been involved and an investigation would cause chaos in the military.

In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who said that he had heard that Alpirez had nothing to do with the murder of DeVine and that he had refused to allow the interrogation team onto his base. According to the source, the team then went to a local drinking establishment and Alpirez had no prior knowledge of their intent to apprehend and interrogate DeVine. The source had also heard that Alpirez was unhappy about DeVine s death because he had known Mrs. DeVine from visits to the DeVine restaurant. The source speculated that Alpirez would not have been in the military zone chain of command at the time of DeVine's death.

In June 1995, the station reported to its headquarters that a source said that the army seemed to have proof that Alpirez was not involved in the death of DeVine--for example, that he was not in charge of the soldiers who killed DeVine. The source said that Alpirez could lose his life if he disclosed what he knows.
</text>
</a>

---

<b>
<title>APPENDIX B: INTELLIGENCE BEARING ON THE FATE OF EFRAIN BAMACA</title>

<text>In March 1992, the station disseminated an intelligence report based on a source's information that on March 12,1992, the Guatemalan army had captured "Everardo," the commander of the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) Luis Ixmata Battalion, in an ambush near San Marcos. The source said that Everardo, although lightly wounded in the arm, was in good condition, being well treated by the army, and cooperating fully with his captors. According to the source, the news of Everardo's capture had not been publicized and would probably be kept secret, or even concealed by a claim that he had been killed, in order to maximize his intelligence value. The source also stated that Everardo had told his captors that Cuba was providing training and weapons to his guerrillas, and that the latest weapons shipment had come six months earlier. (There was no mention in the report of Everardo s actual name, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, and thus it apparently received no attention until the report was rediscovered in early November 1994.)

In April 1992, the station reported a source's claim that ORPA leader "Comandante Everardo" had allegedly been recently killed in combat in Quiche.

In late May 1992, the Department of Defense (DOD) disseminated an intelligence report indicating that the Guatemalan government was concerned by the precedent set by the Human Rights Ombudsman's office in filing a request directly with the courts rather than through the attorney general's office to exhume a body at the request of a "Mr. Bamaca" whose son was believed to be buried in the grave. Twelve bodies were presumed to be in the grave.

In May 1993, the station learned from a source recounting the apparent accuracy of the stories being told by "Willy" and "Carlos" (escaped guerrillas Jaime Adalberto Augustin Recinos and Santiago Cabrera Lopez) regarding captured guerrillas being held in clandestine prison cells by the Guatemalan military, including their description of particular captured insurgents--including Bamaca. The source reported an allegation that Bamaca was alive, but he could neither confirm nor refute the allegation.

In September l993, DOD disseminated an intelligence report claiming that clandestine military prisons had "always" existed in Guatemala, and that guerrilla prisoners were commonly held incommunicado in isolated military zone locations, interrogated, and killed after the army had extracted all useful information from them. It was also reported that Bamaca had been held incommunicado, interrogated a number of times, and killed, and his body disposed of in an unidentified location.

In May 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report that a source claimed that unidentified D-2 officers took Bamaca away shortly after his capture and that was the last the source had heard anything about Bamaca's whereabouts or status. The source had also suggested that Bamaca was in good health at the time.

In June and August 1994, the station reported that it had heard that the escaped guerrillas' testimony that they had seen Bamaca alive in a clandestine prison was fabricated in order to support the guerrillas' propaganda objectives. Reportedly Bamaca had actually died shortly after being wounded and captured in the fire fight with the army.

In October 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source stating that Bamaca's capture was viewed as a great success because Bamaca was the only important indigenous guerrilla leader--as opposed to those of mixed "Spanish-indigenous" descent--at the time. He also said that to the best of his knowledge Bamaca died of his wounds shortly after his capture.

In early November 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report saying that the army reportedly did not have Bamaca in custody and speculating that if the army knew where Bamaca was, whether dead or alive, it would turn him over to end the media attention. The report also described the practice by which the Guatemalan army reputedly interrogated captured guerrillas and then forced them to work for army intelligence or face summary execution.

In early November 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report saying that Bamaca had reportedly received a relatively minor wound in the arm in a firefight near Retalhuleu, was captured, and was interrogated at Retalhuleu and later at San Marcos. Because of Bamaca's importance and because of his repeated attempts to escape, he was encased in a full body cast to prevent escape. The report indicated that Bamaca may have been questioned for about a month in San Marcos by military intelligence division officers, and talked freely about the guerrillas' policies, personnel, and activities, but provided false information on arms caches. After the military intelligence division decided Bamaca was no longer of use, it issued an order that he be killed and sent a D-2 helicopter which took Bamaca away from San Marcos still alive. The report speculated that Bamaca had probably been dumped at sea, which may be why the government could not now produce the body. DOD had disseminated a report in April 1994 which suggested that in the mid-1980's, the D-2 often dumped guerrillas from aircraft into the sea to eliminate evidence that prisoners had been tortured and killed.

In early November 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who said that the description of Bamaca did not match that of the guerrilla killed in the firefight on March 12, 1992. The report recounted an observation that the army may have substituted another guerrilla's body for that of Bamaca, who was apparently killed elsewhere to cover up evidence of torture.

Also in November 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who said that Bamaca was dead and that Jennifer Harbury's efforts to draw international attention would only bring condemnation on the Guatemalan government and strain relations between Guatemala and the international community.

In mid-November 1994, DOD heard that Bamaca had been interrogated in San Marcos principally by Majors Soto and Sosa. This report claimed that Bamaca was uncooperative and tried to escape and was, therefore, incapacitated in a full body cast.

In mid-November 1994, DOD disseminated a report indicating that Bamaca was dead and recounting an allegation that Bamaca's remains were in a place that made them "impossible" to recover.

In mid-November 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report indicating that the guerrillas apparently did not know what happened to Bamaca after March 12, 1992, but that they felt Bamaca could still be alive only if he had betrayed the guerrillas and cooperated with the army. In case Bamaca had cooperated and was still alive, it was reported that the guerrillas believed Jennifer Harbury's demonstrations would force the army to kill Bamaca and thereby remove a threat to the URNG. They believed, however, that Bamaca was probably dead, and the report recounted that the URNG intelligence apparatus had been sending Harbury fabricated reports that Bamaca was alive in order to encourage her highly visible political activities against the Guatemalan government.

In mid-November 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who had heard that Bamaca had surrendered without resistance, was turned over to the G-2 in San Marcos, and was held at San Marcos and Santa Ana Berlin, Quetzaltenango Department.

In late November 1994, the station heard from two sources who offered their views on Bamaca's fate. One speculated that Bamaca may have died of his wounds while being interrogated.

In late November 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting that it was believed that Bamaca had died of his wounds shortly after the firefight in March 1992.

In early December 1994, the station disseminated an intelligence report stating that a source said that Bamaca was captured unharmed or lightly wounded and may have been alive for four or five weeks. The source opined that he had probably been killed once he had outlived his usefulness. He also said that Bamaca's high-level guerrilla rank was not discovered until after his death. The report also stated that Colonel Alpirez took charge of Bamaca's interrogation.

In early December 1994, DOD disseminated an intelligence report stating that on March 12, 1992, Guatemalan journalists were shown the bodies of two guerrillas, one of whom they were told was Bamaca (who was described to them as only a platoon lieutenant, not a higher-level commander). After the journalists examined a diary taken from the body reported to be Bamaca's and photographed the body, a civil judge came to record the deaths.

It appeared to be normal procedure for then-Human Rights Ombudsman De Leon both to receive all information about guerrillas captured by the army and to take custody of any guerrillas released after they agreed to give up their armed struggle. The DOD report commented that in light of all of the reports of Bamaca's capture, at least one of these observers had probably been duped into thinking that a dead guerrilla was Bamaca.

In mid-December 1994, the station learned from a source that he had heard that Alpirez, Major Raul Oliva, and Colonel Leonel Godoy had "worked with" Bamaca after his capture. The source did not know if Bamaca was dead or alive but assured the station that Bamaca was not killed in San Marcos. The source also described a burial site for guerrillas killed in the attack on Bamaca's column, but said that Bamaca was not buried there.

In mid-January I995, the station was informed by a source that he had heard that an official who had investigated the Bamaca case had found witnesses to Bamaca's suicide. The information was passed only to the DO.

In late January 1995, the station disseminated a report from a source who said that he had been told that it was known within the senior ranks of the army that Alpirez had killed Bamaca.

In early February 1995, DOD disseminated a report saying that Alpirez had reportedly overseen the interrogation of Bamaca. The report did not recount any allegations about who had actually killed Bamaca, but expressed doubt that Alpirez would have personally done so.

In late February l995, the station disseminated an intelligence report stating that sources said the Guatemalan government had conducted three separate investigations of the Bamaca case and had decided that he died of his wounds soon after the firefight and that his identity was not discovered until one or two days later.

In early March 1995, DOD disseminated a report indicating that Bamaca had probably not been held at either of two Pacific naval bases in Guatemala.

In early March 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report stating that the Minister of Defense had said that a body exhumed in the search for Bamaca's remains (presumably in August 1993) was indeed Bamaca's. Reportedly, the judge who had claimed otherwise had been paid to say so, but would soon testify in court that it had been Bamaca's.

In mid-March l995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report which recounted that there was no body of Bamaca for the Guatemalans to produce. It gave no further details.

In March I995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who said that, at the time of Bamaca's capture, he was visited at San Marcos by senior officers. The source added that he believed the army would stick to its story that Bamaca died in the firefight.

In March 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting rumors that Bamaca's body had been thrown in to a river on an unknown date.

In early April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report indicating that Bamaca had led soldiers to locate an arms cache on Santiaguito volcano in Military Zone 1715, where they were ambushed by guerrillas. The officer in charge, Lieutenant Colonel Jesus Aguirre, was reportedly wounded, and in his anger ordered Bamaca killed, possibly by being thrown into the active volcano. The report suggested that it would be easy to determine exactly when this occurred because Aguirre's wounds were so severe that he traveled to Houston, Texas for treatment. It added that Aguirre had visited the United States in 1992 from March I8 to June 5, and from September 6 to September 30. The second trip was reportedly to Houston for unspecified medical reasons. (Escaped guerrilla Santiago Cabrera has stated that Aguirre had been wounded and left San Marcos before Bamaca's capture and did not participate in his interrogations. A March 1992 station report corroborates that Aguirre was seriously wounded two weeks before Bamaca's capture.)

In early April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report indicating that Alpirez had been in command of an anti-guerrilla operation away from headquarters during the time Bamaca was captured. The DOD report noted, however, that in public testimony before the Attorney General, Alpirez had stated that his duties at the time were administrative, not operational.

In mid-April 1995, an internal DOD intelligence report indicated that Bamaca had reportedly been wounded in the shoulder during the March 12 firefight and had been taken to the Santa Ana Berlin military installation for treatment and interrogation. During this time Colonel Alpirez, from the San Marcos military zone, visited Santa Ana Berlin to follow the situation. Colonel Alpirez reportedly ordered that Bamaca be put in a full body cast to prevent his escape. Bamaca was then moved to several different places in Guatemala for interrogation and then eliminated. The report did not provide details on Bamaca's death.

In April 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who had heard that Bamaca was buried at the Cabanas army detachment, which was located in the village of Montanita on the Cabuz River. The source was unable to provide any other details on what had happened to Bamaca.

In early May 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting that Bamaca was reportedly dead, but it gave no further details or the basis for this statement.

In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who said he had heard that Alpirez was not involved in the death of Bamaca, but that Bamaca had been turned over to military intelligence in Guatemala City at some point after his capture.

In May 1995, the station reported to its headquarters that the embassy had informed it that Angel Nery Urizar Garcia--who claimed to have seen Bamaca alive at Santa Ana Berlin military detachment at some point in 1992 when Urizar was affiliated with the D-2 and posted to the region--was reportedly under the protection of Guatemalan human rights authorities and claimed to have been the subject of an assassination attempt. The station soon afterwards disseminated a report to its headquarters and to CIA analysts that a source had confirmed that Urizar was an enlisted man who worked for G-2 in the San Marcos region when Bamaca was captured. The source said that Urizar's claim that the army had killed and buried a former guerrilla in Bamaca's place appeared to be credible, as the army wanted to interrogate Bamaca but have the public believe he had been killed.

In June 1995, the station relayed to its headquarters a source's report that Colonel Alpirez had Bamaca's interrogation report, but the source had no specific information that Alpirez had killed Bamaca. He believed Alpirez was capable of it, but felt Alpirez would not have acted without orders.

In June 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report that a source stated that there was a rumor circulating in the Guatemalan army that the search for Bamaca's remains at the Cabanas detachment was futile because Bamaca's body had been burned.

In July 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who said that the Guatemalan government felt it unfortunate that Nery Urizar Garcia had claimed that the army had buried another guerrilla in Bamaca's place. The source reported speculation that if Bamaca s body were not found at the gravesite (apparently at Las Cabanas), it was because the guerrillas had switched the body.

In early July 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report in which it was said that Colonel Alpirez had been heard to say to someone in the Solicitor General's office that he had been the second commander of a combined task force made up of units from military zones 18 and 1715, which was under the command of Colonel Haroldo Antulio Ruano Del Cid and headquartered at Santa Ana Berlin. Alpirez reportedly stated that task force patrols had used Bamaca as a guide to lead them to hidden weapons caches and that one of these patrols, led by Major Jesus Efrain Aguirre Loarca, had been ambushed and Aguirre wounded. According to Alpirez, the decision was then made to eliminate Bamaca, but Colonel Ruano would not take responsibility for the decision, which was referred to Colonel Harry Ponce, the Military Zone 18 commander, who referred it to the D-2 in Guatemala City. Colonel Otto Perez Molina, the D-2 director, reportedly then flew to Santa Ana Berlin with Colonel Hector Mario Barrios Celada to pick up Bamaca in a helicopter piloted by Captain Erwin Sosa Lara. Alpirez allegedly did not know where Bamaca's body was located. The DOD report noted that Colonel Ruano was assigned at the time as the deputy director of a military high school; such an assignment would make it unusual for him to have commanded an operational task force.

In early July 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting that President Serrano had been told that Bamaca's remains were not at Las Cabanas military detachment, where Jennifer Harbury was seeking an exhumation--but that there were clandestine cemeteries in that general area with the bodies of other victims.

In July 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report that a source stated that some Guatemalan officials felt that the government should use legal maneuvers to obstruct the grave excavation at Cabanas military detachment. They feared that an exhumation there would indeed unearth guerrilla remains and lead to calls for exhumations elsewhere. In early August l995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting speculation that Colonel Alpirez may know exactly who killed Bamaca and when and how--and that he may be holding this information as his "ace in the hole."

In late February 1996, DOD disseminated an intelligence report stating that the Guatemalan government had obtained declassified CIA documents relating to Bamaca's capture. These documents made no mention of Major Sosa Orellana, who had reportedly ordered the murder of another insurgent who was then passed off as that of Bamaca.

In late March 1996, DOD disseminated a new account of Bamaca's fate from a March 1996 letter to the embassy purportedly from "PREGUA," allegedly a group of disaffected army officers. According to this account, Bamaca was captured and interrogated over the course of a year in various military zones and in Guatemala City with the knowledge of the leadership of the Guatemalan army and numerous army officers identified by name. The letter stated that the recent allegation that another guerrilla was killed and buried in Bamaca's place was true. Reportedly after the efforts of Bamaca's wife focused greater attention on the Bamaca case, President Serrano, Minister of Government Perdomo, Minister of Defense Garcia Samayoa, Army Chief of Staff Perussina Rivera, Chief of the Presidential Military Staff Ortega Menaldo, and D-2 chief Colonel Perez Molina met to consider the situation. Although all participants except Colonel Perez Molina supported releasing Bamaca, it was allegedly decided that Colonel Perez Molina would take care of the problem. According to the account, Colonel Perez then ordered his subordinates to kill Bamaca, and the order was carried out by D-2 enlisted men near Guatemala's southern coast, with Bamaca's body being buried or burned in a sugar cane field. The DOD report commented that many of the persons named in the letter were indeed at the relevant time in the positions that were asserted in the letter, but that the letter appeared to have been written by different authors than an earlier letter purportedly from the same group, and that it appeared unlikely that such a high level group would have deferred to Colonel Perez Molina on what to do with Bamaca. The report also noted that although the document listed 25 officers who were aware of or involved in Bamaca's interrogation, it did not include two officers who have been included in many other accounts--Colonel Alpirez and Lieutenant Colonel Soto Bilbao.

In late April 1996, DOD disseminated an intelligence reporting a belief that the sort of high-level meeting to decide Bamaca's fate alleged by the 'PREGUA" letter could have occurred. The report also recounted speculation that three likely candidates as the author of the letter were Colonel Alfredo Merida Gonzalez (a former D-2 chief known to have written anonymous letters before) and Colonel Alpirez and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Gillermo Oliva Carrera (both of whom had been mentioned in earlier accounts of the case but were completely absent from the PREGUA letter).
</text>
</b>

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19. guatemala/otr04/hmnrts_mu.htm

<text>
It has prospered in peace since, and is either a shining example of peaceful democratic struggle or an embarrassment, depending upon whom you ask...

The Guatemalan Army, controlled by the powerful, and a power unto itself (owning businesses, large tracts of land, communications, and banks - the "Bank of the Army" being one of the biggest in the country), insinuates itself into the daily life of most villages in this country. The army is blamed for disappearances through forced conscription (many boys are picked up at local soccer matches) or more surreptitiously through middle-of-the-night abductions. Those "desaparecidos" (disappeared) are either never seen again or are found tortured and killed. It is a widely understood truth that "there are no political prisoners in Guatemala" - this said as black humor by potential victims of the government. The army created civilian patrols and sent them after anyone deemed an "enemy of the people" or a communist. This list often includes church workers, health workers, community leaders, priests, and those who refuse to join or cooperate with the civilian patrol. For this reason hundreds of thousands fled into neighboring Mexico in the early 1980's, and approximately one million (out of six million) are "internal refugees" within their own country.</text>

<illustration>

<caption> It would be a moving experience for those who know a little Spanish to visit Santiago Atitlan some early December. Stand shoulder-to-shoulder with people who work hard to make community a reality, who daily undertake activities which could put their lives in jeopardy should the army return. The inspiration carries a long way, and it could change the way you look at your own community, and even your own life.</caption>

</illustration>
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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20. guatemala/spm05/fguatemala_mu.html
Guatemala Schools

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<ref>
Academia de Espanol Guatemala - Antigua, Guatemala

 <text>Maria Eugenia Dominguez 6a Ave. 0-69, Zona 1 Huehuetenango, Guatemala </text>

</ref> 

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<item>Spanish College Latinoamerica - Antigua , Guatemala Jose Sanchez Corado Calzado Santa Lucia Norte No. 33 Antigua , Guatemala

</item> 

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<item>Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala - Guatemala City, Guatemala Officina de Bienester Estud Ciudad Universitaria Guatemala City,