A taxi driver, the owner of a blue Ford LTD with license plate number BZ-0286, has been reported missing along with his vehicle.Charlotte Bernard, 29, chief cook of the Belize/Lebanese Restaurant at the corner of Central American Boulevard and Vernon Street, reported to Police that her common-law husband, Peter Novelo, 36, left home from about 6 p.m. Tuesday, December 16, and has not returned since. Bernard said she believes that Novelo, a taxi driver based at Belcan Taxi Stand, is the victim of foul play.
During the two years they have lived together at #274 Oleander Street, Novelo, said Bernard, has never gone for more than four hours during the night without informing her of his whereabouts, either directly or through a messsage left at the taxi stand.
"Peter would never go and leave me for so long without me knowing where he is, so he must be dead or in serious trouble," said Bernard.
Charlotte Bernard said she has heard a report that the disappearance of her common-law husband is linked to Julian Bush's accomplice or accomplices who fled the scene after Bush was fatally shot. Anonymous telephone callers, she said, told her that Peter Novelo was last seen in his taxi in the company of two men at the Belcan Taxi Stand.
According to the anonymous callers, only Novelo's taxi was at the stand about 8:30 p.m. Tuesday, December 16, not long before Julian Bush was killed.
Bush and at least one known accomplice, whom Police have not yet identified, had attempted to rob Tang's Supermarket at #11 3rd Street. Bernard is speculating that her common-law husband's taxi was the vehicle the robbers planned to get away in.
According to one of Novelo's fellow taxi men, Novelo was seen in his taxi in the company of the men who allegedly attempted to rob Tang?s Supermarket on the same night the robbery attempt took place.
Peter Novelo is described as being of medium build, weighing 145 pounds, and being 5' 7" in height. On the night he disappeared, Novelo was wearing a pair of maroon colored pants with a jacket, also of the same colour. </text>
In August 1990, the station disseminated its first intelligence report on the murder from a source who reported that Colonel Garcia Catalan, the military zone commander, had ordered the surveillance of DeVine and that it was carried out by five enlisted men. The source added that the Ministry of Defense was engaged in a cover-up, including the destruction of a white Toyota pickup used to conduct the surveillance of DeVine. (By the time of this report, the embassy, because of Carl West's investigation, already strongly suspected that members of the army killed DeVine.)
Also in August 1990, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who reported that President Cerezo, under pressure from the US ambassador, had ordered a proper investigation by the Ministry of Defense. The source also stated that rumors that DeVine had been somehow involved with the guerrillas were apparently unfounded and perhaps part of the military cover-up.
In September 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report which suggested that DeVine may have been killed by soldiers from Military Zone 23. It had been rumored that DeVine had been providing support to the guerrillas, but this report speculated that the murder had not been officially ordered. By another account related in this report, the Ministry of Defense was blocking any investigation and had already executed the killers.
Later in September 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report suggesting that President Cerezo and the military high command intended to placate the U.S. embassy as much as possible on the DeVine case, but did not really expect to bring the case to any particular conclusion.
Another DOD report disseminated in September 1990 provided an account of the investigation being carried out by the new commander of Military Zone 23, Colonel Ortega.
In October 1990, the station learned from a source that five army suspects had been arrested, and that although they had not been ordered to kill DeVine, they had been ordered to surveil him in order to recover one or two missing Galil rifles believed to be in his possession. The source opined that the soldiers had gotten into an altercation with DeVine and went too far. The source repeated these findings to the station again in October. In that second cable the station also stated that it had been told that DeVine drank heavily and practiced his karate moves on troops from the Poptun base beating them senseless, though the station had not verified this.
In mid-October 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report claiming that several soldiers had been charged with DeVine's killing as a result of US embassy pressure, but that those charged were not believed to be guilty. The report said that the assistant G-2 of Military Zone 23, Second Captain Santos Bohr Avendano, had been in charge of the operation, and that another officer may also have been involved. It also reported that the motive for the killing remained unclear, but DeVine was said to have been involved in providing logistical support to the insurgents and possibly in arms smuggling. This DOD report also referred to an anonymous phone call to the embassy that fingered Captain Bohr as the officer on the scene.
In December 1990, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who stated that he believed that Captain Bohr Avendano and all but perhaps one of the arrested soldiers were innocent, and that those who had killed DeVine had not acted under official orders. (All but one of the soldiers in fact appear to have been innocent, and in February 1991 they identified the soldiers who were eventually convicted.) The source also reported that the Minister of Defense, against the advice of the Army Chief of Staff, was an obstacle to pursuing a proper investigation. (This intelligence contributed to the US ambassador's recommendation that almost all military aid to Guatemala be suspended; the suspension was implemented almost immediately.)
In late December 1990, DOD disseminated an intelligence report saying that DeVine had reportedly tried illegally to buy two army rifles for 1,000 quetzales. Soldiers from the military zone G-2 section reportedly were attempting to bring him in for questioning when he punched one of them in the face; the soldiers then knocked DeVine to the ground and killed him. By this account, the zone commander had not ordered a murder, but certainly knew about the events. The report said the army recovered the two rifles but did not say from whom. It also recounted the rumor that DeVine's killers had been executed by the army, but that the other soldiers who had been charged for the crime might be convicted anyway.
In early January 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report recounting that at the time he was killed, DeVine was being investigated for providing medical supplies and food to the guerrillas. The report stated that the zone commander knew of the investigation--and became part of the cover-up--but that he had not intended that DeVine be killed.
In April 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report with a source's information that the soldiers had killed DeVine while interrogating him about a missing Galil rifle. The military zone had heard that the rifle had been sold by a deserter to DeVine, and the D-2 had instructed the military zone commander, Colonel Garcia Catalan, to recover it. One of Colonel Garcia's subordinates, Captain Contreras, had sent a group of four sergeants and eight soldiers on the mission. When DeVine either did not know anything or refused to talk, one of the sergeants killed him with a machete. Contreras was now being criticized for having failed to supervise the enlisted men. Many officers reportedly believed that Contreras, who was known for his temper and abuse of soldiers, probably frightened the soldiers into taking extreme actions out of a fear that they would be severely punished if the rifle were not recovered.
Also in April 1991, the station obtained a copy of a report relating to the De Vine case. It included a personality profile of DeVine, which was generally positive, but noted a sometimes aggressive manner and a readiness to denounce people involved in narcotics trafficking. It recounted various claims or rumors that provided possible motives for the killing: that DeVine was an army informant, that he had denounced drug traffickers, that he was a victim of guerrilla extortion, that he was killed by persons who wanted to acquire his property, that he had personal problems with two army deserters, and that it was revenge by someone DeVine had shot years before. The station noted that the report contained nothing that directly incriminated the army (whose involvement was by then well-established) and did not disseminate the information in the report as intelligence.
In May 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report recounting that a source stated that President Serrano apparently blamed the chief of the D-2 for blocking the investigation. The source stated that the D-2 chief was indirectly responsible for DeVine's death since he had ordered that a missing rifle be recovered--and directly responsible for the subsequent cover-up--but that there was no evidence that he had intended harm to DeVine.
Also in May 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source stating that Captain Contreras and five sergeants had been arrested in the DeVine case. Contreras was identified as having issued the order to stage the operation, although he did not accompany the men, but the source was not certain if the order was to kill DeVine or to just "teach him a lesson." Colonel Garcia Catalan was reportedly not in Peten at the time and neither involved in nor aware of the operation. Contreras' immediate supervisor, Major Paiz, was also reportedly uninvolved. The source said that preliminary investigative findings indicated that Colonel Portillo Gomez had been aware that some operation was planned against DeVine, but it was not yet known if he was more deeply involved.
In late May 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report in which Colonel Portillo was described as being very concerned at being reported in the press as having been involved in the DeVine killing. He reportedly maintains that he was not in the area at the time and that he is being framed.
In early June 1991, DOD disseminated an intelligence report with a claim that Colonel Portillo was being used as a scapegoat for the DeVine murder and that it may have been Colonel Garcia Catalan who was actually involved.
In June 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from multiple sources that the Minister of Defense was attacking the D-2 for doing more work for US intelligence agencies than for the Guatemalan defense ministry. The minister was reportedly likely to replace the chief of the D-2 for this, and because he believed the D-2 had informed the US government that Guatemalan soldiers had killed DeVine.
In July 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who stated that Colonel Portillo, who had been alleged to have been in temporary command of Military Zone 23 at the time of the murder, had not in fact been in command of this area. The source also said that it was apparently common knowledge that there was some kind of personal or business relationship between Colonel Garcia Catalan and DeVine.
In August 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report that a source believed the killing was the result of the enlisted soldiers carrying out their mission in an inappropriately hostile manner and that there was no evidence that DeVine was involved in any significant illegal activity other than occasionally smoking marijuana. The source stated that Colonel Portillo knew nothing until after the killing. The source stated that senior army officers were covering up army involvement because they felt that if they admitted involvement, the US government would react angrily, which would hurt the army's image, provide propaganda to the insurgents, and jeopardize military aid. According to the source, the case had become so charged with nationalism that the army could not see a way to back away from its actions without an enormous loss of prestige.
In October 1991, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source stating that Colonel Alpirez, who commanded the Kaibil training base near DeVine's farm, had been present when DeVine died during interrogation conducted by Captain Contreras at the base. Colonel Garcia Catalan had reportedly ordered Contreras to recover a missing rifle. The report also indicated that Alpirez was an extremely violent man and had exhibited bizarre behavior. (The CIA passed the information to the Department of Justice to determine if the crime fell under US jurisdiction. The handling of that crimes report by the CIA and DOJ was described earlier in this report.)
In December 1991, the station disseminated two intelligence reports from sources stating that President Serrano had relieved Minister of Defense Mendoza at least in part for his obstruction of the investigation in the DeVine case (as well as the Ortiz case). The new Minister of Defense, Garcia Samayoa, had promised to immediately advance the DeVine investigation.
In April l992, the station learned from a source a view that the military should allow some of the military officials implicated in "less significant" human rights cases to be prosecuted in order to end the army's reputation for covering-up to protect its own. The DeVine case was reportedly cited as an example of a "less significant" case. This information was not disseminated beyond the CIA.
In early May 1993, DOD disseminated a report recounting that Colonel Garcia Catalan may have given "the order" in the DeVine case. (It was not clear, however, what "the order" actually meant.)
In late May 1993, the station reported that a source claimed that Contreras had been heard to say that he had picked up DeVine, had informed the armed forces general staff "through channels" that he had DeVine in custody, and asked for instructions. Contreras had then reportedly been instructed to "do whatever it takes to resolve the situation." The source explained that "the situation" meant recovering the missing rifle, and that "through channels" meant that he had advised the general staff of DeVine's apprehension and had received this response through D-2 channels. The source believed that the order must have come from the general staff.
In late May 1993, DOD disseminated a report claiming that Contreras had been sighted in north central Honduras.
In February 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report indicating that Contreras may have been hiding in Venezuela. A March 1995 report from the DOD corroborated this. In April l995, the DOD disseminated a report of rumors that Contreras had returned to Guatemala from Venezuela and that the D-2 had put out an order for his death.
In April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report in which it was suggested that Lieutenant Colonel Felipe Alfonso Ochoa Montero, the assistant director of the D-2 under Colonel Ortega (who was abroad at the time), may have ordered Contreras to kill DeVine. The report also related that Colonels Garcia Catalan, Portillo, and Alpirez were reportedly not aware of the order (though all three had participated in the cover-up). The DOD report also said that Ochoa was reported to have since died of cancer. (This report appears to be of dubious credibility in that in June 1990 neither Ortega nor Ochoa was in the D-2, and Ochoa was not in Contreras' chain of command.)
In April 1995, DOD disseminated an intelligence report that included the allegation that Colonel Garcia Catalan had sent Captain Contreras and two or three soldiers to investigate reports that DeVine was involved in arms and narcotics trafficking. According to the report, DeVine was murdered by one of the soldiers who wanted to rob him during the interrogation.
In early May 1995, DOD disseminated a report which said that Alpirez had an audio tape that proves that he had no prior knowledge of the DeVine murder, that he had been ordered to participate in the cover-up, and that former ministers of defense had been involved in the cover-up. The report recounted one individual's belief that Colonel Cabrera, chief of D-2 at the time, had ordered the interrogation of DeVine. Knowledge of the existence of Alpirez' tape was reportedly becoming increasingly widespread, and Alpirez had been heard to say that it would be made public should anything happen to him.
In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who stated that he believed that the Ministry of Defense was using Colonels Alpirez and Garcia Catalan as scapegoats to protect more senior retired officers. The source did not believe Alpirez knew about the killing until after the fact and felt Alpirez had participated in the cover-up only on orders. The source also recounted that Contreras had reportedly claimed not to have killed DeVine, but said that an enlisted soldier had done so.
In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source recounting that the Guatemalan government would probably postpone investigation of the cover-up of the DeVine murder at least until after the conclusion of a peace accord with the insurgents, since some 20 military officials were suspected to have been involved and an investigation would cause chaos in the military.
In May 1995, the station disseminated an intelligence report from a source who said that he had heard that Alpirez had nothing to do with the murder of DeVine and that he had refused to allow the interrogation team onto his base. According to the source, the team then went to a local drinking establishment and Alpirez had no prior knowledge of their intent to apprehend and interrogate DeVine. The source had also heard that Alpirez was unhappy about DeVine s death because he had known Mrs. DeVine from visits to the DeVine restaurant. The source speculated that Alpirez would not have been in the military zone chain of command at the time of DeVine's death.
In June 1995, the station reported to its headquarters that a source said that the army seemed to have proof that Alpirez was not involved in the death of DeVine--for example, that he was not in charge of the soldiers who killed DeVine. The source said that Alpirez could lose his life if he disclosed what he knows.
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